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Research Paper no. 4/99

**The United States, Euratom and
European Integration 1955-1957**

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Research Papers from the Department of Social Sciences, Roskilde University, Denmark.

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ISSN1399-1396

Abstract

The article treats the negotiations about Euratom and the Common Market which ended with the Rome Treaty. A short general overview of the negotiations is presented and a more detailed account of the crucial decisions during the first half of 1956 is given. The main aim is to assess the role of the United States and the significance of an agreement on Euratom within the larger context. The United States is seen as a main player in the integration game (together with France and the Federal Republic of Germany, Britain being largely marginalized). It is concluded that an agreement between the three countries on a certain construction of Euratom was probably a precondition for successfully concluding the negotiations about the more important Common Market project. The outcome of the Euratom negotiations was a compromise between US, French and German standpoints on a number of issues in which the military and civil aspects of atomic energy were closely intertwined. This compromise was only partially implemented later. In the long run, Euratom turned out to be not so much a project of sectoral European integration as an arrangement for safeguarding the status of the Federal Republic as a non-nuclear weapon state.

Keywords: 1. Europe – Foreign relations – United States 2. United States – Foreign relations – Europe 3. Europe – integration – history 4. Euratom – European Economic Community – history.

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This paper was first presented to the third Pan-European International Relations Conference in Vienna. Minor corrections have been made in the present version. Any comments are Welcome.

1. Introduction

This paper will discuss the role of the United States in what may be seen as the most important period of construction of the present European Union, the years from 1955 to 1957. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) had been organized earlier but it has for long been evident that the Common Market (the European Economic Community, EEC) was the central point of departure for further developments. During the period 1955-1957 not only was the Common Market negotiated, but also the third six-state integration project, the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The negotiations between France, (West-) Germany, Italy and the Benelux states on the Common Market and Euratom were conducted in parallel and agreement on one project was to some extent conditional on agreement on the other. France was the main force pushing for a certain model of Euratom, while Germany with varying support from the other four were primarily interested in the Common Market.

The US did not participate directly in the negotiations in Europe but watched them attentively and intervened in various ways, occasionally very directly. Numerous views and pressures were exchanged at the diplomatic level, and at bilateral meetings between chiefs of government and foreign ministers in the US, the Six and Britain. The US sent signals through public statements and by making offers of nuclear assistance and resources. Below the governmental level US industry made alliances, e.g. with German industry, in order to influence nuclear policy. A few important personalities acted as brokers or coordinators in the process, notably the "inspirator" Jean Monnet and the Belgian foreign minister Paul-Henri Spaak. In sum, the US should be regarded as one of the main actors in the integration game and no less important than the European protagonists, France, Germany and Britain. The outcome of the issues at stake may be seen as a deal between, primarily, France, Germany and the US. Italy and Benelux played secondary and supporting roles, receiving "side-payments", and Britain was largely marginalized. The initial positions and preferred policies of the three main actors emerged as a result of their internal interest pattern.¹

US policy concentrated on Euratom and on promoting a certain model for that community. The Common Market was discussed internally now and then, more at the level of officials and economic experts than as a top political subject. There seems to have been little intervention on concrete issues during the first year. The Common Market was seen as having smaller chances of success and being of a more long-term character. In the US it was regarded as a possible threat to agreement on the more immediately important project, Euratom. Apart from this, the general attitude to the Common Market was positive, provided that there were

¹ This perspective of Great Power deals on the important issues with side-payments to the minor actors has been influenced by the type of intergovernmental approach that was used by Moravcsik (1991) when explaining the emergence of the Single European Act in the 1980's. Moravcsik did not include the US as a main actor, which seems natural in connection with his topic. In the fifties, however, the US had more influence in the European integration game and Euratom - being related to the global military situation - was another kind of project than the SEA. The target of Moravcsik's argument, the endeavour to explain the SEA as an outcome of a neofunctionalist process, is of course less relevant for explaining integration in the early construction period.

provisions against the emergence of a protectionist trading bloc which might hurt US interests.

The present paper will concentrate on US relations with France and Germany concerning the question of Euratom. I will attempt, however, to place this subject in rough outline within the total negotiation context. The questions asked will be these:

Did the US play a role for the emergence of the Euratom project? How did the US standpoints on Euratom and, in rough outline, the Common Market develop? How did the US try to influence the negotiations on the projects, Euratom in particular? Did the result concerning Euratom coincide with US standpoints - the "negotiation bid" to France and Germany - and to what an extent did US policy contribute to the result? How far were the goals for the policy toward Euratom attained?²

The paper is arranged in the following way. First, the origins of the *relance européenne* with particular reference to Euratom, the French interest in it, and the US role, is discussed. The following negotiation process in Europe is divided into two phases. First, the the period from the Conference of Foreign Ministers in Messina at the beginning of June 1955 to the Conference of Foreign Ministers in Venice at the end of May 1956; this was the time of talks within the Brussels intergovernmental committee of experts during which the two integration projects were outlined in principle. In Venice the report of the committee, the "Spaak Report", was approved as the point of departure for formal negotiations. The second period is that of negotiations within the intergovernmental conference which went on until the approval of the treaties at the Conference of Heads of Government in Paris in February 1957. Developments during the two phases are presented in rough outline in sections 3 and 5, respectively. The account is based mainly on secondary sources. The core of the paper, in section 4, is a more detailed investigation, based mainly on primary sources, of the development of US standpoints on the important negotiation issues during the end of the first phase. The outcome was the US general input - although later supplemented or detailed on some points - before the start of formal negotiations. I call this the US "negotiation bid" to France and Germany.

²The primary sources used in the present paper are mainly those of the FRUS collection, many of which have also been used in earlier research, e.g. in Helmreich 1991. My intention in relation to the existing literature on European integration in this period is primarily to emphasize the role of the US as a player in the negotiations and to present some dimensions of US policy in a systematic way. The literature on Euratom is not prodigious. Without trying to make a long list a few works from the last decades may be mentioned. For US policy: Bossuat 1994, Helmreich 1991, Hewlett-Holl 1991, Schwarz 1992 Winand 1993. For French policy: Guillen 1985 and 1994. For German policy: Weilemann 1983, Fischer 1994. Histories of European integration, or historical chapters in books on the EU, often do not attribute much importance to Euratom, probably because of the later modest role of that Community.

2. Origins

Some points of departure concerning nuclear policy and integration policy for the US attitude to the two European integration projects in this period should be mentioned.

In December 1953 President Eisenhower had proposed his "Atoms-for-Peace" plan. This was a radical change in US nuclear policy. Earlier, the US had tried to keep the outflow of resources and information as small as possible. Now, the Soviet Union was invited to cooperate, and US assistance for development of the peaceful atom in the world was promised. The peaceful atom was propagated as the great promise for a bright future in industrial as well as developing countries. In 1955, the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was busy implementing Atoms-for-Peace by starting exchanges and negotiations with a number of countries, among them France and Germany, on bilateral agreements for cooperation on peaceful uses of atomic energy ("research bilaterals", or "research and power bilaterals"). Negotiations with the Soviet Union on what was to be the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under UN auspices had started. This was a potential instrument for the control of nuclear proliferation even if it would not get any practical role until more than a decade later. A competitor for introducing nuclear power in Europe was Britain. Britain was advanced in this field and planned to export its reactor concept. While promoting the peaceful atom, the US also nuclearized Europe militarily in these years. Nuclear weapons were almost "conventionalized". Large numbers of so-called tactical nuclear weapons were deployed in Europe with a US veto on their use.

The US had been the initiator or co-initiator and midwife for all efforts at European cooperation and integration since the war. This was most of all for reasons related to the containment policy and the need for prevention of new conflicts between the European Great Powers. In particular, the US supported the projects with supranational features, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Defence Community (EDC). The core of these projects were Franco-German conciliation based on the principle of *égalité*. The US intervened forcefully in the negotiations on the EDC in order to ensure French ratification. The British were passive but hoped that the EDC would fail; they feared that the result in the long run would be a Europe dominated by Germany. In 1954, the US secretary of state John Foster Dulles threatened in an often-cited dictum an "agonizing reappraisal" of the US strategy for Western Europe if France did not ratify the treaty. The US pressure was so strong that it could be characterized as "blackmail and sometimes bribery".³ It proved to be counterproductive, as the French parliament declined the project in August 1954. The nuclear dimension of the EDC project was one of the factors explaining the defeat. Influential circles in France interpreted the intricate treaty complex as closing the nuclear weapons option for France.⁴

The rescue operation led by Britain ended up with the Western European Union (WEU) as a framework for controlling German rearmament, membership of NATO and transition to sovereignty. The US also supported this model.

³Macmillan 1969, p. 477

⁴Debré, pp. 161-256

Concerning weapons of mass destruction the restrictions were embodied in a unilateral declaration by chancellor Konrad Adenauer not to manufacture in the territory of the Federal Republic any atomic, chemical or biological weapons. The declaration was further qualified by referring to the *rebus sic stantibus* clause in international law, and it was also limited by the fact that the WEU treaty was valid until 1998. The restrictions on Germany with respect to the military atom thus were not comprehensive and did not seem to imply rock-solid guarantees. Altogether, the WEU should be regarded not so much as the last link in the European integration process until then but rather as a loose structure for keeping German rearmament within limits and controlling the observation of these limits. The organization had no supranational features and it was not based on *égalité*. For some time, however, it looked as if it might become the framework for a seven-state (including Britain) intergovernmental development.⁵ In any case, the proponents of European integration had to wait for the final approval of the Paris Agreements about the WEU before presenting new projects to the nations. All agreed that the EDC failure should not be repeated. The French ratification which sealed the WEU took place on March 28, 1955.

While the WEU process was going on the integrationists reflected on possibilities for a *relance européenne* that might stand a chance. The circle around Monnet, at this time chairman of the ECSC, concentrated on sectoral/functional integration, primarily the spread from coal and steel to other sectors of the economy. In December 1954 the Assembly of the ECSC demanded an extension of the competences of the ECSC to sectors affecting competition in the field of coal and steel: transport, gas, electricity, the atom. In February 1955 Monnet favoured the idea of expanding the ECSC with transport and classic sources of energy and of founding a new community for atomic energy. He did not want some kind of nuclear EDC, i.e. a scheme which included the military atom; the US nuclear umbrella was sufficient. The new community should be exclusively peaceful and based on *égalité*. The chances for acceptance would be good because the atom gave enormous promises for the future and there were no vested interests in the field. Spaak, who was in close contact with Monnet, favoured the concept and proposed it, as soon as the WEU had been ratified, to Germany, France and Italy. The reactions were reticent or ambiguous. In particular, the Germans were not as enthusiastic as expected; they referred i.a. to their interest in nuclear cooperation with Britain. At this time, Spaak received a memorandum from Dutch foreign minister Beyen, opposing the sectorial method for integration and proposing a customs union as a step to the ultimate goal, an economic union. This seemed so ambitious to Monnet and Spaak as to endanger the *relance* but they eventually decided to combine their concept with the Dutch view. The combination was expressed in the so-called Benelux memorandum which was distributed to the Six. It proposed a conference for preparing treaties on sectorial as well as general integration.⁶

French policy-makers became interested in nuclear integration during the spring of 1955. The background was this. France had a nuclear program that was about ten times smaller than the British one and just about a hundredth of the immense US effort. During the forties she had obtained almost no nuclear cooperation with the Anglo-Saxons as a result of joint US-British-Canadian policy to keep other

⁵Gerbet 1989, pp. 61-64

⁶Gerbet 1989, s. 65-91

countries out of the area as far as possible.⁷ However, in the first half of the fifties there had been secret bilateral US-French negotiations and an agreement about joint exploitation of uranium in French Morocco. A superior principle of the French program had always been to keep the nuclear weapon option open. The raw material problem had been complex - the US and Britain jointly controlled most of the world's uranium outside the Eastern bloc. Most of the actual production and supply had come from the Belgian Congo and gone to the US and Britain as a result of secret agreements between these two countries and Belgium. Substantial deposits had been found in France, however. These were the only important sources in Western Europe (together with those in Sweden). The assured supply was not so plentiful, though, that France could feel certain of independence in the long run if a large civil and military program were launched. The actual program was based on natural uranium reactors producing plutonium.⁸ It became increasingly clear to the French that it was very desirable from both a military and civil point of view to command the complex and expensive technology of enriching uranium. Enormous enrichment plants existed in the US but the technology remained highly classified and was not affected by the revision of the atomic energy law and the disclosures at Geneva.⁹

