Comparative Typologies of Development Patterns: The Menzel/Senghaas Framework[1]

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Introduction

Of the 170 independent states of the world (1990), only a small minority are rich states. The perennial question of development theory has been why the rich get richer, most people get poorer, and a few get less poor. In the postwar era, development aid became a profession in the rich countries, while in academic circles, a struggle ensued between generalized perspectives aimed at explaining development and underdevelopment. These two views were modernization and dependencia.

Within modernization theory, the most interesting parts of the discussion about "take off into sustained growth" revolved around reasons for differences in economic growth rates. Dependency theory criticized this concentration on single states, focusing instead on the international structures which produced the different fates of development and underdevelopment. Both approaches, however, lacked a proper comparative and historical framework.[2]

The controversies between the two schools peaked in the 1970s. Since then the grand positions have crumbled and the trend has been towards specification, meaning not consensus, but a stronger

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[1] This is a rewritten, much revised and extended version of a paper first presented at the "International Symposium on the Functions of Law in the Development of Welfare Societies: Commemorating Professor Vilhelm Aubert", ISF, Oslo, August 23–26, 1990.

This essay is related to a comparative study (Mjøset 1992) in which Irish development problems are compared with more successful late-developers of Northern and Central Europe. Ulrich Menzel and Dieter Senghaas provided comments, as well as factual and bibliographical information at a late stage of preparation of this essay. I am also grateful to Ådne Cappelen, Sjur Kasa and Kristen Nordhaug for comments. The essay is dedicated to the memory of Vilhelm Aubert.

Tables and figures are numbered consecutively. References with year and a point (e.g. 1982.1) refer to the bibliography of Menzel and Senghaas' publications, while ordinary references refer to the additional list of references. In most instances, page-numbers referring to the English translation are added (e.g. 1982.1:44/32), if such a translation exists. Full references to the translation are given in the bibliography.

[2] This goes at least for the generalization and popularization of these approaches. It can be shown that the pioneers, e.g. Rostow within the modernization camp, and the Latin-Americans (e.g. Cardoso) among the *dependistas*, had more sophisticated approaches. Cf. Mjøset 1986, and also the overview in Senghaas & Menzel 1979.1.

emphasis on typologies and debates related to specific cases. This essay surveys one of the important contributions to this turn: the work of German political scientist Dieter Senghaas, much of it in collaboration with Ulrich Menzel,[3] in the period 1976–86.

Throughout the early 1970s, Senghaas had published extensively within peace research. In the preceding decade, the 1960s, large parts of the peace research community had been committed to a paradigm of "idealist internationalism", emphasizing that common understanding and consciousness of increasing global interdependencies would enable the superpowers to scale down their mutual aggression. In the late 1960s, however, younger scholars challenged this East/West-perspective by pointing to persistent North/South-inequalities, even in a world of progressive decolonization. With Galtung's (1971) seminal article "A structural theory of imperialism", the North/South-dimension was absorbed into peace research. The German translation of Galtung's essay was published in the first of a series of readers edited by Senghaas (1972.1, 1974.1, 1979.10), who himself was certainly a part of this movement to extend peace research by including a number of the research topics brought up by the dependencia tradition. It is, however, important to remember that Senghaas also had a background in modernization theory, since elements of that development paradigm was part of the idealist internationalism which characterized much earlier peace research.[4]

Senghaas' first book length contribution (1977.1) to development studies set out to study of patterns of autocentric development. It includes a comparative study of Japan and Brazil. The dichotomy of autocentric versus peripheral development, derived from the work of Samir Amin, played a crucial role. This dichotomy defines two models of economic development, the autocentric one implies economic growth and social development, while the other does not entail social development, not even in phases with high rates of economic growth.

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[3] We have made no attempt to trace differences of opinion between Senghaas and Menzel, despite the fact that much of their work has been published under separate names. Whenever only one name is mentioned, the other could be used interchangeably.

[4] In international relations theory, this approach was often linked to so-called neo-functionalist approaches, launched by liberal U.S. social scientists. In the early 1970s, Senghaas had published together with Karl Deutsch (cf. 1970.1, 1970.2, 1971.1, 1971.2), a famous representative of neo-functionalism.

Starting from this perspective, Senghaas, teaching in Frankfurt a.M. in the mid-1970s, organized a research group on the theme "Strategien zur Überwindung peripherer Gesellschaftsformationen". In 1978/9, a number of case-studies on socialist developing countries were published. This point of departure we shall dub the first phase of a three-step research venture.[5] Although we do not intend to make this survey a piece of sociology of knowledge, it is easily seen that in this phase, Senghaas was influenced by debates on a New International Economic Order (NIEO), a growing criticism of traditional Western development aid, and a growing interest in ideas of self-reliance and basic needs.

The second phase started as Senghaas launched the project "Untersuchung zur Grundlegung einer Praxisorientierten Theorie autozentrierter Entwicklung" at the University of Bremen. While the first phase had studied contemporary cases of attempted autocentric development, the second phase mainly dealt with historical studies of European cases. A series of 14 research reports were presented in the period between early 1978 and late 1981. Most of these papers ended up as chapters of two books, Senghaas' *The European Experience* (1982.1) and Menzel's *Exits from dependence* (1988.1). The latter had been presented as a Frankfurt "habilitation" as early as in 1981. While Amin in his discussion of autocentric development tended to treat the core of the world economy as one homogenous unit, Senghaas and Menzel in this project disaggregated the core. While Amin had argued that the 19th century international structure made it possible for small countries to develop, Senghaas and Menzel argues that the "peripheralization pressure" radiating from core countries was just as much a threat in the 19th century as in the 20th century. They were particularly interested in small countries, whose openness made them particularly vulnerable.

Based on these case-studies, Senghaas and Menzel coined the label "autocentric development despite world market integration", a problem formulation which could hardly emerge within Amin's framework. Even Senghaas and Menzel first regarded this as a major historical enigma. The countries of the 19th century European periphery were all in a structurally peripheral position, they all supplied foodstuffs and raw materials to the core, above all to England. The enigma was why some of these became "*mature*

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[5] Menzel & Senghaas, preface in Menzel 1985.4:13–16 summarize their overall project as a sequence of four projects: 1. Dissociation in general, 2. Socialist developing countries, 3. The early OECD-countries, 4. NICs. – In our account, 1 and 2 are phase one, while 3 and 4 are phase two.

capitalist *national* economies", while others – despite high growth rates of exports – degenerated to *peripheries*.[6] Senghaas quotes Ireland, as well as the Southern, South-Western and Eastern parts of Europe as examples of such degeneration. In contrast, he finds that there was a specific "Scandinavian development trajectory" leading to mature national economies.

Posing such questions, Senghaas and Menzel were on their way towards a revision of Amin's framework. This was a fortunate turn, since a too rigid application of the core/periphery-framework had hampered dependency theory, and since comparisons with European cases had often been identified with Rostow's use of the "English model" as a paradigm for take-off processes anywhere.

The wider intellectual context of this second phase was an increasing criticism against the dependency paradigm among left wing development theorists (Warren 1980). While the diplomatic movement among third world countries for a NIEO was moving into a blind alley, with the Reagan administration ignoring the United Nations (UN) and reviving the cold war, radical development studies scrutinized 1970s statistics and pointed out that the third world had a better performance than the core in the crisis period from 1973 and onwards (Shiffer 1987 versus Amin). In particular, the emergence of "second generation Japans", the Newly Industrializing Countries (NIC) countries, was presented as a major problem for dependency theory. While Senghaas in the first phase had been sure that countries like South-Korea were bound to display all the problems of peripheral capitalism, he was quite ambivalent in 1980/81. A new project was launched and in 1983 and 1984, and Menzel produced a large manuscript on the two most famous NICs, South-Korea and Taiwan (1985.4), *In der Nachfolge Europas*.

That work marks the transition to a third and last phase. South-Korea and Taiwan emerge as cases of autocentric development, following, as is the message of the book's title, in the wake of Europe. A year later, Menzel and Senghaas published a final synthetic collection of essays (1986.2), containing – among other things – reworked versions of the conclusion from of Menzel's 1985 book. No new monographs were written. Rather, in this third phase, the work on European countries and their East-Asian followers gave rise to suggestions of indicators

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6 Such an approach had already been launched within a more traditional economic history framework, by Berend & Ránki 1980 and 1982.

of "threshold countries", as well as to a generalization from small to large countries.

The wider context of this phase included the full collapse of the NIEO, the visible successes of the Southeast-Asian NICs, the debt crisis emerging in the third world and the decline of the socialist self-reliance as a convincing alternative. All social sciences must manoeuvre in a political context, and our point is not to criticize Senghaas and Menzel for changing their perspective according to "intellectual business cycles". In fact, it seems that they largely avoid opportunism. They accumulate knowledge, but at the same time they acknowledge the lessons of history.

In this essay, we shall look closer at each of the three phases. While there are several surveys of recent U.S. and English comparative historical sociology (e.g. Skocpol 1984), the German contribution of Senghaas and Menzel seems to us to deserve a similar presentation. We are not providing a "research evaluation" in any strict sense, but we want to trace the various typologies proposed by Senghaas and Menzel as they work out the lessons of their various case-studies. We have chosen a chronological approach. Their results have mainly been communicated to the research community in the form of collections of essays. For instance, Senghaas' most well-known collection, *Von Europa lernen* (1972.1), mainly contains the results of phase two, but also one essay (1978.4) which clearly belongs to phase one (see note below). Furthermore, a number of essays published in journals or in collections edited by others, turn out to be written much earlier than the year of publication. It is not that we want to engage in philology, but it is actually quite revealing to look at these essays in the exact order in which they were written. Thus, we enclose a chronological bibliography. This makes it much easier to understand the evolution of Senghaas and Menzel's ideas on development questions. Towards the end of the survey, we present some critical suggestions, certainly not in order to reject the approach, rather to point out weak spots that may be improved upon by future research.

The first phase – investigating autocentric development

The dichotomy between autocentric and peripheral models of accumulation or social formations was developed by Samir Amin. It has been a crucial influence on the research questions Senghaas has posed.

Samir Amin (b. 1931, Cairo) is one of the first third world economists to make substantial contributions to the traditions of Marxist economics. He rose to fame in these circles in the early 1970s as his two works *Accumulation on a World Scale* (1970) and *Unequal Development* (1973) were published, first in French, soon translated into other major languages. These studies combine rich historical analysis, especially of the varieties of the peripheral mode, with attempts to construct formal models of the two cases and their interaction in the world economy.[7] The formalizations were based on Marx' schemes of reproduction, but we shall not deal with these debates, simply because they have not been of any importance to Senghaas' use of Amin's dichotomy.

Much of the rather heated debate (surveyed by Brewer 1980) between Amin and other Marxist schools has been concerned with his grand schemes and generalizations. To a large extent, it has been forgotten that Amin's work was not only deductions from Marxist schemes, it was also based on a number of concrete politico-economic studies of African countries.[8]

To see how Amin's dichotomy inspired Senghaas' comparative research efforts, we shall start from his distinction between four sectors of the economy, defining autocentric reproduction as the connection between sectors 2 and 4, while dependent reproduction combines 1 and 3, cf. Figure 1.

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[7] For a collection of analyses of peripheral capitalism, showing the use of this notion (and the complementary notion of structural heterogeneity) among other economists and social scientists, see 1974.1. The point of departure for the collection was a conference on "Strategies for Economic Development" arranged by Samir Amin in Dakar in 1972.

[8] Cf. Foster-Carter 1982, with a comprehensive bibliography of Amin's work. The empirical works dealt with the following countries (year of publication in brackets): Mali (1961/62), Egypt (1964), Mali, Guinea and Ghana (1965), the Maghreb economy, that is Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia (1966, 1970), the Ivory Coast (1967), Congo (1970), West Africa, that is Ghana, Guinea, Mali, the Ivory Coast, Gambia, Senegal, Mauritania, Upper Volta, Niger, Dahomey (Benin), Togo (1971).

Figure 1. Amin's scheme of reproduction.



Amin (1972) holds that the autocentric model corresponds to the "pure" model of capitalism analysed by Marx, typical of historical developments in Europe, North-America, and Japan. He even claims that this development characterized the USSR and China. Labour is here distributed proportionally on the sectors (2) and (4), which corresponds to Marx' (1885) departments II and I. Central capitalism developed through crises emerging from the system contradiction between productive capacity and capacity for consumption. By the 1930s, the effects of two crucial "internal transformations" increasingly influenced the model: the monopolisation of capital and the organization of workers at the national level. These conditions enabled policy makers to implement effective economic planning which cooled down economic fluctuations. This planning developed in interaction with a "social compromise" which linked growth of real wages to the growth of productivity, and the result was a "stable state close to full employment". This does not mean that Western capitalism reached the end of history, for the pattern depended on national institutions, and Amin (1972:75) finds an increasing contradiction between "globalized production" and the national character of institutions. His prediction, in the early 1970s, that social democratic ideology reaches its limits when internationalization weakens the state, was a quite accurate one, considering the problems West European social democracy has encountered the last 20 years.

