Labour, Labour Movement and Democracy: The Case of Taiwan

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Labour has for a long period been a stabilising factor in the economic development of Taiwan. Since 1949, when the Kuomintang (KMT) government moved to Taiwan from the Chinese mainland, up to the lifting of martial law in 1987, Taiwan had not experienced a major strike. Labour has been effectively demobilized and excluded from decision-making both at the enterprise level and at the level of national politics.

Now, however, Taiwan's workers are stirring. Strikes and other collective actions are not uncommon, and new types of independent trade unions have begun to emerge. The Nationalist Party that was driven out of China by a coalition of workers and peasants now fear the potential of working-class strength and have been forced to pay more attention to labour issues.

At the same time, local industry is facing a set of serious cost pressures weakening its role as low-cost production centre. Labour costs have started to increase more than labour productivity. Moreover, the once beautiful island ('Formosa') has through its rush for industrial growth been converted into a severely polluted area, and both the population and the state are calling for environmental control measures that will impose substantial extra costs on many industries. Due to a certain shortage of land and especially due to land speculation, land costs have gone up very fast, too; and finally, since the end of 1985, the NT$ has gone through a dramatic depreciation (about 50%) as a result of bilateral US pressure.

The strategy of the government has been to formulate a high-tech strategy, that is to move from labour-intensive and pollution-intensive industries towards more knowledge-intensive industries. So far, employers have been reluctant. Small- and medium-sized family firms have not yet shown any willingness or capability to invest along these lines, and larger companies have only partially in-

vested in new machinery. In the 1980s, the level of private fixed capital formation has obviously been below the level of the precedent decade. Many companies look for external solutions. Some have imported foreign workers from Southeast Asia and China. It is estimated that between 40,000 and 200,000 unregulated workers hold jobs in Taiwan.[1] Others have moved production to low costs areas. While outward investments in 1986 were 66 million US$, that figure in 1989 have gone up to almost 7 billion US$.[2] Finally, yet others have chosen to generate non-operating earnings through speculation in the stockmarket and in the real-estate market in Taiwan.

At the political level, the new middle class is in the forefront, demanding liberal democracy, social reforms and the right to self-determination. State-society relation are changing, giving much more space for societal associations.

Workers' demands for union autonomy, fair labour practices, reforms of union laws and less authoritarian management styles are thus part of a broader economic, social and political crisis on the island.

In this lecture , I shall try to describe and explain

- the prevalent weakness of labour

- the growing labour militancy

- the emerging labour movement and its relations to the overall process of democratisation on the island.

The overall question concerns why Taiwan has not developed along the so-called 'normal' trajectory : Proletarianisation - the creation of a free and mobile wage-earning labour force - forming an independent organisation of labour, taking the form of trade unions and workers' political parties.

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[1] Jonathan Moore, Grist to the Mill, Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), 5 April, 1989,p.20.
[2] Taiwan. Country Report, No.2,1990,EIU, p.25.

The traditional weak position of labour

We might get some idea of the position of labour by looking at such factors as the level of conflict and the level of trade union and political organization.

The level of labour -oriented organisation

Taiwan has a high and quickly growing trade union membership. These gains in unionisation, however, are indicative of increased control of management over labour. Unions are of the house-union type, plant level union structure, and are under the direct supervison by management. There are few collective agreements and wage-setting is the sole prerogative of the management. Most workers consider the unions as useless or little helpful.

Frederic C. Deyo characterizes the labour control system in Taiwan as mainly a state -mandated enterprise paternalism.

Types of labour control : Repressive attempts to contain, demobilise and restrict worker behaviour or authoritarian corporatist measures which seek to organise, channel and encourage certain types of individual or collective action.

Levels of control: State level or enterprise level.

"State-mandated" refers to the important indirect role of the state in labour control. The state has increasingly encouraged firms to set up a whole range of council and committees at company level (health, safety, welfare.)

The level of conflict

Difficult to get statistics for obvious reasons. Taiwan has statistics on labour disputes (which have been reconciled by competent authorities), but there is no official statistics on work stoppages and working days lost due to such stoppages. Anyway, the level of collective conflicting generally has been rather low - substantially lower than, for example, in South Korea.

Statistics on the levels of conflict certainly is not a sufficient measure anyway. The level of conflict tells us little about the organisational effectiveness or outcomes of labour protests. One further indicator is provided by the issues involved in labour-management

disputes. Up to 1987, most issues in Taiwan were defensive issues, such as dismissal, injury compensation, wage arrears.