Before engaging in a continental integration scheme the French had explored the possibility of developing nuclear cooperation with Britain. At the end of 1954 the Commissariat à l'énergie atomique (CEA) asked for British technology for constructing an enrichment plant. The British were very interested; the *quid pro quo* would be the sale of reactors to France. In February 1955, the British had to tell the French, however, that a deal was not possible because the Americans had opposed it with reference to Anglo-American agreements¹⁰ (which regulated diffusion of nuclear information and resources to third parties). In this period the first decisions to prepare for the military atom in a more definite way were taken in France. At the end of 1954 the government opened up for secret studies on a nuclear weapon and a submarine and in May 1955 secret funds for the purpose were allocated.¹¹ The French military and bureaucracy were split on the issue. Because of the divergencies a somewhat unclear line on the nuclear arms question and the role of

⁷Skogmar 1993

⁸Plutonium is used as explosive in A-bombs but has drawbacks as a trigger in H-bombs. It was judged by many at the time to become useful for enriching uranium fuel for power reactors and for bringing down the dimensions of military or civil propulsion reactors for u-boats and other ships. It was seen also as the fuel for the next generation of reactors, the breeder. These uses later proved to be problematical for technical, economic and environmental reasons

⁹Enrichment means increasing the proportion of the isotope U-235 in uranium. High-enriched uranium is the alternative to plutonium in A-bombs and much preferable at the H-bomb level. Low-enriched uranium has the same application in principle for power and propulsion reactors as plutonium-enriched fuel but has proven superior in practice. Less natural uranium is needed if enrichment is used. - The enormity of the US installations may be illustrated by a few figures. In 1956 they used about 21 % of the US industrial production of electricity and about 12 % of the entire production of electricity.

¹⁰Goldschmidt 1967, pp. 225-227. Goldschmidt - the author of several books on French and international nuclear history and a former director of international affairs at the CEA - was present when the negative answer came. His interpretation is that the US for the first time had showed their opposition to French nuclear weapons (p. 227). - The US control of enrichment technology should however be seen in a broader context.

¹¹Goldschmidt 1980, pp.146-147

European integration in this connection was outlined by the *Comité de Défense nationale* on in March 1955. The green light was given for some national military nuclear activities but not others, and the idea of a European nuclear force was dismissed. On the other hand, recognizing that it was impossible for France to realize alone a complete military and civil programme it charged the foreign minister to establish the necessary contacts in order to create a European organ for atomic energy.¹² In this mission was embodied a main French theme in the coming negotiations on Euratom: to seek assistance for its national military and civil programme but not to accept integration with Germany based on *égalité*. In the following weeks, the CEA who had modified its earlier negative attitude to six-state nuclear cooperation lobbied forcefully for it.¹³

The Occupation Statute had forbidden Germany from having any significant nuclear activity. The Paris Agreements changed this. Germany thus had to bridge a ten-year gap if she wished to build a nuclear infrastructure. She had no uranium resources on her territory. Cooperation with one or more other powers - primarily the US or Britain, possibly France - was required.

The possibility for continuing European cooperation was one of the main subjects when foreign minister Pinay met chancellor Adenauer in Bonn on April 29 and 30 1955, a month before the Messina conference. The two politicians agreed that there were such possibilities regarding certain sectors, namely aeronautics and transport, and, in particular, the development of peaceful atomic energy.¹⁴ During the talks Pinay proposed the construction of an enrichment plant on a bilateral basis, but Adenauer's reaction was evasive. His general attitude to nuclear cooperation with France was positive, however. He had decided to agree to the French offer of cooperation without consulting the nuclear scientists and industry; there were some protests from them after the event. Fischer interprets this way of acting as a consequence of Adenauer's conviction that the nuclear field was crucial in Franco-German relations and in western European cooperation; he wanted no interference in his judgment of what was politically desirable in the long run.¹⁵ Adenauer was well aware that France had already started concrete preparations for a military nuclear programme.¹⁶ I have found no indication that Adenauer's early decision to support Franco-German cooperation and European nuclear integration had been taken after informing or consulting his main ally, the US.

This leads us to the question of the role of the US at this initial stage. Was US policy significant in bringing forth the initiative of six-state supranational integration in the nuclear field? Indirectly, certainly, as the nuclearization policy, with its civil and military branches, made the nuclear field seem economically and strategically crucial. It appeared as if Europe had to catch up with the American advance of 10-15 years in the technology of the future. The American offer of assistance in this task met a responsive chord by European energy planners. Europe

¹²Guillen 1985, p. 397; Guillaumat (former chief of the CEA) in *L'aventure de la bombe* 1985, p. 611

¹³Guillen 1985, p. 397. - A memorandum by Goldschmidt, dated March 24, at this late date still argued for a purely national, non-European solution ("La France et la collaboration européenne dans le domaine atomique" *MAE Europe 1949-55, Energie atomique*, Vol. 4)

¹⁴Communiqué, Bonn, 30 avril 1955, *DDF*

¹⁵Fischer 1994, p. 211

¹⁶*Ibid* pp. 209-212

had no known oil deposits and energy was twice as expensive as in the US. For several European countries, France in particular, the atom promised to be the possibility of overcoming an historic dependence on the import of coal and oil which was also largely under the control of other powers. The direct origins of the Euratom idea are more difficult to trace. According to Weilemann (referring to an interview made by the Danish researcher Erling Bjøl) it was the American diplomat in Paris Max Eisenberg who inspired the Monnet circle. According to Fischer who interviewed Monnet's close collaborators it was rather the charismatic figure of Louis Armand who was the source of inspiration. Armand, director of industrial applications at the French CEA, was in the spring of 1955 working on a report for the OEEC on European cooperation on energy.¹⁷ Guillen's view is that official France in any case did not initiate the project, even if there was an interest in some military circles in promoting nuclear cooperation with Germany.¹⁸ Leading figures like Monnet, Spaak and Armand may, of course, have been inspired by talks with US politicians or officials. There is nothing in the sources in the FRUS collection, however, which indicates a high-level US effort to promote the idea of six-state supranational integration in the nuclear field until after Messina. The State Department appears to have reacted to information about ongoing developments and then to have formed its opinion. The Americans were informed, of course, and subject to lobbying by the integrationists. E.g., Monnet talked to the assistant secretary of state, Livingstone Merchant, about his actual sectoral plan involving a separate organizational framework for the integration of transportation and atomic energy. He advised that this information should not be disseminated to US embassies, as any US involvement might have unfavourable effects.¹⁹ Monnet was obviously thinking of the reactions to the heavy US pressure in the EDC affair. A week later, vice president Coppe of the ECSC discussed European integration with groups of officials from several US departments. Coppe sketched the preference of the Benelux countries for a six-country customs union and the French preparedness to accept further sectoral integration. He argued for expanding the ECSC to new sectors and emphasized that the inclusion of atomic energy would have a profound effect in promoting integration. The reaction of the officials was noncommittal. Coppe was advised that it would be a considerable time before atomic power could be produced economically and that there might be some danger of building up hopes of immediate benefits.²⁰

In Messina the sectoral/functional and general economic lines of thought on integration were brought together and presented as two parallel roads to the future. The French pushed cooperation on atomic energy, Germany and the Benelux the idea of a Common Market. It was decided, first, to study the communication and energy sectors. Atomic energy was supposed to be crucial: "The development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes will in the near future open up the prospect of a new industrial revolution out of all proportion to that which has taken place over the last hundred years." A common organisation in this field with a number of tasks, among them the financing of installations and free and sufficient access to raw materials, should be studied. Second, it was recognized that a European market, achieved in stages, was the objective in the field of economic policy. A

¹⁷Weilemann 1983, p. 25; Fischer 1994, p. 203 n.55

¹⁸Guillen 1994, pp. 111-113

¹⁹Merchant-Dulles April 12, 1955, *FRUS* 1955-1957, Vol. IV, s. 279

²⁰Two State memos, April 20 1955, *ibid.*, s. 283-289

number of harmonization measures and compensatory mechanisms related to the latter were outlined.²¹

3. The first half of the game: From Messina to Venice

During the summer and autumn of 1955 the French accepted to give the Common Market project a higher priority. This was a change compared to the earlier tendency to approve nuclear cooperation only. In October, France made some concessions on the Common Market in a memorandum to the other governments but added a substantial list of qualifications. In further negotiations France sought to make progress dependent on acceptance of some of these, e.g. the harmonization of social charges.²² The majority of French opinion was still very sceptical about the possibilities for the French economy to withstand the strains of a customs union. France argued for agreeing on Euratom first, and the Common Market later - i.e., a linkage between the two projects was declined. Both supporters and adversaries of French nuclear weapons supported Euratom but had different models for it and different reasons. The nuclear weapon lobby in the technocratic and gaullist elite wanted to use German and other European resources to construct a military and civil programme based on French technology and with preserved French freedom of action. Above all, they needed an enrichment plant which was considered to be outside the scope of French possibilities. The adversaries envisaged a purely peaceful Euratom and integration with Germany based on *égalité*.

The message which the US sent to Europe in the first half-year after Messina contained ambiguities. A number of questions had to be settled internally first. The first was whether the US should promote nuclear and general economic cooperation within a looser OEEC or WEU framework or the more supranational six-state effort. Rather early, however, it was made clear to the Europeans that the US had opted for the latter²³. Already from the start US foreign policy-makers thought that they should, as far as possible, stay in the background and try to influence the outcome of the negotiations cautiously or by indirect means. The lesson from the EDC failure had been learnt. Dulles now and then repeated the need for proceeding discreetly.²⁴ US policy-makers were also advised by Spaak, Monnet and other integrationists to stay in the background particularly regarding the sensitive question of the right of France to manufacture nuclear weapons.²⁵

Britain participated in a rather reticent role in the talks in Brussels but decided to withdraw from them in November. The British hoped that a traditional intergovernmental model within the OEEC framework would ultimately win in both the field of general economic and nuclear cooperation. It was observed within the high-level Official Committee on Atomic Energy that cooperation on atomic

²¹Resolution..., 2 June 1955, *Documents on International Affairs 1955*, London 1958.