Amin holds that the model of central accumulation is a closed one: the "essential" relations of this system can be grasped independently of external developments. This is an important difference in comparison with the mainstream notions of "development of underdevelopment", associated with such names as André Gunder Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein. Compared to trade within the core, Amin emphasizes, core/periphery trade is quantitatively insignificant. While the development of the core is thus relatively independent of

developments in the periphery, this is not the case the other way around.

The peripheral model of capitalism developed in response to the centre's need to import primary products. Capitalists of the core undertake investments to the extent that they can get either raw materials or foodstuffs at a cost which is lower than in the core. If there is a world market price, such a cost difference may depend on a higher productivity (e.g. for natural reasons) or on lower wages. Abstracting from productivity, Amin notes that several mechanisms in the peripheral social formation will be at work to ensure low wages in the export sector.[9] To the extent that these mechanisms prevail, society looses its traditional, precapitalist nature. But no substantial domestic market is created. Rather, the modes of production that were formerly "pre-capitalist" are reproduced.[10] In the autocentric model, the capitalist mode of production eliminates other modes, while in the peripheral model, capitalist development is blocked by the influence of the centre, and therefore pre-capitalist modes are reproduced or conserved. Thus, a basic connection in the autocentric model, the productivity-indexed real wage is absent.[11] The autocentric model implies an equalization of levels of productivity, patterns of work organization, profit rates and wage levels. Such an equalization is absent in the periphery. The periphery attracts only certain investments and its domestic market is very limited. Such a situation has also been termed "structural heterogeneity", with reference to structural defects like a lack of linkages between agriculture and industry, no depth of production, incomplete input/output-structures, the inability to satisfy internal demand for food, and demographic developments that are out of control. Table 2 summarizes the politico-economic and institutional contrasts Amin finds between the central and the peripheral model of accumulation:

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[9] Amin 1972:94, emphasizes that marginalization takes many other forms than just open unemployment, e.g. underemployment, high rates of turnover, independent employment in low-productivity activities which may be the only chance of survival for large groups. The borders between these different types of employment and underemployment, he says, are unclear and tend to change.

[10] Here is a point of convergence between Frank, Wallerstein, Amin, and many other dependency theorists: The conviction that certain allegedly "endogenous" factors are actually products of exogenous forces. The difference is that Amin regards the development in the core as relatively autonomous. Senghaas (1979.2:386) coins the notion "crypto-capitalism" to describe the peripheral type.

[11] Or the connection between the rate of surplus value and the development of the productive forces, as Amin prefers to state it.

Table 2. Amin's dichotomy

	Autocentric development (structural homogeneity)	Peripheral or dependent development (structural heterogeneity)
Development of productive forces	Homogenous.	Heterogenous, that is, advanced in the modern sector, but backward in the traditional sector.
Domestic market	Favouring products related to mass consumption.	Favouring products related to luxury consumption (demand emerging among elites in their direct or indirect relations to the modern sector).
Sectoral connections and relation to agriculture	Durable consumer goods relies on a preceding industrialization of simpler consumer products as well as on a modernization of agriculture. The central country either developed its own sector for investment goods from scratch, or succeeded in a process of import substitution.	The enclave export-sector spurs luxury consumption. Import substitution starts late and with durable consumer goods, i.e. the latest generation of core consumer goods. Thus, the domestic producers of simpler mass consumption goods are not stimulated to modernize. Production of basic foodstuffs, including the agricultural sector, stagnates. Industries do not become growth poles, but reinforce domestic inequalities. To the extent there are basic industries, they are supported by the state, and related to exports and luxury products, not to mass consumer goods.
Population and employment dynamics	The broad masses of the population are integrated into the accumulation model. Cyclical crises of unemployment are replaced by "Keynesian" full employment-oriented economic management.	The broad masses are marginalized. There is a secular increase of unemployment / and numerous varieties of under-employment (impossible to trace in statistical terms). These conditions secure a low wage.
Wages	Origins of demand are the masses. Wages are high, they count as a crucial demand factor.	Wages are a cost-factor only. In the modern sector they are very low, in the traditional sector they are at subsistence level, or there is a natural economy. The elites emulate European or American ways of life. There is development only for the minority, not development for the masses.
Political consciousness	Reformism in the working class.	Reformist consciousness is not possible in the periphery, since the system does not integrate, but marginalise the masses. Consciousness of the system leads to its rejection.

Source: Amin 1972; Senghaas 1979.2 and 1982.1:Ch. 7.

It is not hard to see that this model generalizes findings Amin had made in his studies of West- and North-African countries.[12] Irrespective of political regime, whether proclaimed socialism or post-colonial capitalism, these fundamental deficiencies were present and served to block a type of economic growth which implied development, that is abolition of marginalization, specified as satisfaction of basic needs, abolition of poverty, and provision of full employment. Amin points out that a number of peripheral countries have experienced economic growth in the postwar era, but with increasing inequalities, being growth without development. Growth proceeds only in certain sectors, it is not broad-based. In Senghaas' (1977.1:17) pointed formulation: "There is no reason to blame the peripheral model for not being capable of accumulation, but it is to blame for accumulation that hurts the majority of the people." As for the elites, they will often be very rich, since the distribution of income is much more inegalitarian than in the core. These groups will defend their privileges, above all by means of militarisation (Senghaas 1977.1:Ch.9).

Based on these studies, Amin drew the political consequence that peripheral countries had no chance of catching up with central capitalism. He argued that in the 19th century, with a quite narrow technology gap between core and periphery, "direct political control" was necessary. This was the basis of colonialism or half-colonialism. But later, with a wider technology gap, foreign capital could dominate through local elites, which is characteristic of neo-colonialism. In the latter case, marginalization had also proceeded further. Thus, in the 20th century periphery, capitalism would have to be surpassed. He expressed the hope that the transition from capitalism to socialism would start from the weakest link in the chain.[13] If the system of relative prices at the world market level was maintained as the criteria of profitability, inequalities in the distribution of income (and thus

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[12] Foster-Carter 1980:12 quotes from Amin's 1967 study of the Ivory Coast, claiming that this is his first explicit use of the idea of an "extraverted" development path: "The Ivory Coast provides an excellent case study of "growth without development": that is to say, growth created and maintained from the outside, without the structures thus established permitting one to foresee any automatic evolution towards the further stage of self-centered national development, moved by its own internal dynamism".

[13] Amin (1972:84) denied that the Soviet model was a useful paradigm for third world states, because Russia in the early 20th century was a backwards country within the capitalist core. It was not, he holds, hit by the problem of marginalisation. (The economic crisis of the USSR in the late 1980s and early 1990s may lead us to doubt that claim.) A transfer of the Soviet model to the third world, introducing public property, or emphasizing heavy industry, would run the risk of reproducing dependent development.

marginalisation) would continue. Only by redefining the criteria for resource-allocation according to the "substantial rationality" of basic needs like food, housing, education and culture, autocentric development would be possible in the late 20th century. Only the turn to autocentric development would make planning possible in peripheral countries (Amin 1972:89). Socialism was a possibility, since the impact of capitalism was stronger in the periphery than in the centre. Amin claimed that "dissociation" or delinking from the world economy would enable the state to release the potentials of modern technological progress, especially related to the production of mass consumer goods. But such self-reliant strategies required "real democracy" at all levels, the village, the region and the state. Amin (1972:86–87) particularly expressed his faith in regional economic collaboration, and imagined that clusters of countries pursuing self-reliant strategies could work together towards the creation of a socialist world system. Reflecting the widespread enthusiasm at that time for the Chinese cultural revolution, Amin emphasized that the transition to self-reliance would have both national, popular-democratic and socialist traits.

In the early 1970s, Senghaas followed the general movement towards dependency theory, introducing the core/periphery-perspective into peace research, viewing the world system as one totality.[14] Senghaas (1973:18,28) here explicitly committed himself to the idea that underdevelopment in the third world is a condition for the development of the first world. As noted above, this approach, most consistently worked out by Andre Gunder Frank and later in Wallerstein's world systems theory, differs from Amin in its analysis of core developments. Amin here has an "internalist" account. In the 1977 book, which is the culmination of the first phase, Senghaas has moved closer to Amin's point that the core experienced "self-determined dynamics", while the development of the periphery was "externally determined". For this reason, Senghaas (1977.1:16) is here careful to draw a distinction between dependency theory and the theory of peripheral capitalism.

However, neither the book, nor the early essays make any attempts to disaggregate the notions of core (or metropole, or centre) and periphery. In the book Senghaas explicitly refuses to elaborate a typology of third world countries, pointing to "the identity of the deep structure of different types of peripheral economies" (1977.1:14–15).

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[14] Cf. Senghaas 1973, which is reprinted with a self-critical preface in Senghaas 1989. See also Senghaas 1974.1.

One of the variables in the typology he refers to is size, so the question of large versus small countries is not a main topic of the book. The book does discuss two cases: Japan is presented as a country that was exposed to the dangers of peripheralization, but which quite early followed a dissociative strategy, thereby securing autocentric development. Brazil is the contrast case. Senghaas also deals extensively with the ideas of Friedrich List, and to the extent List mainly studied German and U.S. developments, Senghaas also relates to these countries. Thus, the cases he discussed in 1977 were mainly large countries. We shall not deal extensively with these analyses here. Senghaas does, however, announce in his introduction (1977.1:21) that he would like to look closer at different strategies of autocentric development. He mentions four topics related to this: First, the "heretic" theory-tradition of F. List and others; second, the development of the western metropoles, starting with England; third, cases like Japan, exposed to threats of peripheralization, but ascending to metropolitan status; and fourth, cases in which peripheralization has been either avoided or transcended, like the USSR, China, and socialist developing countries like North Korea, Albania, Cuba, etc.

While the first and the third topics are dealt with in the book, an elaboration of the second one would lead Senghaas into the second phase. The fourth topic, he had already started to study. He shares Amin's and other dependency theorists' view that partial delinking (or "dissocation") is the only way in which structural heterogeneity can be transformed to structural homogeneity. Following Amin, he specifies three conditions for contemporary autocentric development: 1. A dissociation of the peripheral country from the capitalist world market, 2. restructuring: the achievement of structural coherence by means of social reorganization, and 3. new types of international division of labour: the setting up of regional infrastructures (1980.2=1982.1:333ff; 1979.2; 1977.1:16). Senghaas is always careful to emphasize that dissociation is not the same as autarchy. It implies a fulfilment of all three imperatives. He also states the following as his "central criteria for a successful strategy of autocentric development": "The coherent synchronization of a self-sustained production of means of production with the creation of mass demand in order to cover mass needs and local production of mass consumption articles" (1974.1:34; 1979.2 is the best summary). As we shall see, Senghaas has retained this definition through all the phases of his thinking on development.

In the mid-1970s, Senghaas had recruited doctoral students in Frankfurt to produce monographs on the socialist developing

countries. The title of this project was "Strategien zur Überwindung peripherer Gesellschaftsformationen" ("Strategies to transcend peripheral social formations"). The world was divided into a fourfold table, using the dimensions metropole/periphery and capitalist/socialist: metropolitan capitalism (most of the OECD-countries), metropolitan socialism (USSR, Eastern Europe), capitalist developing countries (dealt with in the theory of peripheral capitalism) and socialist developing countries (1979.2:379). Three of these types were thus cases of autocentric development. Senghaas even claimed that they imply an "identical coherent structure of capital formation". Of course, none of them are without crises, and Senghaas agrees that these crises differ. But he holds that the experience of the three types prove that autocentric development is a rational alternative.

There were few studies of the socialist developing countries, but from Amin's point of view they were particularly important. They were the only countries which presently had the chance to break the spell of structural heterogeneity. They were actually in the process of conducting a transition from underdevelopment (due to the influence of colonialism) to autocentric development. They were the "critical subjects" in a theory of autocentric development. There were also indications that socialist developing countries in a few decades had been able to counteract the most vicious traits of underdevelopment and marginalization known from the capitalist periphery. They seemed able to combat illiteracy, hunger, malnourishment, and unemployment.

Within this project, Menzel did his first large monographs for Senghaas. The first study to emerge from the project was Menzel's (1978.1) study of China, and studies of North-Korea (Wontroba/Menzel 1978.2; Juttka-Reisse 1979), Albania (Russ 1979) and Cuba (Fabian 1981) followed. A volume on North-Korean industrialization was announced, but never published, due to the death of Wontroba.

