SPONTANEOUS SELF-ORGANIZATION AND FORMAL INSTITUTIONS

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Pro people policies betrayed

Probably no other African nation has adopted so explicitly a people-first orientation as Tanzania. Yet the outcome of the implementation of its political design and development programmes turned in many ways against the people. It is argued here that an important factor leading to this was the failure to respect people's own forms of organization and to implement the ideal which intended to give them the right to participate in the decision making regarding their own affairs.

The ideological impetus for the pro-people philosophy came from Julius Nyerere, who stepped down in 1985 from his 24 year tenure in the office of the presidency. The approach was evident in the country's ambitious public service programs, especially in the areas of adult education and health care. In the 27 years since independence, Tanzania raised life expectancy from ages 42 to 51 and adult literacy from 10 to 79 per cent. In addition, about half the population had access to potable water (Helleiner 1985, 21), if the optimistic estimates are to be taken at their face value.

Tanzania's commitment to basic needs was coupled with a populist emphasis on mass participation in the development process. In the ruling Party's 1971 Mwongozo Guide-lines the policy orientation was unambiguous:

> If development is to benefit the people, the people must participate in considering, planning and implementing their development plans. The duty of our Party is not to urge the people to implement plans which have been decided upon by a few experts and leaders. The duty of our Party is to ensure that the leaders and experts implement

> the plans that have been agreed upon by the people themselves (Clause 28).

Nyerere expressed this even more forcefully in a 1968 speech:

> We have to be a part of the society which we are changing; we have to work from within it, and not try to descend like ancient gods, do something and disappear again. A country, or a village, or a community, cannot be developed; it can only develop itself. For real development means the development, the growth, of people. Every country in African can show examples of modern facilities which have been provided for the peopleDand which are rotting unused. We have schools, irrigation works, expensive markets, and so on, things by which someone came and tried to 'bring development to the people.' If real development is to take place, the people have to be involved (1973, 25).

Local ten-house cells were to serve as mechanisms in mobilizing democratic grassroots participation in the political and development processes. These cells were the building blocks of a hierarchical political structure that included branches, wards, districts and regions.

The stated policies were not only geared towards popular participation in the development process, but also towards incorporating people's own knowledge. Nyerere in a 1968 speech explained:

> Knowledge does not only come out of books . . . We have wisdom in our own past, and in those who still carry the traditional knowledge accumulated in that tribal past. . . We would be stupid indeed if we allowed the development of our economies to destroy the human and social values which African societies had built up over centuries. Yet if we are to save these, we cannot afford the arrogance which our technical superiority tempts us to assume (1973, 27).

Given the unusual sensitivity the nation's political leadership exhibited towards starting from the people themselves in charting development plans, one has to ask, why in practice was a "top-down" approach the rule rather than the exception. Rarely were people's own priorities, values, working arrangements and technologies taken into account or taken as a starting point for development programs initiated by the government and/or external donor agencies. "Progress" came to mean something that existed externally to the "objects" of development schemes, i.e., to people themselves. Their so-called traditional practices would have to be eradicated be-

fore "development" could occur. Development was generally something "done to" people or imposed on them in the form of directives, projects and campaigns rather than being a collective interactive endeavour.

At its worst, this thinking led to coercion as seen at times in the at times forced removal of people from their homes during the massive *Operesheni Vijijini* campaign to resettle the rural population into villages from 1972 to 1975. The more benign manifestations of this kind of thinking involved the paternalism leaders expressed in their interactions with local people. This paternalism was reflected, for example, in the comments of a senior official involved in the Shinyanga villagization scheme who stated that "Tanzania could not sit back and watch the majority of its people leading 'a life of death.' The state, had, therefore, to take the role of the 'father' in ensuring that its people chose a better and more prosperous life for themselves" (Quoted in Bernstein 1981, 45).

Perhaps the greatest fallacy of the development ideology was that it relegated people who adhered to "traditional" beliefs and practices to being passive repositories of progress, denying them agency in their own lives, and refusing to recognize their own choices and rationales for asserting these preferences. One Party cell leader put it poignantly: "You can't force people to go along on e narrow road. People have their own minds (*akili).* They aren't going to go along with force" (Tripp 1989).