²²Stirk 1996, p. 139-140

²³See below, p. 18

²⁴See e.g. Dulles-embassy Bonn, *FRUS 1955-1957*, Vol. IV, 1 July 1955, p. 308

²⁵Cf. e.g. Burnett-Merchant, *ibid.*, 19 August 1955, p. 326; Dillon-State, *ibid.*, 4 February 1956, p. 403, n. 3.

energy loomed the largest in view of most European countries, mainly because of the importance attached to keeping some sort of military control over Germany. A main British interest in European nuclear cooperation was also to prevent the diversion of fissile material for military purposes, e.g. by helping construct common enrichment or reprocessing plants. The Committee recommended: "We should not join Euratom, though we should avoid giving the impression that our objective was to prevent its emergence if the Messina powers decided in favour of it".²⁶ During the first months of 1956 the British became slightly more positive to cooperation with Euratom, while still favouring the OEEC approach. Their attitude in the matter was described by an American as "friendly acquiescence".²⁷

The first draft on the atomic energy project was elaborated in a subcommittee under the direction of Armand. It sketched an organization with far-going supranational traits regarding research and big installations. It would have a supply agency with monopolistic rights on nuclear materials. The question of military uses of atomic energy and the intricate civil-military relationships was by-passed in silence in order not to disturb opinion in the prospective member states. Germany, however, refused to vote for the report.²⁸ German opinion was very split on Euratom. The opposition to the line which Adenauer had laid in Messina had been growing. German industry and its figure-head, the minister for the economy Ludwig Erhard, was strongly against the idea which was regarded as a French attempt of binding Germany to French *dirigiste* and socialist principles and to put her under French influence. Germany had had its *Wirtschaftswunder* relying on the market mechanism. It was also believed that cooperation with the US and Britain was necessary if the ten-year gap in nuclear development were to be bridged, French nuclear technology was insignificant in comparison. Industry also opposed the customs union in which Britain would not participate and which might make access to this important market for German industry difficult. A related opinion was the general conservative and nationalist one, represented by the minister for atomic energy, Franz-Josef Strauss. Strauss tried to organize an effective anti-Euratom front in Germany. He also wanted general economic liberalism and German-US-British nuclear cooperation.²⁹ However, as he admitted in private, his motive was to a large extent political, to keep the nuclear weapon option open for Germany. The liberal nuclear model which he favoured was, in addition to its economic advantages, more adapted to this purpose. The weapon option was certainly also a dimension of the thinking in industrial circles, both for political reasons and because of the economic benefits of having a civil and a state-financed military branch supporting each other. The opposition party, the social-democrats, however wanted to close the option - particularly on a national basis - for both Germany and France. They favoured a model for Euratom which was intended to

²⁶A.E. (O)(55), 15 November 1955, PRO AB6/1654

²⁷Dillon-State, 15 February 1956, NARA FSPO-O, Box 67

²⁸Spaak, when being informed by the British Lord President, that Britain could not be part of Euratom, "expressed the view that this [the reasons for the German reticence] reflected the growth of nationalism within Germany". A.E. (O)(55)130, 21 November, 1955, PRO AB 6/1654

²⁹Strauss said, when in Washington: "The German Government would like to combine the two approaches, i.e. have EURATOM as part of the OEEC approach. They would not like to have the British left out. Without them EURATOM would consist of five blinds and one half-blind (which he identified as France)." Memo of conversation, State, FRUS 1955-1957, Vol. IV, 14 May, 1956, p. 435

bring this about. It combined supranational features and a limitation of the purpose of the organization to peaceful uses only.³⁰

This was the model which Jean Monnet and his newly organized Action Committee for the United States of Europe tried to promote in the strategic period of the first half of 1956. The committee was composed of a number of influential personalities of various political strands from the six countries, among them notably the leaders of the social-democratic/socialist parties in Germany and France, and trade union leaders. Monnet's idea was that the EDC failure had showed that support for integration at the governmental level was not sufficient, a broad backing in parliaments was also necessary. The Action Committee dealt mainly with the Euratom project and not very much with the Common Market. A main aim was also to prevent nationally controlled nuclear weapons in both Germany and France. In Monnet's view the Common Market was a more complex and risky enterprise which could only be brought about gradually and after an agreement on Euratom. On January 18 the Action Committee adopted a resolution which demanded a supranational organization along ECSC lines which would have purchase monopoly and ownership of nuclear fuels and control the peaceful use. The purpose of the organization was to be exclusively peaceful. The significance of this was that the combination of supranationality and peaceful purpose would exclude the possibility of nationally controlled nuclear weapons. It was the first time that the military question was squarely addressed as an important public theme in what had been up till then a largely technical discussion about Euratom. The Committee demanded parliamentary debates on the project, and also succeeded in bringing about such debates during the spring and summer. The culmination point was the debate in the French parliament in July which however signified a defeat for Monnet's model for Euratom.³¹

There was a breakthrough in the negotiations in January-February 1956. Adenauer had decided not to let the negotiations fail. He imposed his will on his reticent ministers. He also made it clear to them that foreign, in particular American, pressure was mounting, and that it would be harmful to continue a negative line. At the preparatory conference of foreign ministers in Brussels in February Germany accepted to vote for the preparation of a recommendation on Euratom. At the same time the French foreign minister accepted a corresponding procedure for the Common Market. This meant green light for going forward with the two projects in principle. Certainly, Euratom was expected to be created within a few months while the establishment of the Common Market was a matter of many years. There was general agreement that the countries would not universally renounce the right to make atomic weapons, particularly in the case of France. Efforts would be made to work out some formula which would enable Euratom to approve manufacture of weapons itself or by one of its members in the event that a general ban on atomic weapons was not reached. The differences on the concrete issues within the two projects remained. The basis was however laid for the report of the intergovernmental committee, the Spaak Report.³²

³⁰Cf. Fischer 1994, pp. 274-282

³¹Cf. Gerbet 1983, pp. 205-207; Weilemann 1983, pp. 70-76

³²Alger (Brussels)-State, 13 February 1956, *NARA* FSPO-O, Box 67; Weilemann 1983, pp. 68, 76-80; Loth 1991, pp. 120-121; Stirk 1996, p. 141

In the Spaak Report, the proposed property and supply system was complex and reflected a number of fears on the French or German sides. Euratom would have a monopoly on buying and selling all fissile materials within the community and overseas territories. It would have the right to be first buyer and to act as distributor and supplier to the consumers. Thus, for the producers the monopoly meant an obligation to sell to Euratom, whereas they were obliged to buy materials exclusively from Euratom. There were a few exceptions related to existing bilateral agreements. A German proposal had been incorporated giving the consumers the right to buy fissile materials from outside the community if the agency was not in a position to meet their demands. This provision reflected the fact that only France and Belgium had known uranium deposits. Germany was anxious to be free to import scarce materials, e.g. from the US, in case she were mistreated in the allocation. Further, the French insistence on permanent ownership for Euratom on nuclear materials had not been accepted, but a lease system was outlined instead. The Germans saw ownership not only as French *dirigisme* but also as an attempt to control German nuclear activities, legitimate (safeguards) as well as less legitimate (industrial espionage etc.). The provisions of the supply system were in this way unavoidably intertwined with those of the safeguards system. The Germans, on the other side, argued that if the safeguards were to be completely effective Euratom should have the right to inspect both military and civil plants. They feared that the French would exploit Euratom as a means for peering into German nuclear technology while at the same time keeping French knowledge under a "military" flag. The complexities and logical problems in the property, supply and safeguards system were, to a large extent, a consequence of the French determination to keep the nuclear weapons option open, while Germany was not allowed to do so. It should be added that there were no commitments to the French wish for financing common projects in the report. The common projects were to play a subordinate role and to be financed as grants to public and private projects through the general investment fund of the Common Market. Thus, there remained only a reduced hope of common financing of the French favourite project, the common enrichment plant.³³

It proved impossible to include something about the military question in the Spaak Report. The delegates decided immediately before publication to take out suggestions on the subject. Spaak decided, having been attacked harshly by French nationalists in a press campaign, to propose a compromise ("the Spaak Compromise"). After the publication of the report he proposed a moratorium on the manufacture of strategic nuclear weapons for mass destruction for a predetermined period. No bomb test would be allowed for five years; after that Euratom would decide by a vote if the member states would recupereate the right of manufacturing weapons.³⁴

At the conference of the foreign ministers in Venice on May 29-30 it was decided to approve the Spaak Report as the basis for negotiating at an intergovernmental conference with a view to drafting two treaties, one on a Common Market and one on Euratom. Thus a definite linkage between the two projects was now established, even if the French had not accepted the same time perspective for both. In addition to her earlier reservations on various issues concerning the Common Market France gained acceptance for a new element, a study of the

³³ Cf. Brusse 1990, pp. 216, 218; Loth 1991, pp. 120-121

³⁴ Spaak 1969, p. 91; Scheinman 1965, pp. 155-165

problem of inclusion of non-European territories in the market. The military question was postponed. The Germans demanded that any military application should be subject to the same inspection provisions as the peaceful ones and the French proposed that the Spaak Compromise would serve as the point of departure for further discussions.³⁵

4. The US negotiation bid

Apart from the general preference for the six-state approach against OEEC or WEU it was during the months between November 1955 and May 1956 that US policy on Euratom and the Common Market was elaborated and established in rough outline. At a meeting with the National Security Council on 21 November President Eisenhower gave general direction and impetus to the process. He talked in solemn terms of the importance of European integration for ultimately ending the Cold War:

“The unity of Western Europe today, continued the President, would solve the peace of the world. A solid power mass in Western Europe would ultimately attract to it all the Soviet satellites, and the threat to peace would disappear...with even greater emphasis the President repeated his view on the desirability of developing in Western Europe a third great power bloc, after which development the United States would be permitted to sit back and relax somewhat. To help to produce such a development it must be demonstrated to all the countries of Western Europe individually that each and every one would profit by the union of them all and that none would lose. The President cited the development of the American historical pattern as an illustration of the point he was making.”³⁶

Referring to this general position Dulles sent a memorandum to Eisenhower asking for approval of certain principles and for permission for the State Department and the AEC to study possible moves toward Europe on an urgent basis. Dulles wrote that only the Community of Six offered promise of opening the way to a genuine United States of Europe. The other institutions contributed to European cooperation but not to supranationality. The ECSC was a proven and successful institution. Now there was great promise to expand into the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy (the Common Market was not mentioned). This might fail, however, without concrete US support. The US should stimulate the six to come to a conclusion which offered real promise for integration. The central part of the memorandum was a reference to the better prospects of controlling proliferation of nuclear weapons, and to the German question:

“If the six countries set up an integrated institution possessing central and inspection authority in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy, control over military uses of atomic energy by these six countries would be simplified, and there would be set a precedent for similar regional arrangements elsewhere.

³⁵ *Projet de procès-verbal...*, DDF, pp. 917-930; *Communiqué...*, *Documents on International Affairs 1956*

³⁶ Editorial note, *FRUS 1955-1957*, Vol. IV, 21 November 1955, p. 349

Success would bring the incalculable political and psychological advantage of tying Germany more firmly into a Western European community. It would confer upon the Community great technical and economic advantages."³⁷

The study of possible moves toward Europe went on during the spring of 1956. The end-point of the process was a circular telegram to the US missions in the capitals of the Six and in London, and a memorandum on the position of the US Government, at the end of May. The two documents were not identical but coincided to a very great extent (and will be referred to as the May telegram/memorandum in the following). They treated Euratom and the question of linkage between Euratom and the Common Market. The May telegram/memorandum was a direct intervention at a strategic moment and represented an exception to the general rule of not officially exercising pressure on the negotiations in Europe. It appeared a month after the publication of the Spaak Report and less than a week before the Venice conference. Thus, it may be regarded as a central part of the US "negotiation bid" to the other main actors, France and Germany, at the moment when the integration talks entered the decisive stage.³⁸ Other parts of the bid were, e.g., the general attitudes that had been transmitted in the diplomatic process, and public offers of assistance in the nuclear field.³⁹

The US internal process behind the standpoints on the important negotiation issues will be outlined in the following. Each issue will be finished by the position taken in the May telegram/memorandum. The following are treated: (1) the choice of Euratom vs. OEEC or WEU as a framework for nuclear cooperation, (2) the question of a linkage between the Common Market and Euratom projects, (3) the question of a French nuclear weapon option, (4) the possible transfer of US enrichment technology, and transfer of rights to the Belgian uranium, (5) the possibility of cooperating bilaterally outside the framework of Euratom, and (6) the construction of the property and supply system, and safeguards. Finally, the goals of US policy toward European integration, with particular reference to Euratom, are discussed.

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³⁷ Dulles-Eisenhower, *ibid.*, 9 January, 1956, pp. 388-389. Eisenhower was "very much in accord" with these proposals (*ibid.*, p. 389)

³⁸ Spaak was reported to be pleased with this exposition of US policy with which he thoroughly agreed; it would be most helpful and strengthen his position in Venice, he said. Sprouse (Brussels)-Dulles, 25 May 1956, *NARA* FSPD-O, Box 67

³⁹ The memorandum is not included in the FRUS collection, only the circular telegram. The missions were asked to try to clear up any misunderstandings about US positions in the minds of foreign ministers and other prospective participants in Venice (Dulles-embassies Brussels, Paris, Bonn, Rome, Luxemburg, ECSC, London, *FRUS* 1955-1957, Vol. IV, 24 May, 1956, pp. 442-444). My source to the memorandum is a French version, "Principaux extraits du memorandum américain du 25 mai 1956 sur la position du Gouvernement des E.U. vis-à-vis de l'Euratom", supplied with the additional information: "Ce memorandum a été officiellement remis ou commenté aux six Ministères des Affaires Etrangères des pays de l'Euratom, ainsi qu'au Foreign Office Anglais, par les représentants américains dans ces pays, à la veille de la Conférence de Venise." *MAE*. See also Goldschmidt 1980, pp. 150-151, 308-310, in which parts of the French version are reprinted and commented upon. Helmreich 1991 mentions the circular telegram (p. 401) but not the memorandum.