Senghaas provided prefaces for all these volumes. One aim of the whole project was to investigate how the precapitalist social formations influenced modern developments. This made the researchers aware of the need to develop a regional disaggregation of the "third world". Much of the dependencia literature related to Latin-American and black African experiences. Many Asian cases had quite different preconditions. Analysing Korea, the researchers employed Amin's notion of the tributary mode of production. Concerning

Albania, which had only experienced a short spell of Italian colonialism, Senghaas raises the question whether that country really had been underdeveloped at all. Rather than a peripheral economy that had been underdeveloped by a strong core, it was perhaps an "undeveloped" country. Senghaas concluded that it would be important to include the different pre-colonial contexts in a systematic comparative analysis of contemporary peripheral social formations.
As for the study of Korea, Senghaas in the winter of 1977/78 concluded that the post-1950 division between North and South-Korea was clearly one between an autocentric model (which the North-Koreans dubbed the "juche"-model) and a model based on full integration into the capitalist world economy. Senghaas (Preface to 1978.3:XV,XX) here claims that South Korea would display "all the consequences" of peripheral reproduction. Also in his notes on the study of Albania, Senghaas (Preface to Russ 1979:VII,X) polemically confronts mainstream development economists, who would certainly predict that autocentric development with dynamic domestic linkages could not emerge in a very small country like Albania (China would be a different matter, due to its size). Their alternative is an export-oriented strategy like that of Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea or Taiwan, but Senghaas is very ironic towards the claim that such integration in the world market would trigger off "broad development processes" (Preface to Russ 1979:VII,X).

These conclusions show that Senghaas in the first phase applied the fundamental perspectives of Amin's version of dependencia theory. The deep structure of underdevelopment is emphasized, but on the other hand, there is a growing recognition of the need to disaggregate broad notions like the first or the third world.

The second phase – discovering the combination of autocentric development and openness

The one point in Senghaas' 1977 list of topics which he had not yet dealt with, was the analysis of the development of the metropoles. A new project, "Untersuchung zur Grundlegung einer Praxisorientierten Theorie autozentrierter Entwicklung" ("Investigations to establish a policy-oriented theory of autocentric development"), was started early 1978. In their first working paper, half a year later, Menzel and Senghaas presented the modernization and dependencia approaches as two phases in the evolution of development research, while their own research corresponded to the third phase, working towards a theory of capital accumulation on a world scale. Their new project was designed to analyse the "critical early phases" of the core OECD-

countries. This was a "heuristic" choice, since no systematic investigations of this had been made earlier.

According to Amin, dependent development occurred as the countries at the peak of the international hierarchy dominated the economies of the latecomers. Menzel and Senghaas now emphasized that in the 19th century, many of the present OECD countries were themselves in a peripheral position relative to more productive and competent "dominant economies". They quote a number of examples, like for instance the British pressure on Switzerland, a small country of two million inhabitants, in the period 1760–1840. Their project intended to trace the "preconditions and processes characterizing development trajectories which do not lead to peripheralization", or more precisely: "the condition for effective counter-management in a situation of threatening peripheralization by potential metropoles within a hierarchically ordered international economy" (1979.1:288).

The important point is that Senghaas and Menzel proposes to apply the theory of peripheral capitalism – rephrased as a theory about the dangers of peripheralization – to the 19th century development of 20th century core countries. Amin had mainly analysed the results of, not the emergence of the core itself. Thus, the notion of "peripheralization pressure" becomes a crucial one, particularly the problem of whether this pressure – or the "competence gap", another term used by Senghaas – is changing, or similar over time. As we have just seen, Amin holds that this pressure increases in the 20th century. The position of Senghaas and Menzel on this matter, however, is ambivalent.

In the first phase, Senghaas defended the strategy of delinking. But only after one year of research on the 19th century development of the OECD-countries, Senghaas made an interesting turn by deciding on a typology – originally proposed by Menzel – which shows that autocentric development had not *only* resulted from delinking. Such development could also be traced in cases of *integration* into the world economy. A somewhat shortened version of the typology is presented in Table 3.

Table 3. Patterns of world economic integration and resulting development pattern.

Pattern of integration in the world economy	Autocentric	Peripheral
I. Primacy of internal dynamics: private market economy	Belgium (1820-60) France (19th century) Austria Germany	Portugal (1703-) Ireland (1814-1930) Latin America (1840-1930) Africa (1880-1965) Asia (1880-1965)
II. Associative	Seitzerland (The Netherlands) Belgium (1860-)	Portugal (1880-) Spain (1880-1937) Ireland (1930-) Latin America (1930-) Africa (1965-) Asia (1965-)
III. Associative/Dissociative	The nordic countries (from 1860/80) Settler colonies: Canada, Australia, New Zealand; USA (before 1860)	India (1947-)
IV. Primacy of internal dynamics: state capitalism	Japan (1868-) Russia (1880-) Italy (1890-) Hungary (1880-)	
V. Dissociative, Dissociative/Associative	The USSR (1917-) The Eastern bloc and the socialist developing countries (1945-)	

Note: The typology is modified. Ireland has been added.
Source: Senghaas/Menzel 1979.3; Senghaas 1980.1:46; 1983.2.

In 1982, Senghaas published a collection of essays, entitled *Von Europa lernen* (1982.1), consisting mainly (but not entirely) of essays related to this project. The first long essay (1981.3) of the book discusses this typology thoroughly. The starting point is the pressure of peripheralization by the core countries on the latecomers. The types I, IV and V (see table 3) are compatible with the earlier discussion of autocentric development. Type V is Amin's paradigm countries for delinking from the postwar world economy. As for I and IV, the label "primacy of internal dynamics" indicates that these countries were either relieved of too strong external challenges (type I) or were cases of successful state capitalism (type IV). Although even the latter would be interesting to consider more closely, it is clear that the types II and III are novelties, which are quite challenging in the light of Senghaas' earlier criticism of "integration". Switzerland and Belgium

achieved an autocentric pattern despite full integration in the world economy. Hence, Senghaas' criticism against the integrationists had to be modified: He now emphasized that only a minority of countries succeeded with an "associative" connection to the world economy. Most of the Type II countries are classified as peripheral countries. Type III, countries which have been mixing elements of liberalization and protection, contains a much larger number of successful cases, but even there, a number of peripheral ones crop up. It should not be forgotten that counting the population of countries in the peripheral category, we easily see that such distorted development is the fate of most people living in the world today. Free trade only led to autocentric development in certain exceptional cases (1982.1:Ch.1,sect.4). The most common reaction to the pressure of peripheralization is the emergence of peripheral capitalism (1982.1:Ch.1,sect.5).

The typology traces different responses to peripheralization pressure in "critical development phases". Senghaas also discusses the fact that the historical timing seems to indicate a growing politization and degree of state intervention as we approach the contemporary situation (1982.1:Ch.1,sect.3): Autocentric development has become an "ever more difficult and politicized affair, the further one proceeds to the present. (...) In the last sixty years there has been no single country which has reached any degree of overall coherence, viability and maturity without dissociating from the prevailing mechanisms of the world market" (1980.1:49, cf. 1983.2 for a longer version). This statement reads like an attempt to save Amin, but Senghaas also warns against generalizations. He notes that in the future, Taiwan could prove a case of Type II-development. Type III cases may well occur again. He also notes that except Type V, all cases in the long term converge towards Type II, but the long term perspective brings us outside the "critical phase" which the typology intends to cover.

The typology in Table 3 mainly serves a negative function. It helps Senghaas to transcend his starting point, which was Amin's theory. Contained in types II and III are *both* cases of autocentric and peripheral development. This implies that the *explanation* of both successes and failures cannot mainly be sought in the strategy of integration into the world economy. Already by 1979/80, it was clear to Senghaas that his cases demonstrated "that the success or failure of development processes very much depends on *internal* socio-political conditions, and if these work against overall development, not even the best international setting would be good enough to overcome such obstacles" (1980.1:51).

Thus, the final five sections of the introduction to *Von Europa lernen* turns away from the study of peripheralization pressure, investigating internal factors. Furthermore, part II of *Von Europa lernen*, which is about half the book, contains two case studies of open, export-oriented economies that succeeded in tackling peripheralization pressure, thereby achieving autocentric development (1980.4=1982.1:Ch.2; 1980.5=1982.1:Ch.3). Above all, Senghaas focuses on Type III countries.[15] The particular focus of the case-studies was the few small countries which caught up with the larger ones, despite integration in the world market. In these countries, pressure from the world market was strongest. Thus, becoming a successful small export economy was a particularly impressive achievement, since these countries had only small populations and were very vulnerable against external economic competition. Writing the chapters of *Von Europa lernen*, Senghaas drew from the more detailed empirical case studies conducted by Menzel in the same period, but published much later (1988.1).[16]

The first case study deals with the Scandinavian countries (1980.4=1982.1:Ch.2). They first established an association to the world market by exporting their various staples: agrarian and mineral raw materials. Export incomes allowed them to import processed consumer goods and machinery. In a second phase, their infant industries were protected by dissociative policies and this ensured import-substitution industrialization. Combining associative *and* dissociative development policies, they are examples of Type III. Despite their continuous export orientation, they achieved autocentric development: "Once import-substitution industrialization succeeded, they began to export not only unprocessed agrarian and mineral raw materials but also processed consumer goods, and later on also producer goods" (1980.1:45 f).

Senghaas' attempted explanation has three steps (1982.1:135–138/89–92): For the initial association to world markets via raw materials, he holds that Hirschman's (1977) theory of linkages demonstrates the

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15 By including, as Ch. 7 of *Von Europa lernen*, an essay written as early as 1977/78 to sum up the 1977.1 book, Senghaas obscures his departure from Amin's position. He is forced to add a preface (1982.1:321/203) pointing out that the types II/III was not taken into account in that paper. This lumping together of essays from different phases of his research, is confusing to the reader.

16 1988.1 consists of 1981.2 as introduction, 1979.6 on Switzerland, 1980.3 on Denmark, 1980.7 on Sweden, 1981.1 on Canada, and 1981.4 as conclusion. In 1982.1:255, Senghaas announced the publication of Menzel's book – under the different title, "Autozentrierte Entwicklung trotz Weltmarktintegration" – for 1983. In the English edition (1982.1:263), the title is quoted as "Autozentrierte Auswege aus Abhängigkeit".

potential for selective industrialization in close interaction with the staple exports. Also the theory of how small countries may establish successful export activities in certain niches of the world market is important (Menzel 1988.1:582, with reference to Hildebrand 1975). As for linkages, one can always discuss whether the resource base itself constrains the spin-offs that follow from a given staple production activity (e.g. Baldwin 1956). There are probably more linkages extending from timber-exports than from exports of olives.

Senghaas, however, argues that linkages may be seen as a potential which will be activated depending on social preconditions (1982.1:249/163). An opening up of the linkage potential gives rise to a progressive "maturing process", which bolsters the transformation from an export economy to a national economy with internal coherence. The export sector is stripped of its enclave nature, and a substantial "domestic" market is established. The import-substitution processes of the Scandinavian countries did not seem to require extreme degrees of protection. The development of backward and forward linkages in a sense forms barriers to entry, they represent competence which defend the national production system despite the integration in a world economy of stronger competitors. Senghaas lists a number of "socio-structural and institutional preconditions" which releases the linkage potential. Local linkage effects surpasses a certain threshold. In this situation, peripheralization pressure can be counteracted: price competition from stronger competitors lead to "innovative responses" (1982.1:135/89; Senghaas also refers to Levin 1960; Smith & Toye 1979). Given the property, resource and income distribution in Scandinavia, rural incomes were broadly spread, and import substitution became "broadly effective".

As a third explanatory step, Senghaas proposes a Lewis type dual economy model in order to illuminate the effects of a turn from a situation with unlimited supplies of labour (Lewis 1954) to one marked by increasing scarcity of labour (largely due to emigration). This feature is less general. It is of relevance in the Nordic area at the turn of the century. It is an empirical question how valid that mechanism is for other countries. Thus, the second step is the most crucial one in Senghaas' turn to internal features.

Table 4 lists the socio-structural and institutional factors mentioned by Senghaas. He gives only a verbal presentation of the list, so the table is a further systematisation of ours. In any case, the list of factors must be regarded as the main result of the second phase of Menzel and Senghaas' research. These factors are the "the basic background and

Table 4. The list of variables explaining autocentric development.

1. ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

- The nature of staple exports
- Geo-economic conditions
  - conditions for agriculture
  - resource endowments
  - regional markets

2. SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS

AREA	VARIABLES (QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE)	VALUE OF VARIABLES CONDUCIVE TO AUTOCENTRIC DEVELOPMENT	RELATIONS TO OTHER FACTORS AND RESEARCH TRADITIONS
Agrarian property	– Distribution of land holdings	– All distributions are relatively "egalitarian" (or marked by only "moderate inequality"), that is: approaching the normal curve	– Rather than size as such the crucial feature is the intensity of farming and the degree of mechanization, i.e. the productivities of land and labour
	– Share of land occupied by holdings of different sizes		
	– Pattern of ownership of other resources (forests, minerals, fish, etc.)		
	– Innovation-orientation of farmers	– High innovation orientation	
Distribution of income	– Distribution of income	– Same as above (only "moderate inequality"); influences the dynamics of the domestic market	– This is one of the factors which creates a "homogenous social structure".
	– The relation between the distribution of income and the savings rate	– The savings rate must be such that productive investments are allowed	
	– The relation between the distribution of income and the demand for investment goods	– The domestic market must be sufficiently stimulated	
	– The share of wages and salaries in the net national product	– Relatively high	– Related to union density
Economic institutions (affecting the quality of the firms)	– Risk-oriented entrepreneurs/firms	– Industrial interests gaining hegemony over traditional elite groups	– Social and political mobilisation
	– Banking system	– Supportive of these firms	
	– Nature of national innovation system at the firm level	– Able to mix collaboration and competition, to absorb information and new technologies, to innovate in times of crisis	
	– Level of education	– High (a high level of literacy)	– The state
	– Quality of institutions of higher education	– High quality, and dense connections to firms	– The state

3. POLITICAL AND SOCIAL MOBILISATION

AREA	VARIABLES (QUALITATIVE & QUANTITATIVE)	VALUE OF VARIABLES CONDUCIVE TO AUTOCENTERED DEVELOPMENT	RELATIONS TO OTHER FACTORS AND RESEARCH TRADITIONS
Social	– Mobilisation of farmers	– Strong cooperative movement	
	– Mobilisation of workers	– Strong union movement	– The state (cf. the research tradition of Walter Korpi)
Political	– Democratization	– Effective democratization weakens old elites and leaves more room for "industrial" interest groups and the establishment of "conflict solution systems" in which these groups have a say	– Small countries are often influenced by events in large countries – Comparison of conflict solution system (comparisons of corporatism) – Distribution variables
	– Nation building and sovereignty	– Early national sovereignty allows national self-determination in customs policies, control of resources, use of earlier unsettled areas	– Social mobilisation – The state
	– Nature of party system	– A large degree of clientelism may be a problem, especially if it reaches from the local into the central administration	– The state (Rokkan's comparative tradition)
State apparatus	– Administrative reform	– The bureaucracy must adjust to democratization and new social movements – Unified legal system and legal security	– Social and political mobilization ("Bringing the state back in" – research tradition)
	– State provision of infrastructure	– Maintain demand e.g. for high-tech products, facilitate the emergence of industrial centres and interaction between agriculture and industry. Match intervention and competition	– Economic institutions (Neo-Schumpeterian research traditions)
	– State provision of education		– Economic institutions

Source: Senghaas 1982.1:136ff/90ff. Modified and extended.

environmental conditions" behind the "development scenario" that we observe. The table is descriptive and inductive.[17] Concerning institutions and social structures, numerous typologies are possible, and the number of possible links between different aspects are enormous. The focal point, we must remember, is the transition from an export economy to an integrated national economy.

While for Amin, the development of core capitalism was due to internal features, Senghaas now argues that internal features are generally decisive, both in the first and in the third world. Not only autocentric, but also peripheral development is mainly due to domestic forces. Furthermore, since autocentric development was possible in open economies, socialist self-reliance is rejected as the "norm" for growth with development. Senghaas has moved from politically radical third-worldism to Western reformism.

Menzel's monographs, which Senghaas drew on, studies the transition to an autocentric development pattern in the critical periods of four success cases: Canada, Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland. The former three are Type III-cases, while the latter is Type II. Responding to peripheralization pressure, each country showed a "unique mix of technology transfer and indigenous invention or adjustment". Their trade policies involved "very careful and very selective" delinking. All countries avoided direct competition, seeking specialized niches, that is, hiding behind barriers based on specific skills, knowledge, etc. Trade liberalisation and state intervention were balanced: liberalisation hit remaining feudal privileges, and state intervention was responsible for the fact that in "all cases a more homogenous distribution of land was either preserved or initiated" (1988.1:552). This trend would then continue in the 1930s, with early welfare state measures, and early efforts at employment policy.

While the focus of the second phase was autocentric development experiences, Senghaas' original intention was still the same as in phase one: research should be relevant for present-day developing countries. It would thus seem that comparisons between these autocentric experiences and more recent failure cases would be

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17 Senghaas attempts to distribute the factors according to the academic disciplines of social science: *Economics* deals with the opening of the linkage potential, *sociology* studies social structures supportive of development (in particular the agrarian structure), and *political science* deals with solutions of socio-political conflict in the early phases which crucially determine the development trajectory. But part 2 of Table 2 involves more than just sociology. It involves property right economics and studies of income distribution. Similarly, there is just as much sociology as political science in part 3 of the table.

important. As Senghaas' and Menzel's research evolved, this proved to be a weak point, as we shall show. Since the start of the second phase, we find only one contribution by Senghaas and/or Menzel in which both failure and success cases are discussed comprehensively. This essay, "Alternative Development Paths of Export Economies" (1980.5=1982.1:Ch.3), is the longest one in *Von Europa lernen*. It starts with a comparison of Denmark and Uruguay, and then goes on to discuss – although very briefly – many other cases. The first comparison is one among many possible paired comparisons. Senghaas notes that he could just as well have studied "Denmark and Ireland, the Netherlands and Portugal, Norway and Greece, Sweden and Spain, Finland and Romania" (1982.1:147).[18]

Comparing Denmark and Uruguay, Senghaas emphasizes that these two countries did not have "dissimilar" points of departure: they were small, had small populations, and their modern development started in the early 19th century, related to agrarian staple exports, as they both lacked other natural resources. About 160 years later, Denmark was one of the world's richest countries, while Uruguay displayed all the defects of peripheral capitalism.

Senghaas rejects the claim that Uruguay was kind of a "Latin-American Switzerland" in the mid 19th century. His comparison shows that Uruguay's development pattern relied on a "social deep structure" decisively different from both Denmark's and Switzerland's. Senghaas argues that the distributions of land and soil are crucial factors in the early development of any country. Empirically, Denmark displays a relatively normal distribution, due to the dominance of family farms. Uruguay, in contrast, has a "Latin American" pattern, that is, very unequal sizes of farms and distribution of land. In Denmark, the relatively egalitarian distribution of holdings caused increasing incomes from exports and productivity increases to trickle down on large groups of the population, generating a home market, despite the small population. *"These different degrees of inequality implied different development potentials of the domestic market in question.* In Uruguay a highly unequal structure resulted in import-export activities on the pattern of the classical division of labour between metropoles and peripheries." (1982.1:174/119).

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18 For some preliminary notes on Greece and Norway, see Aubert 1989, and for a-comparison of all the Scandinavian countries with Greece, Bulgaria and Romania, see Nordhaug 1991. A critical application of Senghaas' analytical framework to the case of Norway may be found in Dillman 1988 and Mjøset 1991:Ch.5.

The connection between industry and agriculture was thus entirely different in the two countries. In Denmark, dense networks of microcircuits linked manufacturing industry to agriculture. In Uruguay, "stock farming, which started with extensive production methods, remained basically extensive over decades and did not on the whole lead to any diversification of agriculture, was bound to prevent the emergence of an agriculture-based industry of Danish quality and density" (1982.1:169ff/113).

The importance of one variable stands out here: the distribution of land holdings (for an early analysis emphasizing the importance of this variable for politics, see Russett 1964). If, says Senghaas, in an exercise of counterfactual reasoning, "big estates had retained a larger presence and greater political influence, agricultural development on the pattern prevailing east of the Elbe [i.e. feudal patterns; L.M.] would have been more likely than an agricultural system based on family-operated farms and an economically independent peasantry" (1982.1:175ff/121). Senghaas enjoys playing around with such "alternative scenarios": If Finland had developed a Latin-American type agrarian oligarchy, he writes, these social forces would have had no interest in supporting a domestic import substitution industry. The consumption needs of this small elite could easily be satisfied by mports (1982.1:121/77). Finland could have become like Romania (1986.2:42/21ff). He also imagines a Balcan-Romanian fate for Sweden, possibly a Greek fate for Norway (1982.1:139ff/92), or Australia could have become something like Argentina. Conversely, he imagines that Portugal could have been Belgium or Switzerland (1986.2:42/21ff).

Senghaas also give brief discussions, based on a very limited selection of sources, of two other autocentric cases (New Zealand and the Netherlands), and of one additional peripheral case (Ireland). A third section of the essay draws conclusions for development theory, and may be seen as further elaboration of mechanisms (middle range theories) connected to the dimensions of the scheme above. Senghaas also presents the development of the Cuban economy since 1963 as a case of autocentric development "in spite of an initial dependence on agricultural exports" (1982.1:194). The final two parts of the essay turn from small export-economies to somewhat larger ones. Here, a variety of peripheral cases are briefly analysed: Hungary, Romania, Thailand, Spain, the southern states of the U.S., and Argentina. The latter is compared to Australia, which is counted as an autocentric case.

Although not published before 1988, Menzel was through with his study of Canada, Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland in 1981, the year before *Von Europa lernen* was published. In his summary of the project comparing successful autocentric cases, he first summarizes three explanatory variables with which we are familiar from the earlier discussion of Type III cases (cf. Table 3): the even spread of export incomes, the early factor shortages (labour in particular), and a mixed strategy of association and dissociation. In addition, he mentions timing, the "parallel relationship between worldwide prosperity and spurts of industrialization in export economies" (1988.1:559). Then Menzel discards these explanatory factors as "mere economic" ones (1988.1:560). He refers to failure cases in which one or more of these factors have been present without generating catching up, and he argues that the pattern of income distribution needs itself to be explained. His conclusion is that the real explanatory factors must be traced in "the social and political systems of the respective countries", and his two major explanatory sections are termed "social preconditions" and "political preconditions".[19] In this way, the other four explanatory variables would count only as intermediate variables in the explanation. He thus obviously shares Senghaas' views on the determining nature of the social deep structure.

By the time of the publication of *Von Europa lernen* in 1982, Menzel and Senghaas had started a new project entitled "Entwicklung aus Unterentwicklung? Untersuchung über die Wahrscheinlichkeit nachholender Entwicklung von Schwellenländern – am Beispiel Südkoreas und Taiwans" ("Development emerging from underdevelopment – An investigation of the likelihood of catch up development of threshold countries – the cases of South Korea and Taiwan"), a project which lasted from September 1981 to April 1984. It resulted in Menzel's study *In der Nachfolge Europas. Autozentrierte Entwicklung in den ostasiatischen Schwellenländern Südkorea und Taiwan* (1985.4). The title was first used for a short essay in *Von Europa lernen*, Ch. 5: "In der Nachfolge Europas? Über ostasiatische Entwicklungswege".

Senghaas makes an interesting remark on the relationship between the methodology in this project as compared to the preceding one. In the project on early European transitions, hypotheses were derived from the debate on contemporary development theory. In particular, the

[19] In our restatement of Senghaas's scheme (Table 4), we have used the terms "socio-economic" and "socio-political", based on the "institutionalist" conviction that there are no "pure" economic factors.

study of processes of peripheralization inspired a study of open economies that had not become peripheries. "Explanations of peripheralization processes were employed to find out why peripheralization did not occur" (1981.6=1985.4:20ff). This gave rise to the list of explanatory factors, explaining export-oriented, world-market-integrated catch up development. Now, Menzel and Senghaas starts with this list of factors and looks at empirical cases in which the problem is whether they are repeating the successful autocentric development of the OECD countries, or whether they are cases of peripheralization.

The change from the project title to the title of the book and the article is interesting. The project title still regards these countries as starting from a position of "underdevelopment", and the "Einleitung" to the book, written jointly by Menzel and Senghaas at an early stage of the project work (1981.6), is clearly ambivalent as to what the answer is to the main question. The same is the case with the short chapter in *Von Europa lernen*. At the end of the project, however, the question mark has disappeared: Menzel's book title presents the two NICs as cases of autocentric development, following in the footsteps of Europe. This step leads from the second to the third phase.

In Ch. 5 in *Von Europa lernen*, Senghaas takes the debate on integration in the world economy as his point of departure. For the development aid establishment, e.g. the World Bank, integration in the world economy is the key to development. Others, like Senghaas in his first phase (see p. above), regarded integration as a blind alley. But in the late 1970s, a group of left-wing development researchers also began to argue a more optimistic view of the possibilities of catch-up capitalist development. In the rather extreme views of Warren (1980), the whole third world was on its way to develop. The hunger and displacement characteristic of the periphery was not worse than what Europe had itself experienced at the time of the industrial revolution. Modernisation theory was reintroduced into Marxism.