Growing labour militancy and the emergence of a labour movement since 1987

Since 1987 there has been a significant shift in labour protests. The level of conflict has been substantially higher during that period. Moreover, a large number of workers have been mobilized within and across firms for different kinds of work stoppages, and there has been a shift towards more offensive issues in conflict. Generally, these conflicts have been confined to government-sanctioned monopolies such as transport industries and large, mainly locally owned, to medium-sized manufacturing enterprises. In contrast to South Korea, female workers' militancy and class-consciousness have not yet manifested themselves among young Taiwanese female workers.

The growing upsurge in labour actions since 1987 has both been a result of and resulted in the formation of new independent trade unions. Although still small in numbers, new unionism has spread mainly along two lines. One strategy has been to capture existing unions, which has been the main strategy because Taiwan has a compulsory single union system. Another strategy have been to set up new unions where no union existed in advance. Moreover, local unions have joined various independent federations on the regional and national level. The new independent unions are mainly placed in in industries mentioned above. Workers in small- and medium-sized enterprises are not represented and unionisation is mainly a male activity.

At the political level labour oriented parties have been established - the Labour Party in November 1987 and the Workers' Party in 1988. These parties are still very small and weak and the main opposition party - the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) - is middle class-based and has been very slow and unwilling to take up labour issues.

How are we to explain the growing labour militancy and unionization? How are we to explain the scope of such activities? I shall argue that in order to explain this, we have to look at employment relations and the reproduction of labour. Moreover, we should look

at the democratic opening created by middle class struggle for parliamentary democracy.

Labour systems : Familism and entrepreneurialism

Like other Third World countries, Taiwan has experienced continuing proletarianisation of workers. Wage employment has spread so that more than two-thirds of the labour force in 1989 were paid employees. Industrial wage earning and salaried workers in manufacturing, mining, utilities and construction in 1986 constituted 54% of all paid employees and 35% of the total labour force. According to Sen, the working class increased from 14% in 1956 to 35% in 1980 , while Helmuth Asche has calculated the size of the working class in 1980 to 49%, of which, however, only 30% was employed by capitalist enterprises. Although valuable as a starting point, such overall figures only cover one aspect of the process of proletarianization and working class formation.

The labour systems oremployment relations, include the relations of production (workplace conditions and control of labour), the exchange relations (wage conditions and recruitment patterns) and also the reproduction of labour (the structure of family and characteristics of the community).

In small enterprises in Taiwan, we find what Deyo termed a "patriarchal labour system". Taiwan's industrial structure is marked by the existence of a large majority of small family-owned enterprises. As for distribution of employees according to the size of establishments (rather than enterprises), 56% of all employes in May 1990 worked in plants having less than 50 workers. In manufacturing, the share is 54% and it has gone up since 1982. Furthermore, these small enterprises are found not just in the cities and towns but also dispersed all over the western industrialized part of Taiwan.

In the lower segment we find household enterprises financed, built and staffed by members of individual households, producing on a sub-contracting basis to larger factories or exporters.The labour is unpaid family labour. Niehoff found that none of these workshops (mostly active in plactic injection and plastic recycling) were registered officially. These post-peasant households represent extreme cases of self-exploitation. Family members are "frequently manning their machines for continuing shifts of between 12 and 16

hours each, and working for periods of several months with only an occasional day off." Male members of the households are predominantly given the active roles in the enterprise's operation and the eldest sons are usually selected to work the machinery. Other children are employed outside the household in wage-labour jobs - parents prefer near-by employment - and remit substantial parts of their earnings back to the family. The family households normally do not recognize themselves as being exploited in the sphere of circulation by outside production-and export brokers, and inside the household, politics in production takes the form of "kitchen politics".

A pattern of family-based authority is also found in small-scale factories above the household level. Capital and marketing opportunities are found through networks of relatives, friends and neighbours and apart from family labour, labour is recruited from the same network structures. Relationships in these factories generally are more personalised and the work routines more informal. Workers normally work tirelessly for long hours and under dirty, dark and dangerous working conditions. Although they lack bonuses, subsidised meals, fringe benefits and insurance, and the retirement benefits found in large factories, it is often possible to make more take-home cash in these small enterprises. Overtime opportunities and piece-rate payments open up possibilities for earning through hard work. Workers have little interest in unions, and in his Yingge case, Stites observed that "there was no overt grumbling and no one could remember any collective action taken by workers against an employer."