Euratom vs. OEEC or WEU. The OEEC and WEU possibilities covered primarily the US relationship to Britain in the areas under discussion. Britain was the standard-bearer of the OEEC approach in both areas although she participated in the Brussels negotiations for some time. She opposed the Euratom idea and the Common Market even more. The State Department tended strongly to favour the six-state approach because of its supranationality, as it had done when facing similar choices earlier in the fifties. Very early, the Department stressed the need for supranationality. The WEU did not appear to offer promise of accelerating integration in this sense, nor did the OEEC, even if the OEEC would have continued value for cooperative arrangements.⁴⁰ In July 1955, Dulles, in spite of dissenting views from his atomic energy staff, authorized a positive attitude to the proposed European atomic pool. He agreed in principle that a pool modelled on the ECSC should be treated in the same way as a national state and that the President should be advised to make a public statement to this effect.⁴¹ In the autumn, he wrote that he was concerned at British efforts in Brussels to promote the OEEC as the principal concept. He believed that the strong US interest in European integration warranted that the US make its attitude known to the ECSC countries and to Britain.⁴² British support for the six-state effort was desirable, Dulles believed. He referred to the President's view that if Britain had given stronger support to the EDC at an earlier time it would have been a success; such a mistake ought not to be repeated. When informed by German foreign minister von Brentano, Monnet and Spaak that the British were working hard to block the development of the European idea in terms of atomic energy and a common market he felt that he would have to discuss seriously with Eden and Macmillan when they came to Washington.⁴³ US policy-makers, were aware, however, that there were limits to the possibility of inducing Britain to accept American views on atomic energy. The US should not lose sight of the fact that Britain was for the Europeans an alternative source of material and assistance, it was observed.⁴⁴

In the May telegram (with almost the same text in the memorandum) the US preference for Euratom was expressed clearly, and British policy to promote the OEEC as an alternative framework, and to propose a chemical separation plant for reprocessing plutonium as its core project, was denounced in rather strong terms:

“There are some indications that British, who favor OEEC approach, and some Germans and other Europeans as well, may endeavor to use OEEC work to undermine Euratom effort. Such British suggestions as OEEC chemical separation plant tend to reduce apparent technical advantages of Six-power approach and can be used by opponents of Euratom integration to argue Euratom not urgent. Also understand that full US cooperation OEEC work has been misinterpreted as indicating US ”preference” OEEC over Euratom. Such inference incorrect. US has cooperated OEEC work in capacity as Associate Member OEEC and because we believe OEEC has role to play as framework for broad cooperation in nuclear field among Atlantic nations. US of course does not participate Euratom discussions and does not wish diminish European leadership this field; however, movement for effective Euratom has full US support for vital political and security considerations...”

⁴⁰ Hoover-embassy Rome, *FRUS* 1955-1957, Vol. IV, 30 May 1955, p. 290

⁴¹ Merchant-Dulles, *ibid.*, 1 July 1955, pp. 304-307; Smith-Dulles, *ibid.*, 5 July 1955, p. 309

⁴² Dulles-embassy Paris, *ibid.*, 1 September 1955, pp. 328-329

⁴³ Dulles-State, *ibid.*, 17 December 1955, pp. 369-370.

⁴⁴ Memo conversation State-AEC, *ibid.*, 25 January 1956, p. 395 (Livingstone Merchant, assistant secretary of state)

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On the question of *linkage* between the Common Market and Euratom it was very clear that the State Department regarded the finalization of Euratom as the important matter in the short run. The Common Market project was certainly seen as contributing to US long-term goals for Europe, but also as a complex construct with uncertain prospects. The US did not at this time, as in the case of Euratom, take a position on details in the market negotiations even if it kept a vigilant eye on possible tendencies towards development of a protectionist bloc in Europe.⁴⁵ Strong demands for linkage between the projects were seen as endangering the chances of success for Euratom.

Monnet's view on the matter may have been influential. Monnet informed Dulles in December that the Monnet Committee was now seeking action on atomic energy along ECSC lines. Those favouring integration recognized, he said, that it would take years, perhaps ten years, to achieve the Common Market. This was, among other things, due to British opposition; the main British target had been the Common Market.⁴⁶

In February 1956 the US ambassador to France, Dillon, wrote that he was convinced that the French would make no definite commitment toward the Common Market. Therefore the chances of Euratom were not good if Belgians and Germans tended to insist on any very definite progress toward the Common Market as the price for their support of Euratom.⁴⁷ Dillon further reported that the French foreign minister, Pineau, had said to him that the French Assembly at this time would accept no linkage. Pineau had expressed fears that some of those in other countries who were not keen about Euratom might attempt to use the Common Market as a means of killing Euratom. He had asked for the US position on linkage, and Dillon had explained it to him.⁴⁸

In March, the Italian ambassador told Dulles that Italy supported that the two projects should go on in parallel and that the Euratom could only be established with the support of the US. The Italian prime minister had talked to Adenauer on the matter of linkage and been very firm in his support, even to the point of suggesting that the five nations "go it alone", without France if necessary. Dulles said that if the French were convinced that the five might proceed without France, it might well influence them to go along.⁴⁹

German minister Franz-Josef Strauss, during a series of talks with US officials shortly before the Venice Conference, said that he did not insist on realization of the Common Market now as a condition for Euratom, but if there were no real step toward a Common Market in connection with Euratom, the market would never be accomplished. The opinion of Dulles was, on the other side, that if a

⁴⁵ For the view of the Common Market, see e.g. Memo conversation, State, *ibid.*, 21 December 1955, pp. 374-376

⁴⁶ Memo conversation, Dulles and Monnet, *ibid.*, 17 December, 1955, pp. 367-368

⁴⁷ Dillon-State, *ibid.*, 3 February, 1956, p. 402

⁴⁸ Dillon-State, *ibid.*, 7 February, 1956, p. 408

⁴⁹ Memo conversation Dulles and Martino, *ibid.*, 1 March, 1956, pp. 417-419

Common Market were made an absolute condition for unity in atomic power development, Europe might end up with nothing.⁵⁰ It was emphasized to Strauss that there were political disadvantages to Germany if being tagged with the responsibility for the failure of Euratom either on insisting on a formal link with the Common Market or by otherwise attaching conditions which would frustrate the negotiations.⁵¹

The May telegram expressed the US standpoint in this way (the FYI passage was not included in the memorandum):

“Common Market Tie. Germans, in particular, and Dutch and Belgians to a lesser degree, assert Euratom by itself is insufficient step toward integration. Strauss, German Minister for Atomic Energy Matters, would even condition German ratification of Euratom on simultaneous ratification of the Common Market by Germany’s partners. US sympathetic desire Six countries establish Common Market though we have not concluded study Common Market report. However, we would certainly hope that approval of Treaty for Euratom, which of such immediate importance, would not be held up until complex and doubtless lengthy Common Market negotiations concluded. FYI. [For Your Information]. Additional reasons for US opposition to link is indication that chances for French ratification of Common Market are presently far more uncertain than for ratification of Euratom. End FYI.”

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The military question: French nuclear weapons? During the spring and summer of 1956 there was a violent debate on Euratom in France; the main current and undercurrent of the debate concerned whether Euratom would be an obstacle to the right of France to manufacture nuclear weapons. The subject had been put on the public agenda mainly as a result of the resolution of Monnet’s Action Committee envisaging an entirely peaceful, supranational Euratom. The Monnet concept coincided with the US view. US policy-makers were however advised to keep a low profile on the question of French nuclear weapons. Outright opposition might ruin the whole Euratom project as the EDC had been ruined. Ambassador Dillon in Paris declared that he felt he should “raise serious warning flag” about the new aspect which Monnet had added to the original Euratom idea. He felt that there would be great difficulties for final ratification in France if a renouncement of the right to make atomic weapons were included in the project:

“I would like to underline one specific danger for US in connection with France. It would be most serious if French should come to believe that US favored their renouncing right to manufacture atomic weapons. Such a feeling would arouse storm of anti-American protest and would ensure the defeat of any such project. If there is any chance of France permanently renouncing right to make nuclear weapons, which I believe is only extremely slight, it would certainly be ruined if it could be labelled as an American project to deprive France of military power that could otherwise be hers.”⁵²

Dillon also reported about a conversation with Monnet. Monnet had declared that he was aware that the demand for renunciation might endanger the whole Euratom project but he was emphatic on the ideological importance of the

⁵⁰ Memos conversation Dulles, Strauss and others, *ibid.*, 14 May 1956, pp. 436, 441

⁵¹ Hoover-Bonn (and other embassies), 28 May 1956, *NARA* FSPO-O, Box 67

⁵² Dillon-State, *ibid.*, 3 February, 1956

principle that all members of Euratom should forever forswear the right to manufacture nuclear weapons:

“He [Monnet] said it was most important that US tread very warily in this field. Overt support by US for EURATOM or US pressure for its adoption in any country would be felt to be counter-productive. EURATOM was a purely European concept and must remain so. He particularly emphasized importance of US staying clear of argument which was bound to arise in France regarding renunciation of right to manufacture nuclear weapons. Any idea that US favored such a renunciation by France would in Monnet’s view cause fatal damage to EURATOM in France. Monnet’s view in this regard closely parallel my opinion expressed in [telegram above], except that Monnet is more optimistic than I am regarding chances of renunciation being accepted by France provided US keeps out of fight.”⁵³

Such views were confirmed when Dulles had a conversation in Washington with the president of the ECSC, René Mayer, and the French ambassador, Couve de Murville. They told Dulles that they did not believe that France would ever be giving up for all time the right to have atomic weapons if others had them. If Euratom had this as a condition it would never be ratified by France. Dulles then advanced the idea of a moratorium (Dulles’s position in the matter was possibly a factor which contributed to Spaak’s letter to the Six a couple of months later suggesting the moratorium compromise). Dulles suggested that in connection with the IAEA “there might be an agreement that ‘fourth countries’ would not make atomic weapons for a period of time - say five years - during which an effort would be made to eliminate these weapons by agreement between the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. I thought that France and others might be willing not to complicate the situation by introducing a new element.”⁵⁴

The standpoint in the May telegram was:

“Military uses. FYI. [For Your Information] We consider desirable discourage atomic weapons production in countries not now producers. Atomic weapons moratorium would also postpone day when Germans raise discrimination issue and seek end WEU ban on production in Germany of nuclear weapons. Therefore US views favorably moratorium proposed Spaak letter... However, in view delicacy French internal problem this subject, with Cabinet split and Pineau consequently likely to go to Venice uninstructed, we are concerned that expression at this time of US view would do more harm than good. End FYI. Therefore, official posture US officials at this time should be to leave this matter for Europeans themselves to decide.”⁵⁵

⁵³ Dillon-State, *FRUS* 1955-1957, Vol. IV, 6 February, 1956, p. 403

⁵⁴ Memo conversation Dulles, Mayer, de Murville, Lewis Strauss, *ibid.*, 6 February, 1956, pp. 406-407

⁵⁵ The formulations were somewhat modified, but nevertheless very direct, in the memorandum, perhaps in order to remind the French of the probable German reaction in case *égalité* were not accepted: “Vis-à-vis de l’utilisation militaire, les Etats-Unis considèrent qu’il est inévitable que les Allemands soulèvent à l’U.E.O. le problème de la renonciation à l’utilisation militaire de l’énergie atomique pour demander d’être libérés de cette discrimination. Pour cette raison, le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis sera favorable au moratoire proposé par la lettre Spaak, mais comme le Gouvernement français est divisé sur cette question, la position officielle des E.U. pour l’instant est de laisser les 6 pays décider de cette question entre eux”.