In the first phase, Senghaas had held that South Korea shared all the traits of the peripheral mode. Now, he finds it hard to decide whether South Korea is about to make a transition to autocentric development despite its world market integration, or whether it is marked by some of the same difficulties as other countries of the capitalist periphery (1982.1:261/170). He emphasizes, however, that both income distribution and the distribution of holdings are more egalitarian than in most other third world countries (1982.1:262/171ff). In fact, only Taiwan had a better score. But there has been no deepening of the

domestic market, a fact which corresponds to an abnormally high export share (34 percent in 1978), abnormal for a country with a medium large population. Inspired by his studies of Scandinavian development he wonders whether South Korea will experience a situation of labour scarcity, and whether such a squeeze will lead the country on to a more dynamic development path. The fact that labour becomes scarce would namely indicate a "thorough capitalization of society". However, if South Korea fails to turn from extensive to intensive accumulation, with a continuous increase in productivity, it will encounter problems similar to those of socialist developing countries, e.g. its socialist twin, North Korea (1982.1:266/175).

The reference to such problems is quite surprising. Above, we have seen that in his long essay (1982.1:Ch.3), written August 1980, Senghaas still regarded Cuba as a success case. But already earlier the same year, he had published an essay on socialism in which the conclusions were less optimistic. This essay (1980.2=1982.1:Ch.6) sums up the earlier project on the self-reliance strategies of socialist developing countries. It also includes analyses of the more industrialized Eastern European countries. Writing after his discovery of internal factors, Senghaas has concluded that delinking is not a sufficient condition for autocentric development. Amin's idea, referred above, was that in the 20th century, catching up with capitalism was no longer possible, capitalism had to be transcended. Interpreting socialism, Senghaas turns this idea on its head, supporting the view of Wallerstein's world systems theory in this particular respect: Socialism does not transcend capitalism, it is a strategy for catching up with the capitalist core. It seems that Senghaas becomes increasingly ambivalent towards Amin's idea: In the essay on socialism, he seems to maintain the idea that catching up is increasingly difficult in the 20th century (1982.1:279,289,291). But in 1981, writing with Menzel, he not only warns against explaining underdevelopment with reference to export-orientation (openness) or access to resources, but also reject the claim that development has not possible since the era of organized capitalism at about the turn of the century (1981.6=1985.4:31).

The new emphasis on "internal factors" makes it less urgent to pass a judgement here. Senghaas' diagnosis is rather that the problems encountered by the socialist countries are internal. He claims that in a first phase, all the small socialist countries could record successes. But this early success created a politically based "disproportionality", giving rise to structural economic problems. The roots of these problems were above all political: The monopoly of power tended to

isolate the ruling elites, who ran a top-heavy planning bureaucracy. They became unable to learn from experience, and thus also critically to evaluate policies. Problems of investment and trouble in coordinating industrial production emerged. As a result, the transition to greater emphasis on agricultural and industrial supply of consumer goods was barred. The development of a domestic market, that is, the transition from extensive to intensive economic development, was blocked. While Senghaas had earlier tried to make Amin's dichotomy fit, we here see that the group of autocentric cases (Table 3) is split. The real success cases are the Western European, later OECD countries, while the eastern European and other socialist countries seem to embark on an autocentric track from which they later depart. As we shall argue in our concluding section, a more sophisticated typology seems necessary.

The problems emerging in the socialist countries make the population apathetic, most people retreating to privacy. Senghaas writes, ten years before the peaceful Eastern European revolutions of 1989, that "new social conflicts threaten to arise in consequence of growing social inequality": "If reforms are not carried out, the effectivity trend of the economy further declines. If they are carried out, new and hitherto unusual forms of open conflict settlement are necessary, which conflict with the present, political-institutional character of socialist societies. Here lies the acute structural dilemma of present socialist societies" (1982.1:299/198). (The impact of secret police corps are not mentioned, but has become clear after the breakdown of the European versions of these regimes in 1989/90.) The paradox is that in these "worker/farmer-states", what was needed was a catching up process which would make the labour movement independent (1982.1:319). A class compromise should develop, with open, institutionalized conflict settlement (1982.1:299ff/198).

Among the socialist countries, Senghaas distinguishes three groups. The first is the East European socialist countries with a developed industrial base, like DDR and CSSR. These countries, claims Senghaas, would clearly have been better off with capitalism, and the problems of the first phase showed up particularly early. The second is the East European countries with a background in "development dictatorships" (like Romania), and the third the socialist development countries, one European (Albania), and the others non-European (North-Korea, Cuba). Socialism was most effective in cases where it promoted the overcoming of the structures of peripheral capitalism. But where "advanced capitalist countries" (DDR, CSSR) were transformed into command economies and had a political autocracy

imposed on them, further development was barred. In a more general perspective, Senghaas claims that in the countries of the capitalist core, socialist movements were transformed into social democracies. With a very broad definition of social democracy, this would apply in the whole Western Europe. Senghaas also introduces a notion of semi-peripheral countries, characterized by a lot of structural heterogeneity, but also by a relatively broad development of productive forces (in industry especially). Such semiperipheries, he claims, generated Eurocommunism.

"Socialism" in the periphery, i.e. African, Arab, Indonesian, etc. socialisms, represent a rethoric, which only indicates a need to catch up. The patterns of conflict in such countries often lead to the victory of a corporatist regime. The more developed the productive forces were, the more problems socialism created![20] We shall not discuss further Senghaas' substantive analyses. It suffices to note that the dichotomy between autocentric and peripheral development must be modified into a more finegrained typology.

The conclusions on socialist development indicate a growing importance of factors related to the political level (Table 4.3). The problem of catching up in the 20th century is not inherent in the world economic framework as such. But the paradox is that while autocratic rule seems necessary at the outset, this point of departure creates political inertia. Here is a similarity between both the socialist and capitalist attempts at catching up. The political framework can only be reproduced in the long term with counter-productive social and economic consequences. In fact, Senghaas and Menzel underline that this has been best analysed in certain branches of modernization theory. The development of productive forces creates highly complex socio-economic structures, which cannot be managed within an autocratic framework. (Their main reference is the socio-cybernetic approach of Karl W. Deutsch: cf. Deutsch 1961, 1966, 1977.) The result is decreasing productivity of capital. This increasing complexity must be matched by a more flexible political framework than what the command approach can supply. More generally, parallel to the establishment of "coherent national economies", a specific political culture and a particular cultural identity develops. An effective political and administrative system is established, one which increases the socio-cybernetic potential for self-management. The problems

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[20] Senghaas 1982.1:304 f/202, argues that the only case of successful combination of anticapitalist development and democracy was Israel, and that case led to "mature" capitalism. Senghaas notes that there has been no democracy for the non-Jews, but he does not discuss the militarisation of Israeli society.

connected to the autocratic structure, is the key to the political conflicts in countries like South Korea and Taiwan: "Such conflicts have objective preconditions, which have been analysed by the most sophisticated versions of historical-systematic theory of modernization" (1981.6:38).

This conclusion is reached at the end of the second phase. In the third phase, the celebration of the NICs becomes more unqualified, as we shall now see.

The third phase – generalization and operationalization

A major motivation in Senghaas' research was always to generate knowledge of relevance for the third world. Thus, following the focused study of small OECD-countries, and the two larger Southeast Asian NICs, it was to be expected that the sequence of projects would be completed by the publication of a volume entitled *Europas Entwicklung und die Dritte Welt* (1986.2). This collection of essays represents the third phase, in which Senghaas and Menzel return to the structural heterogenous countries from the "internalist" position they had consolidated during the second phase. They also extend their arguments from small exporting economies to economies of any size, so the size variable looses most of its importance. This phase has no new monographs, which is regrettable.

The final collection of essays has three sections. The first section is a "synopsis", in which Menzel and Senghaas looks back at the problem of development, summarizing their projects. In particular they consider whether their results are also valid for larger countries (1986.2:21–72). The second section deals with differentiation in the third world, and particularly with the group of NICs ("threshold-countries"). It also discusses how to operationalize the crucial variables that accounts for seemingly successful outcomes of catching-up processes.[21] The third section of the book deals with the impact of the international order on development: the failure of NIEO-reforms, the impact of international regimes, and military conflicts in the third world. The world economy is here analysed in more specific historical terms of hegemony and regimes.

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[21] In fact, about 40 pages from Menzel's monograph on South Korea and Taiwan are reprinted with very few revisions in this part of the collection, i.e. 1985.4:241–282=1986.2:148–198.

As we have seen, in the first phase, Senghaas shared Amin's conviction that catching up today required radical delinking. In the second phase, Menzel and Senghaas were in doubt as to whether the NIC-countries could serve as models. We have just seen that they found the same problems of autocratic rule in the NICs as in the socialist countries within the postwar Eastern bloc. Among these countries, the socialist developing countries, China, Cuba, Albania, North Korea – which had been closest to ideal cases in the first phase of research – could record the best results, after all. In the third phase, however, most of the ambivalence concerning the NICs is gone,[22] while the socialist developing countries are out of question as models.

The summary essay starts from the results of the second phase: the identification of the internal mechanisms which secure successful development with integration into the world market. Following this, two cases of unsuccessful development are discussed. But only in the sections which attempt to generalize earlier findings, this essay adds something new. Menzel and Senghaas now promote the experience of small, autocentric/export-oriented countries as model cases, valid for any phase of industrialism. "Research on countries with large populations and large areas, whose foreign trade share is small because of their size, shows that the conclusions reached in the comparative analysis of export economies can be applied on a general basis. Just as in export economies, success or failure in development depends on early and broad-ranging agrarian modernization and corresponding industrialization" (1986.2:43/22). Thus, their typologies now pretend to classify the "development scenarios" of all countries of the world.[23]

Drawing conclusions for general development theory, Senghaas presents a typology which directly approaches the problem of social and political prerequisites for successful development. The typology distinguishes five "basic socio-political constellations", cf. Table 5.

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[22] The judgements of the first phase, e.g. Senghaas preface to Wontroba/Menzel 1978.2:XV,XX, cf. above p. , are explicitly characterized as "voreilig" – hurried – in 1985.4:18.

[23] One typology is on the correlation between agrarian modernization and the type of industrialisation, already sketched in the second phase (1982.1:66ff/46ff). Six types of possible connections between agricultural dynamics and industrialization are discussed. Given Senghaas' conclusions that socio-structural and socio-political variables matter, this typology has a difficult "intermediate" position. The variables namely, influence both agrarian reform processes and the nature of industrialization (1986.2:43ff/22ff). The discussion of these factors in the summary essay, however, is surprisingly vague and unsystematic, selecting items already contained in Table 4 (the rule of law, literacy, the role of the state in providing infrastructure, etc.).

Table 5. Socio-structural baseline conditions.

	Decisive collective actors				Social compromise resulting from the formative conflict
Type	Farmers	Bourgeoisie	Workers	State bureaucracy	
1. No feudal past	Freehold farmers	Productive small business sector, growing to industrial bourgeoisie	Wage earners gain strength early	pursues a coherent development strategy: infrastructure construction, selective protectionism	Autocentric virtuous circle. *Examples:* The four settler colonies: Canada, the U.S., Australia, New Zealand
2. Successful defeudalization	Similar structure as Type 1, but as a result of often long and painful processes of social change depending on the variable configuration between rulers, aristocracy, merchant capital, bourgeoisie, working class.				Autocentric virtuous circle. *Examples:* Western Europe, particularly smooth in Scandinavia.
3. Dominant agrarian oligarchy and merchant capital	Agrarian oligarchy	Strong merchant capital fraction, a subordinate industrial bourgeoisie			Vicious circle of peripheral export economies. *Examples:* Latin America, peripheral Europe
4. Colonial situation				Local elites retaining – after independence – privileges gained in collaboration with colonial rulers.	Vicious circle of peripheral export economies, perhaps even more monocultural enclave economies than Type 3. *Examples:* Many third world countries.
5. State class				State class may succeed in dominating traditional forces, embarking on an offensive development strategy	Different outcomes in individual countries. *Examples of successes:* The Southeast-Asian NICs.

Source: Menzel & Senghaas 1986.2:49–51/27–30.

This typology is somewhat disappointing. Senghaas only provides a verbal presentation, the table is our own suggestion. The way we have organized the table shows that the typology relies on an implicit classification of collective actors. As we move down the table, an increasing number of holes are empty. As for type 3, which is perhaps closest to Amin's notion of a peripheral economy, we know that the alliance between the agrarian oligarchy and merchant capital strangles industrial development (thus, no significant power to workers, i.e. empty hole in the table). As for types 4 and 5, Senghaas gives no indication of the interaction between local elites and other collective actors. Thus, he leaves us with no means or concepts to deal with the complex relation between populist liberation movements, ethnic conflicts and clientelistic politics in post-colonial societies. Type 5 is particularly problematic, since the outcome may here be both peripheral and success cases (e.g. the Southeast-Asian NICs). In sum, the types most relevant for the analysis of third world cases, are the least satisfactory ones. These types are so vague that an unequivocal classification of cases seems impossible.