One of the key factors mitigating a bottom-up approach was the emphasis on the role of the state, i.e., the Party, the Government and its administrative, legal, extractive and coercive institutions. In Tanzania, as in other parts of the third world, much of the expansion of the state's role in society had to do initially with the post-War thinking emerging in the West that was influenced by the market failures of the 1930s and reconstruction policies of 1940s and 1950s. This line of thinking looked to the state to maintain trade and manage the macroeconomic balance. The views of development economists, who saw an even greater need for state intervention in the economies of developing countries, were fused with those of radical third world nationalist leaders. In Africa, these nationalists looked to the state as a means of exerting domestic interests over those of foreign interests. Furthermore, at independence, there was

only a small African entrepreneur class in Tanzania, which meant that the state had to fulfil functions that might otherwise have been undertaken by the private sector. This meant that the state gave politicians a base from which to enhance their personal power by manipulating markets via the state.

The newly independent Tanzanian state made a sharp break with the colonial state in its ideological emphasis on egalitarianism, communalism and self-reliance. However, various structures and administrative practices inherited from the colonial state proved more difficult to transcend. Even the 1970s villagization programme, which was seen as a way to bring about rural socialism, had had colonial precedents.

Villagization was designed both to ease the distribution of social services and to facilitate administration of the rural population. The operation was reminiscent of the German and British colonial schemes to resettle people along the roads to make it easier to administer them and transport export crops.

Effects of Villagization

Rural development was to be a central concern of the Party in a country in which nearly 90 per cent of the population was directly engaged in agricultural activities. After the Party's 1967 Arusha Declaration, the state was to play a greater role in directing agricultural production. The Villagization programme, *Ujamaa Vijijini* resettled most of the rural population into villages from 1972 to 1975, often with the use of force. Rural development came to be equated with Villagization.

Much has been written about this major effort to restructure rural areas. Its main features are widely known. I reiterate some points in the light of my own research since the ideology of villagization was originally based on the idea that people's capacity for self-organization will come alive in the new context of communality in *ujamaa* villages.

Some of the consequences of the disruptions of villagization were food shortages and hunger. People were forced to huddle in temporary shacks in the cold and rain when their houses where demolished. They tended to shun working in communal fields and now had to walk farther to their own fields. Fields close to the village often suffered from over-cultivation resulting in soil infertility. People also had to walk farther to collect firewood and at times also water (Raikes 1986, 120).

Villagization was intended to be for the people's good, beginning from the bottom up, but it turned out to be very much directed from above. The programme aimed to improve the living conditions of the people at the grassroots through a gradual transformation from development villages to cooperative villages and finally to a socialist mode of production in ujamaa villages, which was thought to lead to increased production. People continued to have their individual fields, but they were encouraged to organize them into large units to facilitate mechanized ploughing, harvesting and transport and to make the protection of fields against vermin easier. Common village plots were also to be cultivated to provide the village with capital for services, including health, education, and water.

Nyerere had envisaged that the ideal would happen and people would be able to adapt their own communal or socially sharing institutions to new forms of collective or cooperative organization for the purposes of production. Through them greater mutual sharing would enable better access to equipment and allow for the equitable distribution of produce to all the members.

In theory, development was to be built on self-reliance. People's interests and active participation were to be incorporated into the planning and implementation of their own development. The Party Guide-lines (1971) stated:

> The duty of the Party is not to urge the people to implement plans which have been decided upon by a few experts or leaders. The duty of the Party is to ensure that the leaders and experts implement the plans that have been agreed upon by the people themselves....it is not correct for leaders and experts to usurp the people's right to decide.

These Guidelines were optimistic when contrasted with how rural villagers actually experienced Government programme. Most people paid little heed to the talk about Villagization at the time the plans were first announced. In the words of a coastal man, people were "only going to obey an outright order which would leave them no choice but to move." By 1974 only 19 per cent of the rural people had voluntary moved into villages in this way.