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Enrichment technology and Belgian uranium. This issue mainly concerns the possibility of assisting the Europeans in constructing a common enrichment plant, and of transferring the US-British rights to the Belgian uranium to Euratom.

The topic of enrichment was hardly discussed during the months after Messina.⁵⁶ It was mentioned by the British ambassador, Makins, in November. Makins wanted to inform the US Government that his government had decided that Britain would quit the negotiations on the Common Market. On Euratom, again, he wondered whether the Messina group or OEEC was the preferable channel through which to develop the idea. He said that it was important for Britain and the US to keep in step, particularly as to what would be the US response if, as seemed likely, a group of continental countries asked for assistance in the construction of an enrichment plant.⁵⁷ Two quite diverging lines about enrichment appeared after this in the State Department. The first was expressed in a memorandum by the Office of European Regional Affairs⁵⁸, the other by the special assistant for atomic energy affairs, Gerald Smith.

The memorandum stated that the very rapid advances in declassification of information that had taken place in particular since the Geneva conference meant that the US no longer occupied a monopolistic position in the field. Of the various forms for cooperation that were available to the US it was improbable that any except cooperation on the erection of enrichment plants could at the present time constitute a US initiative which would fundamentally influence the form and purpose of European development in the atomic energy field. The memorandum referred to the role which Britain's commitment to place troops on the continent had played for French acceptance of the WEU. This action - as no moral encouragement or philosophical explanation could have done - had made possible a change in Franco-German relations. The memorandum ended with the recommendation that the US would make available the know-how, and financially assist, the establishment of enrichment facilities, e.g. in the Saar. This recommendation was above all placed in a non-proliferation and safeguards perspective. It specified that the common institution of the six with sovereign authority would administer the plant. The "authority would enter into treaty relations with the United States which would give both parties assurance, through

⁵⁶There was all the time an awareness that the US enrichment technology was a very strategic asset. E.g. in an early State-AEC discussion an AEC official remarked that, after all, the Europeans had great scientific and industrial resources; there was a real question how much they required classified information. They would need, however, the enriched materials, at least initially. Memo conversation State-AEC, *FRUS* 1955-1957, Vol. IV, 15 July 1955, pp. 313-318, espec. p. 318

⁵⁷ Memo conversation Merchant-Makins, *ibid.*, 22 November, 1955, pp. 350-351

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 6 December 1955, s. 355-360. The memorandum was drafted by Robert W Barnett and forwarded by Merchant to Smith. A similar policy was recommended by the special assistant for atomic energy at the embassy in France, Howard A. Robinson. Robinson-Bowie, *ibid.*, 27 December, 1955, p. 386

development of an effective system of control and inspection, that the product of these facilities would be used for peaceful purposes only."⁵⁹

Smith protested against the policy proposed in the memorandum and recommended that the AEC should give technical advice to determine what action would be most effective. He argued, i.a:

"The suggested contribution of a uranium enrichment plant might well have the most political appeal of any offer we could make. At the same time, it is not entirely clear to me that it would be the most economic move for the Europeans, even assuming substantial U.S. financing. Enriched uranium from the very large U.S. plants whose costs are being amortized over the life of the weapons programs should be much cheaper - unless the EUR proposal contemplates large U.S. subsidy of Europe's power bill. Enrichment plants are terrific *consumers* of electric power which is in short supply in Europe and the imminent shortage of which is the basic reason for European interest in atomic energy...Such a proposal would probably be the most difficult to sell within the U.S. Government because of sensitivity of the technology, which is directly associated with weapons production know-how, and the specter of possible Communist take-over of the plant. We would be making the Europeans independent of us and giving up our monopoly on marketable enriched uranium."⁶⁰

Smith went on to consider other aid possibilities. One was that the US and Britain might release a part of the Congo uranium, possibly in enriched form. Second, the US might help in constructing fuel fabrication or reprocessing (chemical separation) plants; if such plants were built as common projects it would be advantageous from the point of view of safety control. Third, the US might agree to a British enrichment plant in Europe.⁶¹

A high-level State-AEC policy meeting was held on 21 January.⁶² The policy proposed in the EUR memorandum was not positively advanced from the State side, although the attitude to providing Europe with an enrichment plant was not negative. For example Merchant stated in general terms that it was the view of the State Department that the Europeans were determined to achieve atomic energy independence with or without the help of the United States. He believed that what the US could offer was a wasting asset. Bowie reported that Jean Monnet had said to him that the erection of European enrichment facilities made little sense from an economic standpoint, but Monnet had reiterated the very strong sense of compulsion on the part of the Europeans to achieve atomic independence. The AEC representatives, for their part, were entirely negative to the whole idea of

⁵⁹A marginal notation read: "leaving them to use their P weapons" (p. 359). This probably indicates that the non-proliferation of H-bombs (using highly enriched uranium) was what really mattered, not so much proliferation of A-bombs using P(lutonium).

⁶⁰Smith-Merchant, *ibid.*, 8 December 1955 pp. 360-361

⁶¹*Ibid.*, p. 361. Smith mentioned a recent British request, thus referring to Makins' question as a demand for a British plant, not as a US-UK plant.

⁶² Among the present were Dulles, Merchant, Smith and Robert Bowie (director, Policy Planning Staff), and Lewis L. Strauss (AEC chairman), Thomas Murray, Willard F. Libby (AEC commissioners), John Hall (AEC international director). *FRUS* 1955-1957, Vol. IV, 25 January 1956, pp. 390-399. The general purpose of the meeting was to clearly transmit the preference of the President and Dulles for European integration in the shape of Euratom to the reticent AEC chairman who was suspected not to be fully sympathetic to that policy because he gave priority to AEC's developing the Atoms-for-Peace program along bilateral lines. Enrichment policy was one of the themes of the discussion. Cf. Hewlett-Holl 1989, pp. 320-322

assisting Europe with enrichment facilities, although export of the product, enriched uranium, was thinkable. Several kinds of objections were made:

“Mr. Libby observed that the French appeared to want to produce atomic weapons. Mr. Murray said that he believed that weapons manufacturing capacity would be developing in a number of countries. To forestall this would require keeping the French out of the gaseous diffusion process⁶³. Mr. Hall observed, however, that if the purpose of European integration is to achieve atomic independence, they should have a gaseous diffusion plant but perhaps such a development was precisely what was clearly contrary to United States interests. Mr. Libby added that the Europeans could well do this without our help, but that it would be extremely expensive and, in any case, we could not help them with it on account of inhibitions of United States law...Mr. Libby stated flatly that the United States could not tell the Europeans how to make a gaseous diffusion plant. Mr Merchant wondered if this might not be a premature judgment at this stage. Mr. Libby quickly replied that the British gaseous diffusion plant does not work, that he doubted the efficiency of the Russian process, and that we do effectively possess a monopoly in this sector of the whole field. Admiral Strauss added that a gaseous diffusion plant to be efficient would produce quantities of material far beyond the foreseeable power requirements of Europe. Further, for it to be operated, it would consume enormous quantities of power. We may, however, be in a position to supply the Europeans with materials which, from a price standpoint, would be advantageous for them to obtain from us rather than to produce themselves.”

The conclusion of the meeting was that an ongoing AEC study should be awaited. The State representatives said, however that they were under pressure, for the Europeans were expected to ask for US views and assistance. The impact would be greatest if the US were in a position to volunteer first. If the possibility of assisting in the creation of an enrichment plant were to be ruled out, one should at least have in mind the range of things that were possible to do.

Meanwhile, a discussion about participation in a European plant was going on among British policymakers. Some saw this as a possibility for Britain to participate in the nuclear development on the Continent. When the Cabinet Official Committee on Atomic Energy discussed the matter it was observed that such a plant had become the emotional centre of the European movement. There was some arguing about whether the British should see if it was possible to get in into the construction before the Americans, or whether policy should be closely coordinated with the US. Doubts were expressed as to whether the Americans were really prepared to build a plant; a preferable alternative might be for Britain and the US to supply enriched uranium. It was decided that the views of the US should be obtained, without suggesting that the British were in any hurry to join a European project.⁶⁴

US policy on enrichment was made clear to the world shortly after this. A public announcement, which was an implicit negative answer to the alternative of exporting US enrichment technology, was made on 22 February without awaiting the completion of the AEC study. President Eisenhower offered for power and research programs abroad an allocation of 20,000 kilograms of uranium-235. That was a large quantity and a significant part of the output from the American enrichment plants (the same quantity had been offered to American industry

⁶³ The main process used in the US for enrichment

⁶⁴ A.E. (O)(56), 15 February 1956, *PRO AB 6/1654*. - Later, the British suggested a chemical separation plant. This was, as noted above, denounced by Dulles in the May telegram/memorandum

earlier). The pattern of distribution between the three channels - bilaterals, IAEA and Euratom - prices and other details were not specified.

The subsequent AEC-study recommended that up to half of the quantity might go to Euratom. The study also dwelled upon the possibility that Euratom might construct a gaseous diffusion enrichment plant. A partial ownership in such a plant might be a greater incentive to nuclear integration than any other single factor, it was stated. The study proposed that the US should do nothing to prevent the Community from constructing an enrichment plant; it did not propose export of US enrichment technology, however.⁶⁵

At the end of April, Lewis Strauss told Monnet that the AEC would shortly be in a position to announce further details concerning conditions and regulations under which the US could undertake the release of the announced quantity of enriched uranium. Monnet advised him that the US ought to tread very wearily in the matter:

“M. Monnet stated that in his personal opinion it would be difficult for public opinion at this time to understand why the U.S. should allocate materials to Euratom before the latter had been formed. He was afraid that the public might conclude that pressure was being brought to bear on Europe by the United States in order to cause Euratom’s coming into being. Since Euratom’s formation was primarily a matter for Europeans to decide by themselves, M. Monnet advised the Chairman to await a later date before making the announcement...any announcement should follow the raising of the question by the European powers rather than precede it”.⁶⁶

A less burning problem was the uranium from the Belgian Congo. The war-time secret US/British-Belgian agreement would expire in 1956. There had in fact been diplomatic exchanges about what would replace it since the beginning of the fifties, and regular negotiations since the end of 1954. Belgium had tried to persuade the US to fulfil earlier promises of giving her a kind of nuclear special relationship (privileged access to technology etc.) in exchange for the uranium, to get a more substantial part of the uranium herself and to get rid of restrictions which she had accepted in the field of peaceful nuclear energy. A new US-Belgian "power bilateral" was finally signed on 15 June 1955⁶⁷. It proclaimed that a special relationship existed and listed some privileges; the conditions were generally more favourable to Belgium than earlier. The US however continued to control most of the Belgian uranium for the period of the agreement (until 1965, though disposition of ores from 1961 on remained for later negotiation).⁶⁸ Thus, when the negotiations on Euratom were going on, the US still kept a large degree of the rights to the Belgian uranium and could use abstention of these rights as an incentive in the negotiations.

There had been early considerations of Merchant and others about possibly giving away US rights to Belgian uranium to a European pool. In the autumn of 1955 the

⁶⁵ "Action in the field of atomic energy to encourage integration of the Community of Six", *FRUS* 1955-1957, Vol. IV, 13 April 1956, pp. 425-427. Cf. Hewlett-Holl 1989, p. 324.