Although Senghaas claims that the generalization from small to all countries is successful, the vagueness of this final typology indicate that the ambitious goal of total generalisation has not really been achieved. The general point that the same factors will help us explain developments in both large and small countries is fairly self-evident given that Senghaas' focus is now on internal factors. More specific consequences, i.e. further specifications of the factors in Table 4, are not drawn. Senghaas urges development research to pay particular attention "to the analysis of socio-political constellations, a subject scarcely touched on hitherto" (1986.2:52/30). But in fact this typology does not match the level he himself has achieved in other parts of his work.

Types 1–2 produce virtuous circles and types 3–4 imply vicious circles, while type 5 may generate one or the other. Actually, earlier parts of the essay contain interesting accounts of such circles (or cumulative processes) for the cases of autocentric and peripheral development, respecified with a stronger emphasis on internal factors than what Amin would have allowed. Perhaps the most important result of the third phase is such sketches of the interrelationships between the solutions of social conflicts and the economic development potential of a country. Senghaas already hinted at this earlier, but such connections are now much more elaborated. We have attempted to summarize these accounts in the form of the two Figures 6 and 7, which are just very crude indications of the complex

feedback relations involved. Senghaas refers to Gunnar Myrdal's notions of "circular and cumulative causation", and also talks about the "factors having a configurative effect on each other" (1986.2:29ff/11).

The social and political variables play a crucial role here: Success hinges on the outcome of the political conflict between "new" and "old" groups, and "in export economies with a detrimental social structure this political conflict has generally culminated in the victory of the traditional oligarchic export interests" (1986.2:29/10ff).

Figure 7 indicates some mechanisms involved in types 3 and 4 of Table 5. As for type 3, it consists of failure cases in spite of long term independence: Argentina and Uruguay are examples of settler colonies which failed to develop. There are also rice-exporters like Thailand and Burma, and countries of the eastern and southern "European periphery", including the South-Western case of Portugal. These countries were exposed to similar terms of trade movements as the successful ones, but was not in a position to benefit from this. The formative conflicts took place in Portugal in the 17th/18th century, and in Latin America in the early 19th century. As an outcome of social struggles, the agrarian oligarchy and merchant capital became related to each other in a symbiotic fashion. Their interests influenced domestic relations in a way which supported peripheralization. In this way, internal forces determined the external vertical type of integration of the country as periphery opposed to the core. "It would not be an incorrect interpretation of history to describe this process as a kind of auto-colonization" (1986.2:32/13). Their lack of success is their own responsibility, a fact which has been obscured by dependencia theory. Such a constellation hampers the development of a national bourgeoisie, the development of human capital, and the abolition of illiteracy. The state is not ready to support the bourgeoisie. These countries would see Europe as the standard, and they would regard their own lower classes as "barbarians". All the problems of marginalization (cf. Table 2) would be present in such a situation.

But "self-colonization" was not the most common case. Most countries belong to Type 4. They experienced real colonization, the rule of an external colonializer, which deliberately blocked independent development, reproducing the colony's enclave economy. The excessive growth of the enclave in a situation where the subsistence economy created marginalization, gave rise to structural

Figure 6. The virtuous autocentric circle.



heterogeneity (1986.2:34/16). Generally, the old priorities – emphasis on the enclave, neglect of the rural food sector – have been maintained by post-colonial elites. Senghaas (1986.2:35/16) here refers to the "long-term inheritance of colonial domination and imperialist penetration".

Senghaas' accounts show that interesting discussions of cumulative causation can be developed. Menzel and Senghaas know a lot about the contrasts between the vicious and virtuous circles, but they provide few specifications of differences within the two groups. In that respect, the two figures are nothing more than a return to the point of departure: the dichotomy between autocentric and peripheral development. As we shall argue later, a broader typology is necessary, and the typology in Table 5 must be considered a starting point only.

This weakness, however, is partly mended in section 2 of the collection (1986.2), where operationalization is suggested. Here quantitative indicators are derived from the study of the successful development/integration cases, providing measures which a country should strive for if it wants to follow in Europe's footsteps, like the Southeast-Asian NICs have done (1986.2:Ch.5), as Menzel's study of South-Korea and Taiwan concluded.

Figure 6 The virtuous peripheral circle.



The list of indicators is derived from Menzel's study of the NICs. Quantitative threshold values are based on the indicator values observed for the relevant periods in the Southeast-Asian and other NICS, as well as in certain OECD countries. Table 8 reproduces the list of indicators. It deals explicitly with economic measures only, but Senghaas and Menzel states that they would appreciate an extension to social and cultural indicators (1986.2:179). Given the importance of socio-structural factors in their argument, it is a bit surprising that they do not try to include such indicators.

Indicators 1 (agro-industrial connections) and 2 (internal market), which contain the crucial distributional variables (land and income), are conditions of the remaining ones: 3 (coherence), 4 (homogenization), 5 (maturity) and 6 (export-competitiveness). Indicators 1, 5, and 6 relate to the development of manufacturing industry, the supply side: 1 includes a measure of agro-industrial interconnections, 3 (coherence) measures the density of linkages within the national economy,[24] 5 (maturity) measures how sophisticated manufacturing products the economy is able to put out, while 6 (export-competitiveness) measures the extent to which these same products conquer export markets. Indicator 2 relates to the

[24] The gross value of production consists of inputs and value added, and Senghaas' argument is that the higher the share of inputs, the higher the "density" of linkages. The extreme version of a non-coherent economy is a monoculture exporting only raw materials and importing only final products.

Table 8. Structural economic indicators of newly industrializing countries.

1. The structure and performance of the agricultural sector and the extent to which it is intermeshed with the industrial sector		
Performance	Growth of agrarian production in the early phase of industrialization,	3 percent yearly average over 20 years
(interacting with)		
Distribution of land	Gini-Index	< 0.5
Agro-industrial connections	Agrarian input-coefficient (inputs of manufactured goods as a share of the value of agricultural gross production)	40% (0.4)
	Agrarian output-coefficient (the share of agrarian output serving as inputs to manufacturing, as a share of the value of agricultural gross production)	40% (0.4)
2. Broad-spectrum development of the internal market		
	A combination of:	
Growth of demand (interacting with)	Growth of GNP per capita in the early phase of industrialization, and	4 percent yearly average over 20 years
Dispersion of demand	Gini-index for the distribution of incomes	< 0,5
3. Coherence		
Interpenetration within and between economic sectors	Total inputs as a share of gross production value or	45%
	Domestic inputs as a share of gross production value	35%
4. Homogenization		
A correspondence between (i) the distribution of the sectoral contributions to GNP and (ii) the sectoral distribution of employment (agriculture/industry/services)	The sum of percentage points of deviation between the two distributions, or	Declining
		20
	A Gini-index of sectoral divergence	0,2
5. Maturity		
A movement of production to capital- and skill-intensive activities	The share of machinebuilding, electro-technical and automobile production within manufacturing industry	18%
6. International competitiveness		
Ability to compete in international markets	The share of machinebuilding, electro-technical and automobile production in total exports. (Share of domestically produced capital goods.)	20%

Source: Menzel & Senghaas 1986.2:197 (Table 8).

demand side, the consolidation of a domestic market. Indicator 4 (homogeneity) concerns the balance between the sectoral distribution of employment and sectoral contributions to GNP. If the two distributions diverge strongly, structural *heterogeneity* is indicated: in such a case (as e.g. data for India brings out), the decline in the agricultural sector's contribution to GNP is not matched by a parallel decline in its share of employment: this indicates a persistent gap between the productivity levels in industry and agriculture. In the homogenous case, an equalization would be recorded.[25]

These indicators may be analytically separated, but what really matters is the cumulative process: "The determining factor is the combination of processes relevant to development strategy in a new profile that ultimately, structurally, quantitatively, or qualitatively – has nothing in common with the original export economy" (1986.2:42/21).

One might believe that such a list would serve as the starting point of an investigation. For Menzel and Senghaas, it forms something like an end point, since they both turned to work on related, but different questions after 1986. Of course, the list is quite an achievement and a lot of cumulative research work is needed to develop good bundles of indicators. The indicators are derived from thorough theoretical knowledge as well as from extensive work on autocentric cases. Still, it is disappointing that Menzel and Senghaas never went on to actually figure out the indicators on the basis of existing data sources. One possible excuse might be that something similar had already been done by Morris and Adelman, but possible divergences between these studies and Menzel/Senghaas' own indicators are not discussed.[26] The

[25] To substantiate an analysis using these indicators, one would need the following types of economic data: National accounts data easily provides sectoral growth of output through specific periods, and various relations between aggregates. Income or tax/revenue surveys make it possible to calculate Gini-indexes for the distribution of income. As for land holdings, one needs to look at statistics on the agrarian structure. For input/output-coefficients, input/output tables would be needed, although some of the coefficients mentioned by Menzel and Senghaas (e.g. for agriculture), might be calculated from more specific data-sources (e.g. sectoral statistics on agriculture). Not many countries provide good input/output-statistics, and comparison between countries involve numerous technical problems, e.g. related to the definition of units.

[26] The work of Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris has some interesting parallels to that of Senghaas and Menzel. In the late 1960s, they published two studies analysing a sample of 74 developing countries using 48 indicators of social, economic and political characteristics. Adelman/Morris 1967 (1971) studied economic performance, and its relationship to Western type democratic patterns, while Adelman/Morris 1973 raised the question of growth and income distribution, particularly whether the benefits of economic growth reached the poorest segments of the population in low-income countries. Here they rejected the view that economic growth in and of itself created more equality. Rather, they found that the economic structure determined the pattern of

battery of indicators is thus, as Menzel and Senghaas' title says, "a proposal", one which has not really been exposed to the test of systematic empirical research.

Menzel and Senghaas' results have consequences for the evaluation of development strategies pursued by development aid agencies in first world countries. The movement for a NIEO disregarded reforms at the national level. This was partly compensated by a "basic needs" strategy, but this was still only a "corrective policy". As a more promising strategy, Senghaas suggests agrarian modernization interacting with mass-consumption oriented industrialisation. The basic condition for such a strategy is free farmers, the evolution of agro-industrial interconnections, constitution of a broad internal market, and suitable economic infrastructure. These are all factors well-known from the analysis of autocentric export-economies (1986.2:43ff/36).

In 1986, Senghaas still defends his 1977 discussion of delinking: "For societies with accentuated heterogeneous internal structures, some delinking and, in the extreme case, complete delinking from the world market is postulated as a condition for coherent development of

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income distribution. Economic modernization did not necessarily create more participant political structures, other social and political factors were the most important determinants. But only certain types of participatory political structures would create a more equitable distribution of income (1973:186–189). These conclusions were close to the dependencia tradition, although the theoretical framework was mainstream economics and particularly a broad battery of indicators operationalizing variables which had earlier mainly been used in studies by modernisation theorists. In a later study, reported in many articles and synthesized in a large book (Morris/Adelman 1988), their topic was partly parallel to that of Menzel/Senghaas' phase two. Their most general theme was the relation between institutions and economic growth. Their sample consists of 23 countries with substantial GNP growth between 1850 and 1914 (West-European countries, land-abundant settler colonies, two Latin American countries (Argentine, Brazil), Japan and also present third world countries: Burma, Egypt, India and China. The latter had high GNP growth, but low growth of GNP per capita). They employ 50 variables arranged in five main groups: economic, demographic, human capital/socio-institutional, politico-institutional, market-institutional. The Data Appendix, thus, is longer than the actual analysis! This very ambitious and systematic research design differs from Senghaas' and Menzel's approach: in their terms, it includes both autocentric and peripheral cases, and Morris/Adelman employs a much wider spectrum of variables compared to Table 9 above. We shall not summarize their results here (cf. 1988:209–222). It can be noted, however, that in some respects they support Menzel/Senghaas' findings, e.g. that landed elites aligning with foreign export interests dominating the political process is detrimental for development (1988:211); and that a narrow distribution of land blocks the diffusion of economic growth (1988:219). But generally, their conclusions are more relativistic: "no set of institutions was uniquely appropriate either across all strategies or for all phases within a given strategy" (1988:211). If Menzel and Senghaas had emphasized typologies and periodizations more strongly than they do, they would end up close to Morris and Adelman.

productive capacity" (1986.2:62/39). But he is no longer clear as to whether this is a useful policy-advice to present day third world countries. The reason is his stronger emphasis on internal factors: the internal absence of structural heterogeneity produces an autocentric trajectory, which is possible with both association and dissociation. Furthermore, the planned economy approach to catching up destroys the economic motivation and the potential for self-regulation. It is true that Senghaas' studies through the three phases have been focused on the autocentric model, but this postulate of full continuity in his research downplays the fact that the determinants are now much more internal than external, and that the ideal cases are a different group than those pointed out in 1977, as our survey has showed.