Even when the orders came to move to villages, people refused to obey the directive in places like Bunju. "If you want to move us you have to do it yourselves," one villager said. In Bunju a team of district and regional officials with the help of defense force personnel had to destroy their old homes and physically move the villagers and their belongings out of their homes and transport them to the new plots. The officials and defense forces came from Dar es Salaam with their own provisions. They could not risk eating local food for the fear of being poisoned by the people. They lived in tents, which they themselves erected, since the local people refused to cooperate with them. The generally peaceful coastal people resisted as they had in earlier periods of external intervention. By resisting, they asserted the validity and power of their own practical wisdom based on experience, when it came into conflict with the state and the "modernizing" project of the elites (Interview with one of the officers in 1989 who had taken part in the operation in Bunju).

In the coastal areas, people were moved to compact villages along the main road and to a few fishing villages along the ocean. Many villagers were settled on land belonging to other villagers and under trees that did not belong to them. Sometimes people were moved only a few meters from their original homes, while others were moved as far as one to two kilometres. When the villages were restructured, land was to belong to the village, but the general rule was that individual households were allocated one half to one acre plots near the houses and one to three acre plots for cultivation. All Party cell leaders, each of whom represented about ten households, were allocated a number of plots to be divided among their former cell members. The division of agricultural land was more complicated and often ended up being quite arbitrary.

Still, the villagers who had to move away from their former fields during Villagization did not always continue cultivating this land,

even when the plots were relatively nearby. This was because they were uncertain of their future claims to this land since the policy remained unclear. Not surprisingly, new conflicts emerged over claims to uncultivated land, which had once been under cultivation prior to Villagization.

Officials paid little attention to villagers' loss of property and old cultivated fields. Under such conditions little consideration was given to the customary or Islamic modes of transferring land and property rights from one occupant to another or to inheritance practices. Disputes had been settled so far in neighbourhood and kin "courts" in which the "heart" could rule over the "law," as I was told by a Bunju man (Swantz 1985, 111). All institutions of land inheritance were discarded in the coastal villages.

One year after people's old houses had been destroyed, seemingly for the sole purpose of making villagers rebuild their houses to stand in straight lines, people were still trying to make some sense of their fate as they sat in their new small grass or clay huts seeking protection from the sun and rain. One village elder in Maneromango village in Kisarawe District explained in 1974:

> When we got our independence (*uhuru*) we heard that everyone should rely on his own strength (*kila mtu ajitegemee*) and we really took this to heart and started working. When the word came that we should do away with thatch roofs, we went down to work. We did not know a hundred shilling note but now we know it. . . . . We realized that *uhuru* is a great thing. We had changed our houses and even our looks. Almost everyone wanted to do as well as the neighbour. And development followed.

It was possible to strain the endurance of the people quite far, but when it no longer made sense to them, they began to question how far they should go on obeying orders. Another comment by the same elder illustrates this:

> When the voice came to live in *ujamaa* villages from our basis of living in clan groups, for us it was difficult. . . . In the end we agreed to work together, but living together was hard for us. Leaders find it difficult to make us do it . . . . When the people meet between themselves they argue about it, but because it is an order (*azimio*), a Government policy, they fail to oppose it in the meetings. If a person opposes it publicly it will be thought of him, 'Where do you come

> from? What kind of a Tanzanian is this, he opposes his government?' and so he agrees . . . When the committee member goes to explain to people he does not know what to say. Every way is used. What has been agreed to in the meeting of the District is very difficult to refuse in the meeting of a Ward. But in implementation, that is where it becomes bad . . . . I could not refuse to carry out the actions because I had not said so in the meetings, and I am a leader. As we know in our nation, all of us do not yet know how to present our views because we come from far. If an order comes from a leader, it is difficult for us to oppose it. If you oppose you look ahead and wonder what is going to happen to you.

This TANU elder had seen how the defense force had broken his glass windows, iron sheet roof and framed doors, which he had acquired piece by piece with much toil and saving over a long time. Now everything was gone. His wife was still crying bitterly while huddling in the thatch roof clay hut they had managed to build. Bed frames and cupboards had to be left outside to wait for a better day. The shopkeeper neighbours were similarly standing in the middle of the rubble of their house and shop, the corner of which had not stood in straight line with the other houses. No consideration was given to the cost of all the material loss.