⁶⁶ Memo conversation Monnet, Lewis Strauss, Robinson, *ibid*, 28 April 1956, pp. 432-433

⁶⁷ Later the same year there was also an agreement between Belgium and Britain

⁶⁸ Helmreich 1990, espec. p. 59

atomic energy officials were negative to this idea.⁶⁹ In December, however, Smith saw this as a better alternative than export of enrichment technology. Spaak, as a representative of the Belgian side in the bilateral, was willing to give up some of the privileges in it if that could facilitate his negotiations on Euratom. The American atomic energy expert at the embassy in Paris, Robinson, reported that Monnet had told him that Spaak had promised that Belgium was willing to release restricted information which she might get from the US to Euratom if it would be founded and if the US would agree.⁷⁰ The French made enquiries as to whether the US would be willing to revise its agreement with Belgium and to make some provisions available to Euratom; they were told that although the US was sympathetic to Euratom negotiations could not be undertaken until after the actual form of Euratom became known.⁷¹ In the AEC study there was no proposal for transferring US rights to Belgian uranium to Euratom. Instead, the possibility of offering natural uranium from the US was considered. It was argued that the Community would not need natural uranium. Both Belgium and metropolitan France had sources of natural uranium and the US would allocate substantial quantities of U-235. It was therefore not desirable to make an offer of any specific quantity of natural uranium at the moment, "as such offer might prejudice our relationship with Belgium and France in the procurement of source materials."⁷²

Dulles and Spaak were thinking along different lines. Dulles opened up the possibilities for a transfer of the US rights to Belgian uranium to Euratom at the same time as the May telegram/memorandum was transmitted, and it should be considered as part of the same package. In reply to a letter from Spaak, in which Spaak had proposed to study possible changes in the US-Belgian bilateral in order to facilitate agreement on Euratom, Dulles wrote that he left it for Spaak's determination if such studies would be undertaken.⁷³ Spaak was gratified, it was reported: "[Spaak] said if EURATOM principle approved Venice meeting he would now be in position inform other Foreign Ministers he expected enter negotiations with U.S., with which U.K. must also be associated, for revision Belgian agreements these two countries to bring them in line with EURATOM provisions. He added he would now be in position inform other Ministers he hoped obtain advantages through revision present agreements which could be transferred EURATOM when latter became reality".⁷⁴

In July the US-Belgian bilateral of June 1955 was amended.

The US agreed that, should Belgium join an integrated group of Western European nations in agreement for cooperation on atomic energy, "[It] would be prepared if so requested by the Government of Belgium to arrange for the integrated group to assume the rights and obligations of the Government of Belgium under this Agreement, provided the integrated group can, in the judgment of the Government of the United States of America, effectively and securely carry out the undertakings of this Agreement."⁷⁵

⁶⁹Helmreich 1990, p. 64

⁷⁰Robinson-Bowie, *FRUS* 1955-1957, Vol. IV, 21 December 1955, p. 384

⁷¹Alger-State 13 February 1956, *NARA* FSPO, Box 67

⁷²"Action in the field of atomic energy...", *FRUS* 1955-1957, Vol. IV, 13 April 1956, p.426

⁷³Dulles-Spaak, *ibid.*, 24 May, 1956, p. 445

⁷⁴Embassy Brussels-State, *ibid.*, 25 May, 1956, pp. 445-446, n. 4

⁷⁵Cited in Helmreich 1990, p. 65

The May telegram/memorandum did not mention neither enrichment nor the Belgian uranium explicitly; only in general terms prospects of making available substantially greater resources towards a real integrated community. As was noted above, the British move to suggest the construction of a common chemical reprocessing plant within the OEEC as an alternative to an enrichment plant within Euratom was denounced.

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Bilaterals. The balancing between the bilateral approach and the pool approach had not become clear during the autumn of 1955. German integrationist politicians and officials advised the State Department to make it unmistakably clear that it was interested in pooling atomic energy in Europe and to let it be known that German industrialists would gain no advantage through a bilateral agreement.⁷⁶ The State Department made no commitment but sent a positive signal which was conditioned on progress in Europe. While reserving its decisions until the Europeans had agreed on the main principles of a pool, it assured the Germans that if such a pool had sovereign responsibility and otherwise contributed to integration it would try to surmount possible legal problems and seek approval from Congress for cooperation with the pool.⁷⁷

Monnet saw bilateralism as a central problem and urged the US to demonstrate preference for the pool approach. Monnet, when meeting Dulles at the end of the year, stressed that bilateralism was one of the two main problems (the other one was British opposition). The US must indicate that it preferred to proceed on the basis of unity instead of bilaterally; Aedeuener needed some basis for overruling the objections of the German industrialists and would welcome such an attitude.⁷⁸ Dulles indeed told German foreign minister Brentano and Spaak that the degree of cooperation from the US would be greater on the basis of the community approach than on the basis of individual effort, and he felt that there would be a disposition for this in both executive and legislative branches.⁷⁹ Monnet continued to fight against bilateralism "in the strongest possible terms" when talking to Robinson in Paris. He was particularly anxious that the US not enter into an agreement with France, nor with Germany. Robinson pointed out to his superiors that it was problematic even to conclude a research bilateral with Germany - which the German government had decided to approach the US about - because of French reactions.⁸⁰

Dulles' memorandum to the President at the beginning of 1956 on principles of US integration policy was not very definite on this point. Dulles did not recommend a downgrading of the bilateral approach, only preparation for a possible change. He

⁷⁶ Editorial note, *FRUS 1955-1957*, Vol. IV, 30 September 1955, pp. 330-331; Memo State, *ibid.*, 21 October 1955, p. 332

⁷⁷ Hoover-embassy Bonn, *ibid.*, 24 October 1955, pp.335-336. - "Not until late October were we even able to say, authoritatively and with support of the AEC, that we would treat the pool of European countries on roughly the same basis that we would treat a single country". State memo, *ibid.*, 6 December 1955, p. 358

⁷⁸ Memo conversation Dulles, Monnet, Bowie, *ibid.*, 17 December 1955, pp. 367-368

⁷⁹ Dulles-State, *ibid.*, 17 December 1955, p. 372

⁸⁰ Robinson-Bowie, *ibid.*, 27 December 1955, p. 383

explained that the US were engaged in the early phases of bilateral negotiations with some of the Six about nuclear power cooperation and recommended that any resulting agreements should in some way reflect the possibility of US approval of assignment of the bilateral agreements to the Community. The bilateral negotiations should not take such form as to embarrass the larger objectives of the US.⁸¹

At the State-AEC policy meeting Dulles, when asked by an AEC commissioner if negotiations about power bilaterals should be held back in the present situation, Dulles favoured going forward along parallel roads:

“The Secretary responded by distinguishing three general approaches to advancing United States interests in this field. One was the IAEA. He believed that this Agency would come into being very slowly. The second was the bilateral approach and he assumed that these could go forward. In fact, he had specifically opposed a suggestion that bilateral negotiations be suspended. The third was U.S. support, if possible, of efforts to create an integrated European institution in the atomic energy field. The Secretary did not believe that these three approaches were mutually in conflict and should go forward simultaneously”.

There were exchanges or negotiations about bilaterals with both France and Germany, among others, in the spring of 1956. The US attitude was slightly more restrictive toward Germany than toward France. Negotiations about a research and power bilateral were going on with France, containing a proposed clause envisaging that Euratom would inherit advantages and obligations. Regular negotiations with Germany did not start for the time being. When being informed that Spaak was preoccupied about the prospect of a US-German bilateral Dulles answered that he doubted that any such negotiations would be speeded up before the Six had reached agreement.⁸²

The possibility that the US might favour either France or Germany by making a separate deal was a reason for worry in both countries. It functioned as an indirect means of pressure to promote agreement on Euratom. The message which Dulles sent in this period was, in essence, that France and Germany should prove themselves willing to integration before the US promised anything; if not willing, the US might aid just one of them. When French foreign minister Mayer visited Washington a few days before the Brussels conference he tried to point out to Dulles that the key to Euratom was the unwillingness of the United States to make a bilateral with the Germans. Dulles replied that if the other five were all ready to proceed, and the only obstacle was a reluctance on the part of the German industrialists, the US might perhaps find a way to be helpful. However, until the five made their own positions clear, the US could not very well tell the Germans that only by going in could the US deal with them.⁸³ The Germans were correspondingly suspicious of the possibility of a US-French deal. The US ambassador in Bonn, James B. Conant, warned that if there were any consideration in Washington of a power bilateral with the French or other European nations (except Belgium) such negotiations would constitute a very serious hazard to good German-American relations unless parallel negotiations with Germany were in progress.⁸⁴ A circular telegram from Dulles to US missions before the publication

⁸¹Dulles-Eisenhower, *ibid.*, 9 January 1956, p. 389

⁸²Dulles-embassy Bonn, *ibid.*, 30 March and 2 April 1956, pp. 420-423

⁸³Memo conversation Dulles-Mayer, *ibid.*, 9 February 1956, p. 413.

⁸⁴Conant-State, *ibid.*, 9 February 1956, p. 414

of the Spaak Report focused on the bilateral problem. Dulles declared that he was worried that the Euratom process appeared to lose some steam. Some developments, not least the US bilateral program, was interpreted in Europe as indicating a shift of focus away from supranationality. Dulles told the missions to give assurances about continued US deep interest in an integrated atomic community. The ongoing bilateral negotiations (France was mentioned) were designed only to meet immediate requirements and limited needs. Dulles indicated priority for a sufficiently supranational Euratom; the US "could make available substantially greater resources and adopt attitude of substantially greater liberality towards real integrated community possessing effective common responsibility and authority than would be possible for countries separately."⁸⁵

The visit of Franz-Josef Strauss to Washington - during which lengthy discussions with Dulles and others were arranged - just before the Venice Conference was evaluated by the US embassy in Bonn in part as a test of the possibilities for bilateralism:

"It appears to us that Strauss wished to take advantage his trip to Washington to find out for himself to what extent US might lend material atomic assistance to Germany on bilateral basis and how strongly US Government actually feels about giving preference over EURATOM over bilateral arrangements. His request for bilateral deal primarily followed example other CSC countries and does not necessarily denote bad faith on his part since from his point view he had everything to gain if US accepted even part his proposals and nothing to lose".⁸⁶

The formulation of the US standpoint in the May telegram/ memorandum was the same as in the telegram of 30 March just cited, and it was added that if the Six Ministers in Venice took a decision to proceed with Euratom the US would be prepared to begin concrete discussions.

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The property and supply system, and safeguards. US policy makers were aware that a policy of tight control of scientific and technological information could not stop proliferation and this had been one of the rationales behind the Atoms for Peace Program. A future safeguards system had to be built on material accountability, not on information control.⁸⁷ The bilaterals therefore contained clauses about US rights to check that resources received from the US were used for peaceful purposes only, and prohibition against transfer to third parties without US consent⁸⁸ The

⁸⁵Circular telegram from Dulles, *FRUS* 1955-1957, Vol. IV, 30 March 1956, pp. 420-421. In June bilaterals were concluded with, i.a., France and Germany. Spaak was worried because he thought that the French agreement might be used by ant-Euratom elements in France for their ends (the debate on Euratom in the French parliament was approaching). He was soothed by Dulles who referred to his arguments of 30 March and to the time needed for treatment by the US Congress. Circular telegram from Dulles, *ibid.*, 19 June, 1956, pp. 447-448 - Monnet also doubted the wisdom of US policy for bilaterals. Memo conversation Monnet, Kohnstamm, Barnett, *ibid.*, 14 July 1956, pp. 53-455

⁸⁶ Embassy Bonn-State, 23 May 1956, *ibid.*, p. 441 n. 3

⁸⁷ Cf. Memo conversation State-AEC, *ibid.*, 15 July 1955, p. 317

⁸⁸ They also contained a provision for the IAEA approach; a "trilateral" clause that US rights might be transferred to the IAEA after mutual agreement.

possibility of getting simple and effective safeguards in the Six for the entire nuclear sector in the countries, not only the parts affected by US resources, was crucial for the US campaign for Euratom. An effective safeguards system in a supranational system however seemed to presuppose some common steering of preferably also natural uranium but in any case fissile materials (plutonium and enriched uranium). As noted above, the non-proliferation perspective had been essential in the rejected EUR proposal about export of US enrichment technology; the main argument of the memorandum had been that the highly strategic enriched uranium in this way could be put under safeguards in the Six. Dulles made no secret when talking to the Germans about the fact that the safeguard dimension of Euratom was important in US thinking. E.g. he told von Brentano that he felt that the community approach would help solve the problem of controls of materials of weapon quality produced in the process of producing energy.⁸⁹ Monnet talked to Lewis Strauss and Robinson about the safeguards problem just after the publication of the Spaak Report. According to him, Euratom had two primary objectives, to stimulate atomic energy in Europe on a sufficiently broad basis, and to furnish a satisfactory mechanism whereby fissionable material would be subjected to the necessary security controls. Regarding the effectiveness of the latter, he discussed the question of ownership by Euratom versus leasing of fissionable materials and the bearing which this had on the current negotiations. He also advanced the idea of self-inspection. It was very important that inspection and control requirements should be exercised by Euratom itself, he argued.⁹⁰ This idea was quite contrary to the principle on which the whole US bilateral system was constructed, a control by US inspectors.