In an essay (1987.5) published a year later, Senghaas' conclusions are much more consistent with his research results. He now states that as a response to an international competence gap, "extensive or partial delinking" only makes sense if a country already has "appropriate competences of its own which have evolved historically" (1987.5:5/59). Successful transition to autocentric development is here a question of given institutional and socio-structural preconditions. Such reasoning is closer to the modernization tradition than to dependency theory.

Besides the summary that we have discussed here, there is also another summary available. The concluding chapter of Menzel's large monograph on Denmark, Canada, Switzerland and Sweden was ready as early as 1981, but it was slightly reworked before the book edition came out in 1988. One reason is that as the funding for the Taiwan/Korea-project ran out, Menzel was doing work on a new project headed by Senghaas: "Hegemoniekrise und Kriegswahrscheinlichkeit" ("Crisis of hegemony and the chances of war"). Certain lessons from this project are visible in Menzel's summary, which clearly takes into account the new nuances of the third phase.

This summary provides a historical specification of periods of peripheralization pressure. This is quite appropriate, since in earlier writings by Senghaas and Menzel, the notion of such pressure was fairly general. Menzel now relates to the study of long cycles and hegemonies, distinguishing three crises encountered by countries in a catch up position. This highlights the historically changing "pressure for peripheralization", meaning that the timing of a country's development relative to world economic phases may be important.

It is unfortunate that this specification comes at a late stage of the research project. Furthermore, it is presented in connection with a study which deals only with success cases in periods which all end before World War 2. It therefore does not discuss the one question which has been treated in an ambivalent way throughout the whole project: Is peripheralization pressure growing stronger in the 20th century and particularly in the present world economic crisis? It seems that the account, referring mainly to studies within economic history, is biased towards describing peripheralization pressure as similar in all periods of crisis. There is no attempt to distinguish its various components (the types of entry barriers, the size of the technology gap, the research and development intensity of technology, etc.).

The study of hegemonies was related to a new project. This project was more closely linked to peace research. In his further research since 1986, Menzel has linked this study of international relations to developments in Asia, notably the NICs there, but he has also written on and edited collections on China and Japan (cf. the bibliography below, entries for 1987–91). Also Senghaas (1986, 1989, 1990) has turned his attention back to peace research, where he originally started. This turn reflects the events of the 1980s: the new cold war, perestroika, detente and the breakdown of the Eastern block in Europe. These studies are of course related to the themes Menzel and Senghaas dealt with through the three phases discussed here,[27] but

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[27] Both Menzel and Senghaas have later published studies related to the problems they dealt with in three project phases. In particular, Menzel recently published an essay (1991.1) on the "failure of grand theories", a piece also containing "self-critical" elements, according to his subtitle. This essay is strangely disappointing. Menzel does not review his attempts together with Senghaas to transcend the dichotomy between dependency and modernization theory. Rather, he shows that both these "great models" have failed. But as our survey has showed, at least since the second phase of their research, Senghaas and Menzel had taken this into account. Menzel writes an essay signalling disillusion on behalf of most of the work done by other development researchers. It would seem more productive to write an essay on what possibilities of improvement he finds, based on the research he has himself contributed to. This topic is only dealt with in the last paragraph of the essay, which above all signals a certain "Eurocentrism". Like many other European intellectuals, Menzel emphasizes the new range of European problems emerging since the breakdown of the iron curtain in 1989. The latter trend is also clear in the work of Senghaas, who has recently mainly published on European security questions. Within this context, however, he deals with the triple problems of security, development and the environment (1992.1). Rather than Menzel's retrospective disappointment with the whole tradition of development research, Senghaas tries to improve the framework further, but now relating mainly to the present problems of Eastern Europe. These are of course very relevant problems, but one should not forget that numerous third world countries are much worse off.

they also involve a change in perspective, as they move away from explicit case studies of third world countries.

Conclusion

We have followed Senghaas and Menzel through three phases of their research on the dynamics of autocentric development models and the possibilities of extension of such models to the present third world. As for the postwar period, Senghaas in the first phase considered socialist developing countries as models, but in the third phase they had been replaced by the Southeast-Asian NICs, with the claim that these countries follow in "Europe's footsteps".

Senghaas and Menzel should not be accused of having moved from dependencia back to modernization theory. Their starting point was Amin's very specific version of dependencia, and throughout their study, they have retained their focus on the autocentric development pattern. In their third phase, they have moved closer to the modernization pole (1986.2:Ch.4 is their perhaps most thorough rejection of central dependencia theses), but their position is in no way to be equated with standard neoliberal views on third world development (this is particularly clear in 1986.2:Ch.5). The latter view sees no peripheralization pressure, and has little regard for the distribution variables and their relations to social and political structures. Rather, Senghaas and Menzel relaunches some of the more sophisticated versions of older modernization theory, in particular Deutsch's cybernetic approach to national self-management.

The third phase of their research, however, did not involve further case studies of third world countries. In the second phase, they had studied early European success cases and later successful cases of catching up. Coming from studies of third world countries in the first phase, one would expect that in the third phase, they would return to a proper comparison of the success countries with the numerous "failure" cases, both in Europe and the third world. Surprisingly, no such analyses are provided. At this point, the rapprochement to modernization theory may have gone too far. There is the danger of simply arguing that any country will eventually become a threshold country. But a more sympathetic interpretation of their view is the following: both modernization and dependencia must be transcended by a stronger emphasis on middle range theorizing of vicious and virtuous circles, periodization and case studies for comparison. As a concluding attempt at constructive criticism, we shall however argue

that Senghaas and Menzel do not really pursue such a programme far enough.

A crucial claim by Senghaas is that the list of factors derived from the study of success cases (Table 4), can also account for differential developments in the group of failure cases. Senghaas even gives priority to his socio-structural variables: "So the initial distribution of resources and income is likely to be a major determinant in relation to development success. Studies on the connection between growth and distribution come naturally to the conclusion therefore, that the primary determinant for the development of income distribution is the social structure on which an economy is based. Thus today's Third World is repeating a basic historical process that occurred within and outside Europe" (1986.2:38/17ff, cf. also 48/27).[28]

Before we turn to our main points, let us critically comment the unfortunate use of the term Europe. Several of the titles chosen by Menzel and Senghaas refer to Europe. But as the quotation indicates, Senghaas is forced to despecify this message: the autocentric experience can be found both "within and outside Europe". In the 19th century, some of the overseas settler colonies had a similar development experience. Conversely, Senghaas of course knows that there are failure cases in Europe. Furthermore, if the fate of the Southeast-Asian NICs depends on a special influence from Japanese imperialism (we shall return to this), the statement that they repeat the European experience is not accurate. In addition, there is the more principal question of whether 19th century competitive European capitalism really integrated the working masses. One might argue that this trait is more typical of 20th century "Fordism", which is not of European, but primarily of American origins (which is also a topic to which we shall return).

First, however, we shall discuss what we regard as the basic weakness of Menzel and Senghaas' projects: their failure to consider possible routes from structural heterogeneity to a homogenous national economy, i.e. autocentric development. This might seem a surprising critical conclusion, since the quest for such knowledge was the motivation of much of their project work.

Most of present day third world countries are in one way or another marked by structural heterogeneity. Senghaas claims that the study of

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28 For similar conclusions on the importance of the "social structure of accumulation", Senghaas refers to Adelman 1980, Griffin 1983, Elsenhans 1984, Journal of Development Studies 1984, as well as certain World Bank reports.

European and other development successes provide the keys to a transition out of structural heterogeneity. But through the phases discussed above, Senghaas and Menzel has increasingly focused on internal features, implying that countries with a successful development were never severely bothered by structural heterogeneity. Thus, when Senghaas finds "an astonishing degree of conformity between current observations on the development of East Asian countries and the historical findings regarding successful export economies" (1986.2:40/19), one may ask whether any of these countries really made a transition from a state of structural heterogeneity to autocentric development. As for the OECD-countries, the small successful 19th century exporters started their industrialization after Britain's rise to superiority in cotton textiles. But as Senghaas shows, they were able to counter the peripheralization pressure thanks to internal socio-structural and political developments. They never entered into a period of structural heterogeneity, even during the phase of liberal capitalism.

The Southeast-Asian NICs had a colonial past, and they developed later, so they are better candidates. But Menzel and Senghaas (1986.2:Ch.5) do not discuss the extent to which structural heterogeneity had actually developed. Rather than listing adverse effects of "colonial domination and imperialist penetration", they in fact give a balanced assessment of the peculiarities of Japanese imperialism (1986.2:143– 147). Although Japanese rule was ruthless and despotic, the Japanese also left behind them an industrial tradition, a tradition of state capitalist organization, as well as a food producing sector which was a potential basis for autonomous development (cf. also 1986.2:34/15). In the postwar period, Japan's dominance was replaced by U.S. hegemony via a Japanese-American alliance in the Far East. The U.S. influenced agrarian reforms and provided generous aid in both Taiwan and South Korea (1986.2:157), a strikingly different policy than towards the U.S.' own "backyard" in Latin America.

Additional factors behind the successes of South Korea and Taiwan are the systematic export-orientation, long-run absence of direct investments by foreign firms, a high level of educational achievement, an eagerness to learn, high social mobility, possibly a peculiar work ethic, and the existence of a strong and skillful state bureaucracy, capable of leading industrialization, organizing capital imports and balancing associative and dissociative features of trade policies (1986.2:157–159, 170). The latter feature is the perhaps best examples of a strong state class (cf. Type 5 of Table 5 above). Now, Menzel and

Senghaas reject the claim that any one factor explains Taiwan's and South Korea's success. They argue that all the factors here mentioned must "be seen in the light of the relative homogeneous baseline profile that is typical of the East Asian development paths" (1986.2:57/35). But this only means that the explanation is a more complex virtuous circle in which these factors reinforce each other. This does not prove that the "baseline profile" has an explanatory priority. In any case, the listing of favourable conditions implies that a transition from underdevelopment to autocentric development cannot be traced in these particular cases. This reduces the value of these cases as models for present day third world countries. It is, by the way, striking that the lack of democratic participation, neglect of human rights and denial of freedom of speech and organization, in Taiwan or South Korea, which Senghaas was very concerned about earlier (above, p.), is now deemphasized. The argument, derived from Deutsch, about the dangers of autocratic rule, is now obviously only for the socialist developing countries. It is simply claimed that these strains in the medium term will prove dysfunctional, being eliminated through mass protest. Menzel and Senghaas also remind the reader that industrialization preceded democratization in most European countries (1986.2:155ff), which seems a rather dubious way to suggest the European experience as a model for present day countries.

The Japanese influence, in our view, was just as constitutive for the success of South Korea and Taiwan as the other factors listed. This means that the nature of hegemonic or great power influence should be introduced into the analytical framework more explicitly than what Menzel and Senghaas have done. Japanese influence was different both from Western influence and from Moscow's dominance in the socialist world. The Southeast-Asian NICs pushed eagerly to catch up not generally, but with Japan specifically. Similarly, the later U.S. influence was important: One might imagine that in other parts of the world, there were countries with just as good conditions for autocentric development as South Korea and Taiwan, but since they were not on the "perimeter" for defence of the "free world", the U.S. had no geopolitical interest in supporting them. On the other hand, there were surely other countries which the U.S. did influence for geopolitical reasons, but which for internal reasons had no chances whatsoever of achieving autocentric development.

It must be emphasized here that Senghaas and Menzel's conclusions derive from the study of a selection of NICs. The notion of threshold countries ("Schwellenländer", NICs) is generally used for a larger group of countries: Brazil, Mexico, Israel, Spain, Greece, Yugoslavia,

Hong Kong, Singapore (1986.2:102ff,163). But Senghaas and Menzel explicitly state that they do not attempt to draw conclusions of relevance to all threshold countries (1986.2:165). This is unfortunate, since some of the other countries might be more suited for a study of development with initial structural heterogeneity. The perhaps most clear-cut candidates for a transition from peripheral status to the "core", autocentric model, however, were the small socialist countries, but they disappeared as models during the second phase.

If it turns out that due to the influence of Japanese imperialism, the later U.S. aid and push for agrarian reforms and other factors, the Southeast-Asian NICs had few elements of structural heterogeneity, they must be reclassified into a group of countries which had "preconditions" for autocentric development. They were not cases of prior peripheralization. Indeed, with such a perspective, it may be hard to find any cases in which autocentric development emerged from a situation of structural heterogeneity! In that case, it is not so evident that the factors derived from autocentric development in Europe and in the Southeast-Asian NICs can be generalized to provide guidelines for countries marked by deepseated structural heterogeneity. The more internal factors are emphasized, the more urgent this dilemma becomes. Their experience just confirm that their point of departure was one which predisposed them for autocentric development. Any lessons for other countries become quite vague, they just confirm the point of departure. Senghaas has distinguished two types of cumulative circles, as well as the relationship between different point of departure constellations and autocentric versus peripheral development. But the third possible relationship, the route from structural heterogeneity to autocentric development disappears, as too much is attributed to point of departure conditions. (The fourth possibility, retrogression from autocentric to peripheral development has so far not occurred historically.) Just as the Southeast-Asian NICs are reclassified into the autocentric category, the socialist countries (including the developing ones) are seemingly relocated into the "peripheral" section (e.g. in Table 3).