> If he had come to ask and not to explain things would have been different. But now they come just to explain, not to ask questions. But then . . . they go back and say, 'I have gone to get the views of the people.' This is the trouble. There is no one who can say that we are happy. To plant new coconut trees in this land is not easy. These trees have been planted by our grandfathers. The land is difficult.

I have not elaborated on the villagization process as something new that would not be known to anyone familiar with the recent history of Tanzania. But the theme of coastal people's resistance puts also this phase of history into a longer perspective. When people were told to move the coastal people's resistance became evident. What was done was intended to be for the people's good. But in fact development which began from bottom up turned to development directed from above. [1] In the words of a senior official in Shinyanga, Nyerere played the role of a father who had to use hardhanded measures for the benefit of his "children" (Bernstein 1982/21:45). [2]

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1 Descriptions of villagization cf. Swantz 1982:62-83; Swantz 1988:305-317; Freyhold 1979; Hyden 1980, etc.

2 In Shinyanga, however, one of the most misguided "operations" was carried out and, in consequence, the official in charge was removed.

Village organization and social institutions

As in the colonial days, those implementing "Operation Villagization" paid little attention to local modes of organization, local ecological and social conditions and local methods of cultivation, often with disastrous results. In the villagization process, Boesen writes, ". . . the existing agricultural and land use systems were often disregarded although they were the basic elements in the adaptation to the ecology of different areas of the peasants' vital demand for security and for the main tenance of their family development cycles" (1979, 136).

Village organization is there to stay. There are many aspects in the new village organization that will outlast the radical implementation of villagization which at times violated human rights. Institutions were created for village administration which became people's tools in village leadership and in participating in a political process. Even if people often have been left with a feeling that their decisions are by-passed on the higher levels of decision-making, in internal village matters they have been able to exercise leadership.[3]

Today a Village forms a Branch of the CCM Party with the village Chairman and Secretary as the leader. The Village Government consists of the Village Council and usually five functional committees (economic planning and finance; production and marketing; education, culture and social welfare, including health; security and defence; building and transport.) In practice, the designations of the committees vary and not all the villages have all the committees which are listed in the Village Act of 1975. Men have outnumbered women in committees and meetings but each committee should have at least two women. Village Assembly has the power of electing the members of the committees and it offers a forum for debating common issues. In practice, the Executive Committee of the Party makes the final selection of the branch chairpersons and secretaries. The Government can also appoint a salaried village manager, who in some cases could be a local person trained for the job. The village also forms a cooperative for marketing the main agricultural products of the villagers who continue to sell their crops indivi-

[3] Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act was passed 1975 which laid out the basic village structure.

dually. The whole village is divided into units of roughly ten houses, each cell with a leader. (Sheria ya kuandikisha vijiji...1975)

The village programme aimed at raising the living conditions of the grassroots people through a gradual transformation from development villages to villages organized on a cooperative basis until they finally would reach a socialist mode of production in *ujamaa* villages.

Much has been written in criticism of villagization. [4] Hedlund and Lundahl are no less critical than many earlier analysts who have closely followed the events. Their contention is that things went wrong because ideology was made the determinant of economy and ideology did not correspond with reality. They make a distinction between *ujima* and *ujamaa.* I am not sure that the semantics they give rings true but I agree with them when they argue that the old communal groups were not production units. This constitutes a basic difference in the old and new institutional structure. [5]

In all villages common village plots were to be cultivated to provide the village with capital for services (health, education, water, etc). People continued to have their individual fields, but they were supposed to organize them into large units to facilitate mechanized ploughing, harvesting and transport and sharing of such work as protecting the fields against vermine. [6]

In the coastal villages this did not happen. Cooperation diminished instead. During my first research period men in Kilungule, Bunju, organized teams from time to time to net wild pigs which destroyed the fields. After the villagization it was no more done; such cooperation was said not to be possible any more. People had been scattered

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4 I have written elsewhere on the topic, e.g. Swantz, 1980a:9-22; 1980b:251-8; 1981:283-291; 1982/14:62-83;

5 Hedlund & Lundahl, *Ideology as a Determinant of Economic Systems: Nyerere and Ujamaa in Tanzania,* Scandinavian Institute of African Studies Research Report No.84. Some of the earlier critics have been von Freyhold (1979), Raikes (1975 & 1986), Coulson (1982), Abrahams, ed.1985, etc.