When objecting to the free-market arguments of Franz-Josef Strauss, which were presented as his motive for opposing Euratom ownership of fissionable materials and purchase monopoly, Dulles developed his view on safeguards :

“The Secretary said that Minister Strauss might think that controls required in EURATOM would destroy free enterprise, but we do not think so. There is no reason why EURATOM should be socialistic. The problem is how to have controls to insure that atomic energy is being used for peaceful purposes. Because of the by-product of plutonium, the efficacy of controls will be most important. It is our thought that the larger and more responsible the safeguard organization the more control will be facilitated. This would be better than multiple controls of many individual countries involving complicated policing. It is appalling to contemplate a multiplicity of uncontrolled national atomic developments leading to multiplying atomic weapons programs.”⁹¹

The May telegram/memorandum stressed the importance of a sufficiently tight materials ownership and supply system, with something equivalent to ownership of fuels, and a purchase monopoly. This point was the only one which was made a condition for US cooperation with Euratom:

“US could enter into direct relations with a multi-national organization of this sort if organization has effective common authority and responsibility and is thus able to undertake commitments like those now undertaken by national governments, in particular as concerns safeguards.

⁸⁹ Dulles-State, *FRUS* 1955-1957, Vol. IV, 17 December 1955, p. 372

⁹⁰ Memo conversation Monnet, Lewis Strauss, Robinson, *ibid.*, 28 April 1956, p. 433

⁹¹ Memo conversation Dulles, Franz-Josef Strauss (and others), *ibid.*, 14 May 1956, p. 441

While recognize that Venice meeting probably will not deal with important substantive questions (a) ownership of fuel and (b) possibility member states going outside Euratom to obtain nuclear materials, Dept greatly concerned implications compromise on these points. If Euratom is to meet test of common authority and responsibility and not amount to mere coordinating mechanism with certain control responsibilities, our view is that it must have authority over fuel which if not ownership, is as complete as if Euratom owned fuel. Compromise in Euratom draft which would permit under certain circumstances member states make separate arrangements to procure material outside Euratom channels seems to strike at heart of Euratom concept which is six-nation atomic community. Six nations should be informed now as they approach task of drafting implementing treaty that failure to meet foregoing points in light [paragraph above], raise problems with respect future ability US to cooperate substantially with Euratom. “

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What were *the goals* motivating the US standpoints on the issues accounted for above? In the May telegram they were presented in this way (points a, c, and d were also included in the memorandum):

US supports European effort create integrated nuclear community because of:

- A. Possible decisive contribution revival general integration movement, thereby helping tie Germany organically to the West, and hence major step toward increased strength and unity Atlantic Community.
- B. Submergence Franco-German rivalry through creation of intimate common interest in field nuclear development; FYI this of particular importance in relation possible moratorium on military uses. End FYI.
- C. Integrated organization with necessary control powers would provide best opportunity system of safeguards against diversion in one major area of world where nuclear development likely in near future.
- D. Common program merging scientific and industrial potential of Six appears offer best chance rapid development nuclear industry in Continental Western Europe

If the President's long-range vision of the ultimate goal - winning the Cold War - is added, this list reflects in my view rather faithfully the orientation that had developed within the State Department and between State and the AEC, at least as accounted for in the FRUS Collection. A few remarks about my interpretation of priorities should be added, however. It seems quite clear that point a., the German question, was more important than anything else, not least for Dulles. A couple of examples may be given. Dulles talked - in the same vein as George Kennan had done a decade earlier⁹² - of the need for keeping Germany firmly anchored in the

⁹² "In the long run there can be only three possibilities for the future of western and central Europe. One is German domination. Another is Russian domination. The third is a federated Europe, into which the parts of Germany are absorbed but in which the influence of the other countries is sufficient to hold Germany in her place. - If there is no real European federation and if Germany is restored as a strong and independent country, we must expect another attempt at German domination. If there is no real European federation and if Germany is *not* restored as a strong and independent country, we invite Russian domination, for an unorganized Western Europe cannot indefinitely oppose an organized Eastern Europe. The only reasonably hopeful possibility for avoiding one of these two evils is some form of federation in western and central Europe." (Report by the Policy Planning Staff, "Review of Current Trends, U.S. Foreign Policy", 24 February 1948, *FRUS* 1948, Vol. I, Part 2, p. 515)

Western camp. He stressed this very clearly when justifying the US preference for the supranational six-state model to foreign minister Macmillan after the British exit from the Brussels talks:

“There is also the related question of Germany. I have no doubt about the present devotion of the Adenauer Government to full cooperation with the West. There is, however, the danger that the appeal of reunification will, over a period of time, become so strong in Germany as to give rise to temptation to discard the associations with the West in an effort to advance reunification on terms which would at best result in a neutral Germany and at worst in an Eastern-oriented Germany. Our problem is to prevent this possibility arising. The best means of doing this, in my judgment, is to tie Germany into the whole complex of Western institutions - military, political and economic - and to so command her loyalties that neutrality or orientation to the East will be commonly accepted as unthinkable.”⁹³

Similarly, reporting home about a conversation with Spaak:

“Would be most dangerous if Germans had nothing to occupy their minds in the inevitable period of waiting that lies ahead on reunification question. They might then look to the Soviets. Necessary inject creative element into situation. Further progress toward European unity can be this element. Spaak indicated he fully agreed this analysis. Said Adenauer will need all support possible.”⁹⁴

The mentioning of “Franco-German rivalry” and the favourable view of the moratorium in point b. in the May Telegram may be interpreted as referring to the fact that the US also opposed French nuclear weapons, although not to the same degree. It was hoped that the French drive for them might become weaker in the course of time, that a US-Soviet agreement might become possible, or at least that the French ambition might be limited to the A-bomb and tactical level, not aiming at the H-bomb and strategic one. The reference to the rivalry also reflected the long-standing US opinion that a robust and survivable Franco-German deal on integration should be based on *égalité*. This had been the philosophy behind the US support for the ECSC and the EDC.

The general non-proliferation goal was hinted at in point c. A successful non-proliferation policy for the world had to start in the most important and topical area. Last, in point d., the economic dimension was expressed. Western Europe was viewed in the US as a test-course and a starting point for the as yet not very developed US nuclear power industry. Market conditions were more favourable there. The possibilities of introducing nuclear power in competition with conventional energy seemed much better because energy prices were about twice as high as in the US. There was also a competition with Britain about the conquest of the market in Continental Europe. The AEC, largely representing the interests of US nuclear industry, was pushing the economic dimension. Yet, the US economic interests were downgraded in the internal US process. The political goals were dominant in relation to Euratom.

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⁹³ Dulles-Macmillan, *FRUS* 1955-1957, Vol. IV, 10 December 1955, pp.362-263

⁹⁴ Dulles-State, *ibid*, 17 December 1955, p. 370

The US attitude, demands and promises to the European Great Powers over the spectrum of issues at this stage - the US "negotiation bid" - may be summarized like this:

1. Preference for the Euratom approach to the OEEC approach that was favoured by Britain and part of German opinion; denouncement of the British project for a common chemical separation plant under OEEC auspices
2. Euratom first and the Common Market later; no linkage between the two projects.
3. General benevolence but no demands and promises concerning specific Common Market issues.
4. No official opposition - only resistance by indirect means - to French nuclear weapons and their compatibility with Euratom; endorsement of moratorium as defined in the Spaak Compromise.
5. No export of US enrichment technology; promise of supply of enriched uranium instead.
6. A half-promise of transferring US rights to the Belgian uranium to Euratom.
7. Announcing better prospects for cooperation with Euratom than through bilaterals; at the same time parallel work with bilaterals as a reminder of the possibility of US concentrating nuclear cooperation to *either* Germany or France
8. A sufficiently tight and integrated property and supply system as means of obtaining satisfactory safeguards - any US nuclear cooperation was conditioned on this.

5. The second half of the game: From Venice to agreement on the treaties

In Venice it was decided to take the Spaak report as the basis for negotiations directed at elaborating treaties on the Common Market and Euratom. Thus the principle of a linkage between the two projects was now accepted, although it was expected that it would take considerably more time to work out the Common Market treaty. France introduced the question of including overseas territories in the Common Market and the others agreed to consider it. The military question was postponed. The French foreign minister accepted to consider a moratorium on manufacture of weapons, as proposed in the Spaak Compromise, as a basis for further discussions. The moratorium proposal solved internal French divisions by being sufficiently unclear and postponing the issue.⁹⁵ The weapon lobby in France was as determined as ever not to accept anything that might obstruct the time-schedule for the ongoing military programme. The government was pressed to interpret the moratorium restrictively, as an engagement not to make a nuclear test within four or five years (a weapon would not be ready before that) and not to interfere with the domestic programme. The parliament was presented in July with such assurances and a number of arguments explaining why it was necessary for the French economy and independence to accept Euratom. It voted in favour of

⁹⁵ Cf Dillon-Dulles, 26 May 1956 (reporting about conversation with French Foreign Office official), *NARA* FSPO-O, Box 67

Euratom with a substantial majority (332 against 181).⁹⁶ The EDC failure had not been repeated, for the time being.

US diplomacy in the months after Venice continued to reinforce some of the points on Euratom made in the May telegram/ memorandum, particularly in its dealings with Germany about acceptance of the materials propriety and supply system.⁹⁷ In the summer, a more distinct position on the Common Market was also indicated. Dulles instructed a number of US missions that he endorsed the Common Market as outlined in the Spaak Report and declared that it represented a basis on which further progress might be made. He was particularly gratified by some features, e.g. the recommendation to include agriculture and the possibility to include new countries. He also told his diplomats, however, that they should bear in mind the primacy of US interest in Euratom.⁹⁸

The negotiations at the Intergovernmental Conference now concentrated on the Common Market. There were several stumbling blocks, such as the long-standing French demands for harmonization of social costs, inclusion of overseas territories and non-automatic transition from one stage to another when reducing trade barriers, and also a new French demand, the inclusion of agriculture. The French showed tendencies to retreat on the issue of linkage between the Common Market and Euratom. In October, there was a stalemate. Germany did not seem to accept a special position for France in the Communities as a nuclear and colonial power.

The disagreements were referred to a Franco-German summit. Mollet and Adenauer met in Paris at the beginning of November and made a package deal. There were some background factors facilitating agreement. Old Franco-German differences such as the Saar question had been settled recently. The US so-called Radford Plan in the summer, envisaging reductions of US troops in Europe, was interpreted as increasing the risk of a US-Soviet deal over the heads of the Europeans. Most importantly, the meeting took place at the height of the Suez crisis, during which the message of US disavowal of the foreign policy of two European Great Powers was transmitted. The Mollet-Adenauer compromise, refined in subsequent negotiations, comprised both Common Market and Euratom issues. Adenauer accepted the principle of harmonization of social costs in the Common Market. He also accepted that the treaty would allow the French to engage in research which would permit explosion of a weapon in four years, as demanded by the French parliament. The German demand for inspection of all nuclear activities in Euratom - including a French military sector - was weakened, and it was later agreed that inspection would not apply for the defence sector of a member state. Thus France had the right to look into the entire nuclear field in Germany, while Germany had this right only for a part of the French one; how large a part depended on where the French would place the bordering line between civil and military activities. This meant that the Germans had now accepted *non-égalité* with regard to rights of inspection. Adenauer also accepted the principle of a purchase monopoly in the supply system. Mollet, in return, approved exceptions in that system. The supply monopoly of Euratom might be by-passed under certain

⁹⁶ Guillen 1985, p. 399

⁹⁷ Cf. e.g. Circular telegram from Dulles, 19 June 1956, *FRUS* 1955-1957, Vol. IV, pp. 447-448; Circular telegram from Dulles, 30 September 1956, *ibid.*, pp. 467-468; Conant-State, *ibid.*, 30 October 1956, pp. 480-481

⁹⁸ Circular airgram from Dulles, *ibid.*, 13 July 1956, pp. 450-453

circumstances, i.e. if Euratom could not assure supply of sufficient quantities of materials, or at reasonable prices. Mollet finally made a commitment on the issue of linkage between the Common Market and Euratom; he promised to work for completion of the two treaties at the same time. Adenauer did not bow to the ardent and longstanding French wish for an enrichment plant financed by Euratom. A plant was not explicitly declined but the prospects for it became even smaller than before. Realizing this, the French decided to start a purely national enrichment project in spite of the great economic sacrifice involved. Euratom was losing much of its attraction for France.⁹⁹

In November, the AEC published a list of low prices for the export of enriched uranium which had been promised by the President at the beginning of the year. The prices were the same as for domestic consumption and it was declared that the intention was to keep them stable. Some Europeans suspected dumping - pointing to the rapidly growing surplus from the American plants which had been financed from the military budget - and high prices later.