Conflicts in such an setting are not solved by collective action, but rather by quitting the job and finding a new one. To understand patriarchal employment relations in small-scale industries necessitates an understanding of two important facts, that is that the family is the basic unity of survival and that industrial work for male workers is an entrepreneurial strategy.

The Chinese strongly value, idealise and identify with their family. Family commitments are normally of a life-long nature. The family performs economic functions of investment, production and employment as well as functions of security, welfare and retirement. The extended family pools resources, spreads risks and maximises returns across male-related branches and male-related generations. The family makes all important decisions such as investment,

education, migration and marriage . Authority relations in the family are arranged hierarchically along gender and seniority lines.

In a society missing effective social security and unemployment insurance, factory work is a risky business. Male workers normally engage in wage working in order to work hard for the long-term benefits of their family (material well-being and security). At certain stage of the family cycle, male workers go into manufacturing. They prefer small-scale enterprises where through hard work they may get a take-home pay not inferior to that earned in large modern industries, and where they can learn how to run a business and establish wider contacts. Seeing their work as a temporary part of an hopefully successful petty-entrepreneurial career, they probably do not see matters exclusively from a worker's perspective and probably accept working conditions they would not accept if they had thought of themselves as lifelong industrial workers. In sum, the two phenomena- familism and industrial work being an entrepreneurial strategy - to a substantial degree explain why conflicts in household and small-scale industries mainly take on personal and individual forms rather than the form of collective actions.

Familism also constitutes an important element in medium-and large-sized (locally- or foreign-owned) enterprises which employ young female workers on a temporary basis. Here exists what might be termed a "filial proletarian labour system". Recruitment of young women into light, labour-intensive manufacturing has been associated with early industrialisation in many industrialised countries, too. Taiwan differs only in the extent and the rapidity of this recruitment. In Taiwan, the female labour-participation ratio in 1989 was 45%, but among women in the age 20-24, it reached 64%. Out of 2.2 million female paid employees registered in May 1990, 46% were employed in manufacturing, 32% in services and 14% in commerce. In manufacturing, the share of women in total paid employment in private enterprises was 45%. Of all female workers employed in manufacturing, 52% worked in electrical machinery and equipment, clothes and wearing apparel, and textiles.

Within the patrilineal and patrilocal kinship system in Taiwan, the position of daughters are significantly different from that of sons. A kind of implicit inter-generational contract exists between parents and children, in that the latter are expected to pay back the "debts" for their upbringing. In relation to sons, parents invest in their schooling, apprenticeship training and education as part of a long-

term strategy and allow them a substantial autonomy in decisions on job selection, residence etc., and expect sons to take care of them in their old age. Since daughters permanently leave their natal family upon marriage, they have to repay over a shorter time and are expected to begin repayment early.

In the labour market, these filial proletarians are placed in inferior occupations in the factory or the office. In large factories, they are placed in a hierarchical structure that gives them very limited possibilities for upward mobility. The majority remain "just factory girls" - a few may be selected to the position of group leaders just above the level of operators.

These women workers are not personally committed to the firm and feel no compunction about leaving when their friends leave. Therefore, employers have to use a rather strict form of labour control, including seniority payment and allowances/bonuses tying the workers to the company in periods of growing demand for that type of workers. Female workers are generally paid below male workers. In 1989, the average monthly earnings of female employees in manufacturing were only 61% of male employees - a significant decline compared to 1981 when they earned 66% of male employees. This pattern seems to confirm Greenhalgh's observations for the 1970s, namely that an absolute improvement in income was followed by a growing gap in the relative position of daughters in relation to sons. Resentment and negative attitudes towards work situation and the firm, tend to focus on interpersonal relationships They direct their resentment at group leaders, supervisors, co-workers, or office staff.

One possible explanation of this difference between Singapore and South Korea on one hand, and Taiwan on the other, might be that in the first two countries mentioned, female workers constitute a hyper-proletariat, depending on industrial wages for their livelihood and welfare, living in working-class communities in urban areas, and having no exit back to the rural petty bourgeois sector, while this is not the case in Taiwan. The lower degree of both organisational and geographical concentration of the industrial work force is one factor influencing working class behaviour, the complex class structure inside the family is another. Chinese families are multi-class families.