6 Because of people's reluctance to join their fields together and cultivate communally, block-farming was encouraged, *bega kwa bega,* literally "shoulder to shoulder", whereby the fields were located together in blocks, each farmer having his/her own plot. Instead of keeping wild animals off they often increased because of the uncultivated bush that grew in places where people's fields had been previously between the villages. It happened also that animals were hiding in parts within the blocks left unattended by some former farmers.

to the extent that they no more had common interests and new relations were not established on the earlier basis. In fact, in several occasions people talked about *ujamaa* as a system which had killed cooperation.

This is not to say that no new cooperative groups have been formed nor that there has not been any success in them. Particularly women have shared in groups, but most often on a project basis and because of some specific incentives or external initiative. This was the case in the fisheries project which NORAD supported from the Mbegani Fisheries Development Centre. I have elaborated its success and difficulties in another context (Swantz & Tripp, 1990, ms.). Better success can be recorded from Kiwangwa village in Bagamoyo district in which the success of pineapple farming has brought sufficient income to women to encourage them into a cooperative action, further supported from UNIFEM funds.

Whatever the weaknesses of villagization as an operation, life in villages is now often preferred to life in former scattered homesteads. One evidence of this is that only relatively few have made use of the granted opportunity to move back to cultivate their former fields. 7 Many of the promised services were built up in the villages, such as educational facilities, clinics and cleaner sources of water. Even if they do not always function properly for a lack of funds, they yet have lifted Tanzania to the frontline among African nations.

Village life is also preferred because it accommodates social interaction, as it was predicted to do. The action is not nearly always of the kind government development planners would envisage or encourage in their official capacity. In their free time they might well enjoy it. Beer clubs is an institution which flourishes in all villages, at times organized as a village business-making effort, most often it is the principal way for the women to make income and to get some of the money from their own husbands for the household expenses.

General sociality becomes alive on special occasions for special purposes within the community. Family celebrations are social occasions in which communality is expressed in shared work by men

7 Having already moved, perhaps several times. and being uncertain of the future orders, people would have hesitated to move again, starting from scratch again.

and women. Women share in the cooking duties as they do in funerals and family feasts while men prepare the place of meeting etc. Even in such occasions the duties are usually shared in the order of closeness in kinship or neighbourhood terms, keeping in mind previous assistance given by those now in need of help. Reciprocity is the basic principle in all interaction and directs the action.

There are many social institutions based on tradition which especially in the villages in the Coast Region continue unabated. Some years back in the 1970s the village organization served well for the witchcraft eradication operations. The verandah of the village chairman or the office of the Party has time and again served as a place for the medicine-man to perform his duties in administering the medicine to the total village, since very few dared to stay away lest he or she be accused of being a witch. Similarly days could be spent in communal production of medicines needed for the village shrine. Naturally the village structure is used also for other religious functions, be they Muslim or Christian, depending on the area. Religious functions draw groups together mainly on the basis of membership. I shall return to the issue of social organization among the Zaramo.

Directed development

The "peasants'" assumed "ignorance" gave the bureaucrats the right to treat them as inferior beings whose time was at their disposal.[8] Bureaucrats frequently expressed distrust of "peasants'" intentions, capacity and integrity. Their message to a researcher was, "Don't trust the peasants' words; they tell you lies". They summoned people to meetings or to welcome visiting leaders but could leave them idly waiting from morning till evening, with little consideration of time lost. People could sit and wait for an audience in front of some office for hours, with no regard to the distance they had travelled,

[8] The fight had been declared by the Party against "ignorance, disease and poverty" which was open to misinterpretation. I use the word "peasants" in quotation marks because of the derogatory content of it and its connotations in class terms, here referring to the terminology used by bureaucrats and scholars. I prefer the term small farmers.