The paradoxical outcome is that Senghaas and Menzel provide a sophisticated heroization of Western world development trajectories, leaving the notion of structural heterogeneity *more* global than it is in Amin's work. Rather than developing more finegrained typologies of peripheral cases, Senghaas projects his list of factors derived from successful countries on to countries massively influenced by structural heterogeneity! There is very little discussion of possible strategies which may help a country to achieve "threshold status" if it has

become deeply enmeshed in structural heterogeneity. Policy advice on this basis runs the danger of either becoming naive or very pessimistic. Naive advice would be to tell the state classes of present third world countries that they need to create a more equal distribution, agrarian reform, to abolish clientilism, and pass over domestic hegemony to an alliance of industrialists and workers. Pessimistic advice would be that not much can be done, since only countries which are blessed with preconditions which spur autocentric development will ever have a chance to succeed.

A further problem is the fact that Menzel and Senghaas' studies of European development successes related to certain "critical phases". How can we determine whether a present third world country is in such a phase? The definition of a critical period is in fact not clear. Relating to the internal power balance, a critical phase is a phase in which this balance can be influenced. This might differ from country to country. Another option seems to be chosen by Menzel, who (cf. above p.) relates to international business cycles, emphasizing that development successes are spurred by international upturns. But if we emphasize institutional shifts, it seems just as likely that social conflicts burst out during an international downturn. Successful performance throughout the upturn in fact may be conditioned on institutional reshuffling during the preceding crisis. (Cf. for instance the ascent to power of Nordic social democratic parties during the interwar economic crisis. This might be seen as a condition for their success during the later postwar Golden Age.)

In sum, while Senghaas and Menzel have given important contributions to the comparative study of autocentric development, we now need a similar study of structural heterogeneity in a historical perspective. After all, this is the socio-economic pattern prevailing in most really poor countries of today's world. Doing comparative studies, we must shuttle between research problems, models, typologies and case studies. If we accept the importance of Senghaas' basic research problem (that is, the conditions for autocentric development in the present third world), and accept the many middle range theories and models he employs, case studies and typologies emerge as the areas in which most additional work is needed. In particular, one should find cases in which a certain amount of structural heterogeneity had evolved, studying then, concretely, efforts which have been made to approach an autocentric trajectory. A more finegrained typology might enable us to specify which post-colonial countries that are most likely to escape auto-colonization. Such case studies should lead to a typology of failure cases, based

possibly on a number of different vicious circles. Such a typology would be more specific than just the dichotomy between colonization and self-colonization, but it would be more general and aggregate than case by case comparison. It has already been shown the Eastern European and socialist developing countries do not really fit any of the two types (colonization/self-colonization), and since Senghaas holds that they did not succeed in their attempts to embark on an autocentric development model, he needs to specify a type for them, if he wants to avoid the simplistic reclassification mentioned above. We have also shown that the nature of regional hegemonic relations, specified according to regions, must be taken into account.[29] We have indicated that Japanese regional dominance, as well as later U.S. hegemony, have been important for the development of South Korea and Taiwan.

In the third phase, Senghaas and Menzel generalized their conclusions to countries of any size. Maybe among the large countries there are cases of initial structural heterogeneity being transformed into an autocentric development pattern? It seems that for Senghaas and Menzel, it is not really necessary to consider this question, since they claim generality for the results they arrived at in the study of smaller countries: "From a development-policy (and therefore a normative) standpoint, however, it is of considerable interest that the comparative analysis of large-population, large-area countries (U.S.A., Germany, France, Japan, Russia, and the large Third World countries) confirm a central finding from the comparative analysis of export economies: the close correlation, from the outset, between the distribution structures at the basis of growth and the opportunities for truly effective development" (1986.2:48/26).

But it is not as simple as that, and this is confirmed by Senghaas in other contexts. Commenting on any early critical essay by Hurtienne (1981/1984), Senghaas admits that countries like Germany and Japan (as well as Italy and Tsarist Russia) only matured and developed towards a "relatively homogenous OECD profile" (1986.2:48/27) in

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[29] In the early Table 3-typology, the USSR and the Eastern European countries were a separate type: The viability of the Type V of that typology, is more open to questioning today. Rather than genuine autocentric development they seem to display a pattern of development which gave priority to heavy industrial production of investment goods. Senghaas analysed some of the problems of this development pattern in his essay on socialism. But he does not emphasize that while the Western European countries emulated the U.S. mass consumption/mass production model, the Eastern bloc had to emulate the Soviet model. Only the former model stimulated full mass consumption in train with an upgrading of technologies and work organization methods in the investment goods sector.

the post World War II-period. The case of Germany has been extensively analysed by Lutz (1984), an analysis to which Senghaas himself refers. But he does not discuss the implications of Lutz' analysis for the study of the nature of industrialization in e.g. Germany and Japan before World War II: Lutz shows that economic growth in the period of the new imperialism (1870–1914), depended on interaction between the modern and the traditional sector, whereas post-World War II development implied the abolition of the traditional sector. In terms of the original dichotomy, pre-World War I development might be defined as a case of structural heterogeneity, but of a specific type, since during that period, Germany became the industrial leader in electrical and chemical sectors. This impressive industrial modernization developed in interaction with – in fact reproducing – a traditional agrarian and petty-bourgeois sector, functioning as a reservoir of surplus labour. This constellation implied considerable inequalities. The interwar period saw the breakdown of this model, and in that connection, various forms of marginalization became visible: agrarian crisis due to problems in the traditional sector and problems for workers due to crisis in industry and finance. Fascism could be interpreted as a radical, nationalist project of delinking and violent expansion. Only the postwar period entails the emergence of autocentric development with mass production. Such a postwar development was also typical of other presently highly industrialized countries. If this analysis is correct, Germany provides an example of transition from structural heterogeneity to autocentred growth.

As shown, autocentric development has followed also in cases of rather well-developed structural heterogeneity. The other side of this coin would be small West European countries which have failed to embark on an autocentric trajectory despite relatively egalitarian distributional patterns. At least one such case seems to exist, namely Ireland. Senghaas discusses Ireland only briefly (1980.5=1982.2:185–188). His account is descriptive and mainly blames British colonialism up until 1922 for Ireland's persistent underdevelopment. A more recent comparative study (Mjøset 1992), partly relating to Senghaas' scheme (Table 4), confirms the impact of socio-structural factors behind Ireland's development problems. The principal question here is whether the distributions of land and income reflect compromises between collective actors (indicated in Figures 6 and 7, and in Table 5). The analysis of Ireland shows that such a correspondence may not always exist. It seems that in Ireland, the social compromises are detrimental to development in spite of the relative egalitarian distributions. In fact, in their summary

(1986.2:Ch.1), Senghaas and Menzel themselves emphasize that even in countries without a "strong concentration of landholdings", there was a concentration of purchasing and marketing activities in the form of merchant capital. But in the Irish case, it seems that neither distributional variables, nor merchant capital dominance, but other aspects of the social structure – in particular features of the agrarian mode of production, family structure, paternalism and emigration – are of crucial importance. Only by grasping the interaction of these factors with economic interests and the problems of post-colonial development, Ireland's fate can be understood.

As for the theoretical impulses, the work of Senghaas and Menzel synthesize many traditions and approaches, thereby illustrating the futility of grand theory, and the corresponding utility of middle range theories in social research. But there are certain theoretical traditions that should perhaps be integrated more closely into their framework. As for the political variables, it would seem that processes of mobilisation and party formation could be analysed with reference to Rokkan's comparative framework. Furthermore, for the study of the state apparatus (e.g. topics like clientelism in the third world), recent organization theory (cf. March & Olsen 1989) could be of some use (cf. also the notes in the rightwards column of Table 4). However, space precludes further discussion of what modifications in the original framework this might lead to. Only one such theoretical perspective will be discussed somewhat more in detail: the French regulation school (Mjøset 1985, Boyer 1986, Jessop 1990 and Brenner/Glick 1991 for a critical assessment). This school provides an updated version of institutional economics. It proposes to specify world economic periods with reference to both socio-economic transformation and world economic hegemony. While the regulationists are aware ofAmin's contribution,[30] Senghaas and

[30] Cf. Lipietz 1987:51, "Amin anticipated later work on Fordist regimes of accumulation and modes of regulation by showing that the problem of markets gradually became less important as the centre became autocentric, and as the relative growth of departments and income became increasingly subject to "ex-ante" regulation. He argued that on the contrary, the impetus for the capitalist sector of extraverted formations came from the outside (in other words from the centre) and that forms or modes of production in other areas of the social formation (and the care with which Amin examines these was at the time unusual) played only a supporting role (by reproducing labour-power cheaply) or were parasites living off the export sector, when, that is, they were not simply marginalized." Compare our account of Amin's early work in the section on Menzel/Senghaas' first phase. No attempt has been made in this essay to trace Amin's further work after the early 1970s. In a comment on the English translation of Senghaas (1986.2:Ch.1), Amin accepts many of Senghaas' findings, but criticizes his neglect of the international price system as a factor explaining structural heterogeneity. Amin here

Menzel do not show much interest: In a literature list (1986.2:253–295) of about 800–900 entries, no work by the regulation school is mentioned.

The regulation school proposes to periodize developments within the capitalist core as a sequence from liberal to organized capitalism, and they propose specifications of national models within this framework. This generates a more sophisticated analysis (compared e.g. to Amin) of postwar developments. Here we only provide a rough indication of this analysis: U.S. postwar hegemony implied the diffusion in Western Europe of the "norms of production and consumption" deriving from the U.S. model of mass production and mass consumption ("Fordism"). Amin's "core" and its autocentric development model in this perspective emerges as a generalisation of the 1945–73 Golden age period of Western capitalism. Only from this period and onwards, there is a full integration of the working masses in the pattern of economic growth. In comparison, 19th century liberal capitalism (competitive regulation) was a more "incomplete" type of capitalism. It had elements of the peripheral type (Table 1), but its industrial dynamism reminded more of the autocentric type. Introducing the distinction between liberal and organized capitalism would shelter Amin (as well as Senghaas and Menzel) from the accusation (cf. Hurtienne 1981) of misrepresenting 19th century capitalism. But conversely, it is important to maintain the focus on national trajectories: Some versions of 19th century liberal capitalism contained better conditions for autocentric development than others.

In this way, it would also be possible to deal with the question of whether peripheralization pressure has become more intense in the 20th century in a less ambivalent fashion than Senghaas and Menzel have done. But we have no space to consider this in detail here. (Also the neo-schumpeterian approach, cf. Perez 1985, is important in this respect.)

Through all three phases discussed here, Senghaas has maintained a notion of "deep structures" (a term borrowed from linguistics): In 1977 (phase one) he emphasized the similar deep structures of all peripheral cases (cf. p. above), this view is maintained in phase two (cf. p. above), in which the term "social deep structures" was used, and the claim was made that these were entirely different in Denmark and Uruguay. Such a view was confirmed in the latest summary essay (1986.2:42/21ff). This implies that the two ideal types of peripheral

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refers to the basic difference between developed and underdeveloped countries as measured in Senghaas' indicator "homogeneity" (cf. above p.).

and autocentric capitalism are identified as deep structures. This implies a claim that there is an essence in various societies, which must be given explanatory priority. The criticism levelled above opposes such a view. The notion of such an essence (which legitimates explanatory priority), seems to contradict the notion of cumulative causality. Furthermore, it is actually unclear how "deep" the deep structure is, since it seems that it may be changed, by means of structural reforms (land reforms), new balances of power, new state priorities with respect to infrastructure, mobilization of local skills and cultural identity.

Our conclusion, the need for closer case studies of structural heterogeneity and for improved typologies, is a fairly general one. It is even in harmony with statements made both in the earliest and latest phase of Senghaas and Menzel's study. In 1977, Senghaas (1977.1:21) voiced the following note of caution concerning the transfer of experience: "Autocentric development in a specific context can only be realized as the result of long-term processes of political, cultural and socio-economic sovereignty. The reference to earlier and contemporary experience for practical purposes is only meaningful when in this specific context, a capability exists to critically judge such experiences, that is: blind imitation will not do." And in 1986, they both emphasized the need for further case studies (cf. 1986.2:198). Thus, our critical remarks must not be taken as a rejection. Many aspects of the Menzel/Senghaas-framework can be maintained as important contributions to comparative development research.

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