While these young female part-proletarians have not yet been very much involved in collective actions, they certainly are active in "kitchen politics". The bargaining strength of daughters towards the parents has changed. Daughters have more influence on where to work; they may choose their own husbands; and go into conflict over such things as cosmetics, new fashions in dress, choice of closest friends etc. Some use their own funds to pay for high school or training in specialized skills (such as typing), hoping to reap the benefits themselves from such initiatives.

Medium- and large-sized enterprises not only attract young female labour Out of 732,000 employees in private establishments having 100 or more workers, 393,000 were men.

In the private, Chinese-owned firms, employment relations in more labour intensive industries take the form of management paternalism. These enterprises are normally family-owned. Based on studies of family firms in Hong Kong , Siu-lun Wong characterize the personalistic managerial ideology in the following manner:

> My research on the cotton spinners has shown them to be industrial patriarchs who exercised tight control, shunned the delegation of power, conferred welfare benefits on their employees as favors, acted as moral custodians of their subordinates, opposed protective labor legislation, and disapproved of trade union activities.

This phenomenon is particularly critical in Taiwan where the desire to become boss is extremely strong. Male workers do not consider industrial work as a lifelong strategy but as a stage in their fundamental entrepreneurial strategy. Politics in production normally occurs in private rather than public places and take indirect and personal rather than collective forms. Instead of collective action, workers would quietly leave the firm when the treatment of the employer become unbearable. Deyo suggest that these politics of production are termed "politics of face".

The large majority of the working class in Taiwan, then, is made up of part-time workers with strong family ties working under patriarchal or paternalist patterns of employment relations. A stable proletariat working under more long-term proletarian employment relations is found only among (predominantly male) low-level white-collar and civil-service workers, transportation workers and workers in heavy industries. As we have demonstrated above, it is

among this group of workers that a new labour activism and unionism activism has emerged since 1987.

Male workers in heavy industries are normally more skilled, get higher pay and have more job security. In that sense, they are "the new labour aristocracy". In 1989, employees in petroleum and coal, industrial chemicals, primary metals and transport equipment production, earned 128%, 54%, 42% and 25%, respectively, more than the average industrial employee. Furthermore, labour turnover in these industries was significantly below the average in manufacturing industries. In 1989, the separation ratio was 3.8% in all manufacturing, while the shares in the three industries, mentioned above, were 0.5%, 1.8% ,2.1% and 2.9%, respectively.

Capitalist production contains a fundamental tension between the need for labour control and the need for creative participation. This tension gives workers some leverage in the ongoing and unfolding process of negotiation with employers. In many more labour-intensive industries in Taiwan, employers have been able to treat workers as "sheer muscle", but in many heavy industries active and creative participation of workers is required. Alice Amsden has argued that in late industrialising countries such as South Korea and Taiwan, it is particular difficult to manage work in a top-down fashion in many continuous process industries. In such countries, industrialisation occurs, not on the basis of invention and innovation, but on the basis of technology borrowing and learning, Therefore the shop floor has become the strategic focus of firms. Due to technical ignorance at the highest managerial level, and the inexperience on part of the work force (lack of manual skilled workers and technicians), the management in such industries as cement, fertilisers, oil refining and steel have had to rely on motivated shop floor workers to achieve incremental and cumulative improvements in productivity and product specification.

Moreover, the relative strength of labour in employment relations is also influenced by conditions in the larger community. The stable proletariat consists of a second generation of workers, born in the city, having a little better educational background and who expect to rely on job security, pensions, and retirement benefits. Especially in the area around the southern city Kaohsiung and the area around Taoyüan, Chungli and Hsinchu in the north-western part of Taiwan, we find many industrial estates containing mainly heavy industry. Here, one would probably find more class-homogeneous

residential communities, which might constitute a resource base for working-class organisation. At the end of 1982, 69% of the total population lived in cities of 50,000 or more inhabitants, and a range of rapidly growing medium-sized cities were emerging.

Altogether, a set of new structural conditions have emerged in both the work place and the community that strengthen the bargaining power of workers and which form necessary conditions for effective labour activism, including independent trade unionism. The development in wages, working conditions and living conditions may also have influenced working class militancy and will be discussed next.

- During the 1980s, real wages have increased and even more so than labour productivity (in the 1970s productivity increases were higher).

- Higher inflation due to the speculative activities mentioned in the beginning.

- Working hours - very long- indicating a high level of labour extraction.