just to be told to come again the following day. A village Chairman's application to run again for the Chairman's post was discarded because he crossed an order from his superiors. On an occasion he had been severely scolded by a Regional Commissioner because he had dismissed the villagers after they had waited for high level visitors from the morning till late afternoon. The villagers had to reach their fields before nightfall to guard them from animals. (Swantz, 1982:68)[9]

Villagers could no longer regulate their own working time. The cooperative village work and common fields demanded a work schedule for three days a week. These times turned out to be nominal since people attended irregularly or not at all. The attitude of villagers toward the regulation of having to have communal or cooperative fields was little short of ridicule. [10] The communal farms in the Mwambao area, with few exceptions, never brought any benefits to the village. There hardly was a year that they even were harvested. The benefits gained were far out of balance with the amount of work that people were supposed to have spent on the cooperative work and it brought no profit directly to the workers. Only labour with regular pay could have given motivation to work, but the villages had insufficient funds to provide such payments.[11] The pretence that cooperative work was being performed created a credibility gap between people and the state. In most cases, the planting of a modest plot has been managed, but the weeding coincided with the villagers' own labour needs. The most common answer to question about communal field has been: "We planted 'last year' but did not harvest". The new government policy advices

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[9] "We crossed each other with the R.C. The big people had not yet arrived 5 p.m. and the people begged me 'Please, let us go, it will be dark before we arrive at the fields.' 6.30 p.m. the big people came and the R.C. told me, 'You are no good, you have let them go. And my forms were returned, it was bitter." The man was again re-elected when the R.C. changed.

[10] According to the agricultural policy prepared in 1982 by the Ministry of Agriculture each villager should have at least a half an acre individual plot around the homestead, and a plot in the block farm and each village must have a communal farm for its income. (The Tanzania Agricultural Policy 1982)

[11] The agricultural policy recommends paid labour for labour performed for the village. In some villages this has been possible when they have done their own marketing. Kiwangwa village west of Bagamoyo grows pineapples which it markets with two village lorries obtained initially with bankloans. In Bunju cassava is grown on the village plot with women's occasional work contributions. A coconut field given to the village after a dairy-farmer deserted it was rented to a palmwine tapper for a modest sum and thus additional labour needs were skirted..

the village to consider the seasonality of labour in selecting the communal crop.

From time to time, with new orders from the top or with a new village manager, the turns for work were enforced for a period, for instance by closing the shops and bars until the afternoon, but the orders were again relaxed since they were not practicable.[12] In addition, people were supposed to heed to specific plans that both regional and national development policies outlined for them. One year the emphasis in the country was on irrigation, another year on growing cassava; after hybrid maize failed because of lack of rain maize was to be changed to millet or sorghum. Cotton or tobacco alternated as the recommended cash crop.[13] In 1988 it was announced that simsim would be the new crop to be promoted nationally in 1989. (Daily News 15.11.1988) The national and regional emphases became confusing to the local agricultural extension workers as well as to the village leaders and villagers themselves.[14]

Villagers do not stage protests but their attitudes are reflected in poor participation in meetings or communal work, which is organized in ten-house units. Leaders tend to interpret people's passive attitude as laziness. [15] At times complaints are widely shared and they are freely expressed. When the orders have been unreasonable people have on some occasions sent delegations to higher Party offices to plead their cause, much in the same fashion as a community used to come together, and with common consensus, send a delegation to a rain-diviner in Kolelo in Luguru mountains with their common plight.[16]

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12 Only in villages in which daily or weekly payments could be made attendance has been somewhat regular by those in need of quick cash.