Monnet's Action Committee had demanded the appointment of a small independent committee for working out a nuclear power programme for Euratom, and the Mollet-Adenauer summit endorsed the idea and appointed the members. The Franco-German-Italian group was called "the three wise men"¹⁰⁰. Monnet and his collaborators negotiated with US diplomats around the turn of the year in order to prepare cooperation on a nuclear power programme for Europe. The Americans were informed about details in the treaty drafts and made proposals for changes which might facilitate cooperation. They warned explicitly against raising the problems of an enrichment plant or financial support.¹⁰¹ The "three wise men" visited the US at the beginning of 1957 and were warmly received by US politicians and officials, including the President and Dulles.¹⁰² A programme was outlined for cooperation between the US and Euratom for the development of nuclear power in Europe. In their report at the beginning of 1957 the "three wise men" argued emphatically against the construction of an enrichment plant in Europe for the time being.

During the last stage of the negotiations Spaak wanted to check that there was nothing in the proposed treaty which would pose an obstacle to fruitful relations between the US and Euratom. Considering how indispensable US cooperation was, he felt it important that he and the negotiators should be warned in time so that they could make any necessary adjustments. Dulles was somewhat worried about whether the property system was built on ownership of fissile materials. He did not take a firm position that the US could not cooperate unless the treaty provided for common ownership, but "we would certainly be happier if it did so."¹⁰³

⁹⁹Guillen 1985, pp. 406-407; Loth 1991, pp. 126-130; State memo, 3 December 1956, *FRUS* 1955-1957, Vol. IV, p. 493

¹⁰⁰Louis Armand, Franz Etzel, Francesco Giordani

¹⁰¹Weilemann 1983, pp. 141-142

¹⁰²State memos of conversation, 4, 5, 6 and 8 February 1957, *FRUS* 1955-1957, Vol. IV, pp. 512-522

¹⁰³Memo conversation Dulles, Spaak, Lewis Strauss (and others), *ibid.*, 8 February 1957, pp. 519-522. - At this time there were also some aspects of the negotiations on the Common Market that troubled Dulles, in particular tendencies to agricultural protectionism. Cf. Dulles-embassy Brussels, *FRUS*, 26 January 1957, pp. 507-509

The final Franco-German compromises on the Common Market and Euratom were made at the Conference of Heads of Government in Paris in February. After much hesitation Adenauer accepted common ownership of fissile materials, but he got a clause stipulating that member states and firms should have unlimited right of use and consumption subject only to safety considerations. The remaining disputes on Common Market issues - the inclusion of overseas territories and funds for their development, and the decision-making system - were disposed of at the conference.

Dulles was a bit concerned about British initiatives around the turn of the year 1957-58 to create some larger framework for both the Common Market and the Free Trade Area sponsored by Britain. He criticized the tendency to blur the distinction between cooperative arrangements and genuine integration. He also pointed out, however, when talking to the Germans just before signature of the treaties, that the fact that the British no longer opposed the Common Market was a very important factor.¹⁰⁴

The treaties on the Common Market and Euratom were signed on 25 March 1957 and ratified by the German and French parliaments in July with large majorities. The end result was endorsed by the US. Dulles, in fact, made statements in the period between signature and ratification that were similar to his warning about "agonizing reappraisal" in connection with the EDC a couple of years earlier. He told a German delegation that the US would do all it could in any quarter to assist this matter forward. He said that "he had repeatedly emphasized to the French his opinion that failure on their part to ratify the Common Market and EURATOM agreements, following on the defeat of EDC, would have a catastrophic effect on United States attitudes toward Europe."¹⁰⁵

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Later - in 1958-1959 - the ideas contained in the report of the "three wise men" were embodied in an agreement between the US and Euratom on cooperation on a big programme for constructing power reactor prototypes in Europe; the programme included US supply of enriched fuel. This agreement was remarkable, i.a., because the US accepted for the first and only time a safeguards system built on the principle of self-inspection of nuclear resources exported from the US. Such a concession in relation to Europe had, it may be remembered, been characterized as necessary by Monnet during the negotiations on Euratom. The US-Euratom programme developed badly, however. French policy in the gaullist period tried to avoid dependence on the US also in the peaceful nuclear field. As the armaments race was approaching a saturation point and new uranium deposits appeared there was no longer a tight supply of natural uranium but a surplus market with low prices. Euratom got only a minor role. Some of the clauses concerning the property and supply system became dead letters. The safeguards functioned, however. With some simplification Euratom may be characterized as a temporary instrument for controlling that Germany remained a non-nuclear weapon state, up to the German adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty more than a decade later.

¹⁰⁴Stirk 1996, pp. 146-147; Memo conversation Dulles, von Brentano (and others), *FRUS* 1955-1957, Vol. IV, pp. 531-533

¹⁰⁵Memo conversation Dulles-Adenauer (and others), *FRUS*, 26 May 1957, pp. 557-558

6. Conclusion

Some questions were asked in the introductory section: Did the US play a role for the emergence of the Euratom project? How did the US standpoints on Euratom and, in rough outline, the Common Market develop? How did the US try to influence the negotiations on the projects, Euratom in particular? Did the result concerning Euratom coincide with US standpoints - the "negotiation bid" to France and Germany - and to what an extent did US policy contribute to the result? How far were the goals for the policy toward Euratom attained?

I have suggested answers to the first three questions in sections 2-4 above. Some reflections on the last two may be added:

The two Six-state projects were established and alternative intergovernmental and market models - the OEEC, WEU - favoured by Britain and powerful German economic and nationalist interests were defeated. The coalition on Euratom between the US, France and the majority of German politicians (in government and opposition), a coalition which was supported by the minor actors, was decisive.

There was a firm linkage between the two projects all the time because of German insistence, and in spite of US apprehensions that linkage might endanger agreement on Euratom. This proved not to be the case, however. US policy was not successful on this issue, but it did not matter. In the end it was decided that the two treaties should be approved at the same time.

The result of the negotiations on the enrichment issue was favourable from the US point of view. Only France in the end supported the project for a common enrichment plant, all others were against. The Germans were hardly willing to pay for a plant as long as they did not get a Euratom based on *égalité*, i.e. as long as the French did not abstain from the nuclear weapon option (or there was agreement on joint development of a nuclear force).¹⁰⁶ The US promise of selling enriched uranium cheaply to Europe also made a European plant appear an economic waste. In this respect the US bid changed the decision parameters and was a blow to French ambitions. The risk of excessive dependence on the US did not seem great to Germany and the minor actors at this early stage of atomic power development. That problem could be disposed of later.

The question of the Belgian uranium proved not to be very important. It is doubtful if the US half-promise to abstain from the rights to this uranium had much effect in promoting agreement on Euratom, neither for France or uranium-poor Germany. It was becoming increasingly clear during this period that uranium would not be so scarce in the future. It could also be suspected that the better part of the deposits in the Belgian Congo had already been delivered to the US and Britain. The half-promise did not cost much, and it probably did not have much effect on the negotiations.

¹⁰⁶ Trilateral talks (including Italy) about this took place in 1957-1958, until de Gaulle interrupted them after his return to power. This episode has been investigated by i.a. Hans-Peter Schwarz and Peter Fischer. For a short account, see Skogmar 1993, pp. 209-212

The US promise of cooperation and better conditions for a real supranational community was fulfilled after the approval of the Euratom Treaty. The big US-Euratom agreement for US assistance with power reactors and fuel was approved by all parties. Thus, the post-negotiation result was in conformity with the US bid, even if the outcome of the programme in the end was a failure. In the negotiations on the Euratom treaty, the declared preference by the US for Euratom compared to the bilateral channel was no doubt operative in influencing the internal German balance and assuring German acceptance of the project. The German anti-Euratom forces found out that there was not much hope of getting a better deal by trying to ally themselves with the AEC and US nuclear industry. Simultaneously, the maintenance of the bilateral system in relation to the Six was an implicit threat. If the Germans did not accept Euratom the US might choose to cooperate bilaterally with France, and *vice versa*. If France did not accept a model for Euratom that was acceptable to the US the US might prefer to cooperate with Germany. The latter threat did not prove effective, though, as it was clear that the US above all wanted to get agreement on the principle of a supranational Euratom.

The core of supranationality in this case was a sufficiently tight propriety and supply system, and safeguards which included inspection of the entire nuclear sector in the member states. Such supranationality was the crucial issue which was made a condition for US cooperation with Euratom. Toward the end of the negotiations Germany got satisfaction for her demand for a softening on certain points in the propriety and supply system in order not to be discriminated or becoming dependent economically. These modifications were not so far-going that they could not be accepted by the US, France and the smaller members of the big coalition that wanted to control German military nuclear development. The French exceptions, due to the demands for having an uninspected sector, were contrary to the spirit of the US negotiation bid. US policy was evidently unsuccessful on this point. The US did not press harder, however. If this had been made a condition for cooperation, the whole Euratom project might have gone to pieces.

The overriding goal of US policy was to integrate Germany into a European structure that was sufficiently supranational. The OEEC or the WEU were not sufficient. Euratom was a solution to the nuclear dimension of this problem, provided that the propriety, supply and safeguards systems of the organization were sufficiently tight. In essence, the objective of controlling possible future German military nuclear ambitions was attained through the creation of Euratom and the specific construction of that Community. The task of controlling the observation of the German pledge to the WEU became the *raison d'être* of the organization in the long run.

The ambition to prevent Franco-German rivalry presupposed integration constructed on *égalité*. If development of German nuclear weapons were to be prevented, the consequence was that France should not have them either. In addition, the French ambitions threatened the general non-proliferation goal which the US has tried to pursue by various means during the whole post-war period. Every new member of the nuclear club would add to the difficulties; the membership of France would raise that number to four. The French insistence to preserve the national nuclear option at any price made *égalité* in Euratom impossible. US foreign policy had to resign to this fact. If the US had made *égalité* a condition for cooperating with Euratom the organization would most probably not

have been ratified by France, nor, perhaps, would the Common Market. That risk could not be taken. The EDC failure should not be repeated.

On the other side, the French choice of the national military road lessened the risk of a common Franco-German development of the military atom within the framework of Euratom. It was not a US interest to contribute to the emergence of a powerful Third Force in Europe which in due time might emancipate itself from NATO.

The economic dimension of Euratom did not prove important in the long run. This dimension had been subordinated in US policy but it became more important toward the end of the negotiations when the political issues had been solved in compromises between the three main actors. The ambitious programme put forward in the report of the "three wise men" was a deal between the US and those in Europe who favoured close cooperation between America and Europe for economic development. The US goal of making Continental Western Europe a test-ground for the rapid development of nuclear industry was not fulfilled, however. Euratom did not become a vehicle for introducing nuclear power and US reactor technology in the energy systems. Gaullist policy refused to give Euratom that role. In the end, US nuclear technology nevertheless became dominant in Europe. Reactors of the American type were introduced first in the US and then - as an outcome mainly of the market forces - in Europe. Germany, and after de Gaulle also France, opted for it. Neither the British nor the French concepts were able to compete.

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This article was first presented as a paper to the third Pan-European International Relations Conference in Vienna, 16-19 September 1998. Minor additions and corrections have been made.

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