- Living conditions - on the one hand spread of kinds of durable consumer goods, on the other increasing social inequality.

Labour movement and democratization

Since the late 1970s and especially since 1986, Taiwan has experienced a movement toward quasi-democracy. Martial law has been dismantled, new political parties allowed and a dissenting press has become a reality. Recent changes in this pattern can be summarized in three processes: Taiwanisation, liberalisation and democratisation.

During the rule of Chiang Ching-kuo, the elite of majority Taiwanese population were co-opted into the former mainland-based state apparatus and this process has progressed so far that it now seems to be irreversible.

Liberalisation refers to changing state-(civil) society relations, giving more organisational space to citizens, including such matters

as increased freedom of association, of speech and of press. The breakthrough in this process was the establishment of the main opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party in 1986, but Taiwan has also experienced a rise of social movements. Some are related to specific classes or segments of such classes, such as the labour movement (1987ff.), the farmers' movement (1987), the teachers' rights movement (1987) and the student movement (1986ff.), while other social movements have emerged across class lines., such as the consumers' movement (1980ff.),the local anti-pollution protest movements (1980ff.), womens' movement (1982) and the anti-nuclear power movement (1988ff.). It should be noticed that the opposition DPP has not played a significant role in these movements - all following a rather depoliticised strategy. Apart from the labour movement, the new political opposition and the new social movements are middle class-based. More specifically, they are based in the new middle class of managerial and professional positions in the modern industrial, service or state bureaucracies.

Democratisation requires institutional changes leading to political competition on equal basis and accountability of rulers to the ruled. So far, democratisation in Taiwan has been slow and limited, moving towards a softer authoritarian structure in which elections become more competitive and fair, in which the Kuomintang Party itself becomes more democratic, but in which the powerful executives in government are not subject to popular election and control

The main force behind changes in the political structure has been the middle classes and especially the new middle class. They have not yet developed any clear coalitions with workers and the emerging new labour movement. The new middle class support political reform and democratisation, they also back the social reform movements, and they are sympathetic towards the lower classes, but are not prepared to build up a closer alliance with the working class.

In the case of Taiwan, the main relationship between the labour movement and the process of democratisation seems to be that the middle class-based push towards democratisation and liberalisation created the opportunity for the new independent labour movement to organise without threat of state repression hanging over its head. Although the working class has not been the primary force in the process of liberalisation and although its role in the process of

democratisation has been negligible, the KMT state is well aware of the potential of a labour movement.

Conclusion

The general purpose of this lecture has been to describe and explain the prevalent weakness and growing militancy of labour, the emerging labour movement and the role of labour in the process of democratisation in Taiwan.

The process of proletarianisation accompanying industrial development has created a rather large working class population. Still, it has also been associated with the disproportionate expansion of employment relations that undercut effective collective action and more independent unionization. The vitality and expansion of such patriarchal, paternalist and filial proletarian employment relations as well as preemptive state intervention to a substantial degree explain why Taiwanese labour has been demobilised at both enterprise level and national level. Taiwanese industrialization, familism has permeated employment relations. Due to, among other things, the absence of public sources of social security, it is still of crucial importance for working-class people to have membership in and backing from a large class-heterogenous family. For most workers, factory work has not been considered as a lifelong occupation. In order to obtain a less risky basis of reproduction for themselves and their family, male workers situated in patriarchal or paternalist employment relations have been only "part-time workers" aiming at moving out of factory work and into (petty-) entrepreneurship.

Labour peace in Taiwan to a large extent reflects these family-related employment systems, but it does not signify that workers have been satisfied and not reacted against management domination. Workers' resistance, however, has not taken the form of open collective actions such as strikes and unionisation. Instead, conflicts and resistance have taken much more covert, indirect, personal and non-collective forms. Male and especially female workers have shown resistance by "voting with their feet", hopping from factory to factory. Though being placed in a still more unfavourable position in relation to men, weak job commitment, employment insecurity and family obligations have discouraged women workers from seeking autonomous collective action

Finally, we have also attributed the low level of more collective working class behavior to the lack of homogeneous working class communities in relation to the workers.

The presence of these structural economic and social conditions have made direct and repressive state intervention much less important than for example in South Korea. The Taiwanese labour control system was characterised as primarily authoritarian corporatist and enterprise-level based. The state certainly has had an important indirect role in labour control by supporting a house union structure and by regulating personnel practices at the enterprise level.