13 There was an echo from colonial times when cotton was first thrust upon the coastal people "for their own benefit"; "cotton symbolized the foreign penetration and control" according to Iliffe (1979;168)

14 The long history of reluctance to go along with policy orders becomes understandable through Liebenow's description of the Southern Province in the 1950s. Frequent changes in policy measures with the quick turnover of the colonial officers compare well with similar changes of both bureaucrats and policies during independence. (Liebenow, 1971)

15 The government officials commonly find fault in the particular ethnic people they have been posted to work with if they are not of his/her own background which reflects also a class attitude

16 For example Pande and Msoga villages in Bagamoyo district protested against moving; Msata protested an order to thin every second house out after the moving had already once

Villagers make use of the Party and government offices as their legitimate channels for requests and influence, but they also manipulate them both for private and common ends. Intra-village conflicts develop. Local party leaders, leaders of women's groups or project leaders are suspected of making use of their position to their own benefit. On the other hand, being part of the community the local government leaders tend to side with the villagers in conflicts with higher-up bureaucrats and seldom initiate measures against them, even if they see party rules transgressed.

Because of the economic crisis and unfulfilled promises, criticism toward the leaders and the Party became vocal and came from many sides. But it had its base in events that preceded the crisis. The words of the Party had already begun to echo hollow on the grounds of the very policy it set out to implement; it forfeited its own principles. These feelings were aggravated when the economic difficulties deepened. With the increasing scarcity of goods the Party leaders on all levels could acquire daily commodities and get them at regular price because of their position, while for others they either were not available or the prices were raised higher because of the real or artificially created shortages. The Party initials CCM were widely translated to mean: *Chukua Chako Mapema,* meaning "take yours early". This had implications also in allocating and alienating village land. Much of the initial enthusiasm, which derived from the sentiment of being masters in one's own house, has under these circumstances faded away. The higher Party leadership struggles to regain confidence; the continuing economic hardships make it doubly difficult.

Like situations in other developed or developing parts of the world, the grassroots people continue to be pestered with too much "guidance" or plain administrative orders from above. Directed planning is considered necessary, because of "peasants' ignorance". People in the villages wish to be left alone, but they also complain that the functional officers, planners and leaders only give orders but do not come to the villages with the intention of really instructing them how to improve their working methods. The minds of the

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been done; several villages protested against abolishment of private shops from the villages, because the village or cooperative shops were unable to provide the goods. In the cases that I know of the complaints were heeded. About Kolelo cf. Swantz,1986,173.

two sides do not meet on equal terms. Consequently, the orders and the assistance when given from the distance do not fit the situation into which they are applied.

Of the continuing struggle for both the Parakuyo and the agriculturalists of Bagamoyo district the latest example is the treatment of the projects in Lugoba which were started as a continuation from the participation action research of the Jipemoyo project. The project secretary of the ten projects run by men and women have been taken over from them and the tractor and three bicycles donated to them after their work of many years and considerable success have been taken over by the ward development committee of seven men and made property of the Social Welfare Department. Now they can be used by the project only against payment. The committee will choose leaders for the projects to replace those who had started them and worked extremely hard to make them a success. "The problems between ward authorities and the projects began with severe harassment of the women's vegetable project and then a carpentry project. These were the more successful projects". Part of the harassment was breaking the pump that was run by gravitation. (Daily News 8.02.1991; 7.02.1991). Any success of the people is taken over by the bureaucracy. "The committee has threatened to have anyone who questions their activities arrested". Jealousy is a powerful sentiment which destroys communal spirit in many efforts to create participation. Nowadays private profit- making accompanies it.
This lengthy exposition of details of "directed development" is justified in this paper only because it serves to emphasize why there is a counter-movement among the people. With such tensions in relations between the bureaucrats and the villagers it is not surprising that the social organizations in which people find themselves to be at home are outside the formal structures.

Land issues in villages

My most recent study concerns particularly the land issue within the urban periphery, which I can only fairly briefly touch here. I

pick out aspects which I consider to be significant in relation to organizational forms.

The treatment of landrights during Villagization varied considerably throughout the country, depending on the strength of pre-existing claims to land ownership. The customary institutions of inheritance were respected in the most densely populated parts of the mountainous Kilimanjaro Region and Mbeya Region where customary landrights had been firmly entrenched over several centuries; inherited land was in them virtually untouched by Villagization and little actual moving to new village sites occurred. Villagization in these instances meant redefining the boundaries of administrative units to conform with the rest of the country. In the regions in which shifting cultivation had been practised and the land rights not determined over generations there was little regard to former ownership of land. People were not, however, made to give up their right to individual plots of land, whether old or new, even if they were forcibly moved to new village sites.