State-mandated enterprise paternalism in Taiwan cannot be explained by reference to export-oriented industrialisation (EOI). Although, in order to attract foreign investments, the Factories Act was changed marginally in 1975, the basic structure of labour control system was established prior to the EOI period and must be explained by reference to historical and country-specific factors. This does not exclude that these preemptive control systems, turned out to be quite instrumental to labour-intensive export-oriented industrialisation. A relationship between industrialisation strategy and labour control systems, however, can probably be found in relation to KMT's encouraging support of management-centered labour control and management unions as expressed, for instance, in the Labour Standards Law.

Although confined to the stable proletariat, the growing labour militancy and the trend towards an independent trade union structure is remarkable. We have related this shift to both structural and conjunctural factors. Firstly, it was argued that the bargaining position of labour was fortified by structural factors both in the factory (especially in heavy industries) and outside the factory (a tendency towards more cohesive proletarian urban neighbourhoods and communities). Secondly, we stressed that such factors as manufacturing and transport being relatively low-income sectors; extreme extraction of labour through long working hours; rough and dangerous working conditions; and increased social inequality might have been important too. And perhaps of greatest importance: The middle class-based push for liberalisation and democratisation enhanced the potential for working class-based action among the stable proletariat.

The trend towards increased labour activity and genuine unionisation seems to be irreversible. For almost ten years, the government has planned for a high-tech strategy, but Taiwan's family enterprises have been reluctant to follow the plans. Rather than countering increased labour costs, land costs , environmental protection costs and costs of local currency appreciation by shifting to knowledge-intensive industries, the majority of Taiwan's family enterprises seem to keep following short-term strategies by turning into unproductive speculative affairs or by moving production out of the country. Therefore, employment systems have not yet changed drastically in Taiwan. If the industrial structure in the future are going to shift towards high technology industries, it will undoubtedly undercut both patriarchal and filal proletarian employment relations, and the structural conditions might become more favourable for a stronger labour movement. In such a scenario, workers in Taiwan might become a much more prominent actor on the political scene and a main force behind demands for liberalisation, democratisation and a society in which the state expands its role as an agent of social security and economic equality.

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Appendix

1. The subjects dealt with:

a. the prevalent weakness of labour
b. the growing labour militancy and emerging labour movement
c. the relationship between the labour movement and the overall process of democratization
d. development strategies and labour control/labour regimes

2. The social organization of production.

2.1 Concepts:

employment relations/labour systems

relations in production	the exchange relations
- workplace conditions	-wage conditions
- control of labour	-recruitment patterns

(the reproduction of labour
- family structure

- community characteristics)

2.2 Employment relations in Taiwan - familism and entrepreneurialism

a. Patriarchal labour system
- household enterprises
- small-scale factories

b. Filial proletarian labour system
c. Paternalist labour system
d. Stable proletarian labour system

(2.3 Residential community characteristics:
class-heterogeneous vs. class-homogeneous)

3. Worker's resistance
open/covert
personal/impersonal
direct/indirect
individual/collective

4. Political liberalization and democratization

5. Development strategies and control of labour
5.1 Some propositions

a. Proposition 1: Export-oriented industrialization results in labour repression
b. Proposition 2: Export.led industrialization dominated by TNCs results in labour repression
c. Proposition 3: Industrial deepening results in authoritarian control over labour movement
d. Proposition 4: Industrial restructuring towards more complicated and complex forms of production results in less labour repression

5.2 Labour control typology

a.Level of control: state level or enterprise level
b.Type of control: repressive or authoritarian corporatist

Deconcentrated industrial structure:
Table
Employment by size of establishments. Shares in per cent. Taiwan. November 1982 and May 1990.

	All industries		Manufacturing	
	Nov. 1982	May 1990	Nov. 1982	May 1990
Size (persons)				
1-9	32.2	33.5	20.7	23.6
10-49	22.1	25.3	28.2	30.1
50-99	8.2	7.4	14.1	11.9
100-499	12.9	11.9	23.5	21.0
>500	4.6	5.3	9.0	10.4
Governm.	20.0	16.6	4.6	3,0
All	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Monthly Bulletin of Labor Statistics, Republic of China, No.110,DGBAS, Executive Yuan, ROC, December 1982, table 2-11, p.23. and Monthly Bulletin of Manpower Statistics, TaPiwan Area, Republic of China, No.200, DGBAS, Executive Yuan, June 1990. Table 19, p.31.