Thus in the regions which were more entrenched in market economy traditional forms of inheritance were reinforced whereas the groups which resisted incorporation into the values of the market lost most of their former landrights. They have, on the other hand, retained many of their other social institutions.

The impact of Villagization on women's rights to land was similarly not given adequate attention. In many ways divorced, widowed or single women stood to gain from Villagization, because plots were allocated to them personally. But most married women did not benefit from the resettlement campaign in the area of my study. I had shown earlier how many women held rights both to land and trees in the Bunju area in the second half of the 1960s, making independent decisions about selling their produce and property. In Villagization both men and women were to be registered as members of villages and given equal rights to new land. However, in reallocating the plots to households, the tendency was to give precedence to men. In the words of a Makonde man in a Rufiji village they had cleared in a forest: "Land is allocated only to those who (in a household) control land. All the women in this village are themselves controlled". [17]

17 Wale tu wanaomiliki ardhi wamepewa ardhi. Wanawake wote wa kiji hiki wamemilikiwa.

Since the plots were allocated to households in Bunju rather than to adult individuals, women's record of ownership of houses and fields was not always recognized in the reallocation process. Out of 50 Bunju women that were interviewed in 1989, six were cultivating land allocated to their husbands and not to them personally and all five who had land allocated to themselves had been divorced at the time. Not one married woman said that she was allocated land by the village. Those who claimed to have plots were cultivating their own land they had inherited or it was their husbands' inherited land.

The commoditization of village land was one of the many unintended consequences of Villagization resulting from the subsequent disruption of the land tenure system. At the time of Villagization, the selling of land was rare. With the drought of 1974, people from the city began to obtain land from villagers for cultivation. According to Tanzania's property laws, the produce and "development" of land could be given monetary value, while the land itself could not be commoditized. However, after the mid-1970s the purchase of land soon became common practice, regardless of whether the owner of the land had an official title to the land. An unused piece of land could change hands several times and in the e end have several claimants simultaneously. Even this commoditization of land has not done away with the local people's interest in their own social organization and continuity of social ties on their own conditions.

Conflicts over land rights

The ambiguities around land issues frequently brought the village into conflict with higher state authorities at the City Council, District, Region and Central Government levels. The village leaders whom I interviewed in Bunju, were not clear about the laws that regulated the acquisition of land and ordinary villagers were even less knowledgeable about these regulations.

The obvious ambiguity in land allocation procedures left ample room for mismanagement and manipulation of land issues, espe-

cially since individuals were permitted to obtain lease holdings. One outcome of this was that land gradually became a commodity, even though it could not legally be bought and sold.

Moreover, the allocation of land by different bodies through different legal or semi-legal provisions frequently left villagers in Bunju uncertain about their rights to particular pieces of land. Over the years large parts of traditional village land had been given away for various purposes without the villagers' knowledge.

The many different authorities regulating land allocations, the confusion over their respective jurisdiction, and the lack of structures of accountability, explains, in part, how villages so easily relinquished land to city dwellers in the 1970s and 1980s. The movement of urbanites into the rural areas surrounding Dar es Salaam came in several waves.

Perhaps the main reason for the loss of land by villagers was the urban dwellers' acquisition of land in the peri-urban areas in the 1980s. This was primarily a result of the sharp declines in urban real wages in the 1980s and the increasing attractiveness of farming. Large numbers of city dwellers of all income levels, seeking ways to supplement their meagre wages and salaries , started acquiring land to farm and engage in animal husbandry. Others came to the villages from the city to engage in small businesses. Carpenters, tailors, masons, medicine men, bicycle repairmen, black smiths and a group of thirty new palm-wine tappers who moved to Bunju in recent years illustrate this trend. Many situated themselves in a central location near a market along the road, where customers from further away also would have access to their services and produce.

As the demand for land surrounding the city increased, land began to rise in value, regardless of the quality or quantity of crops previously grown on it.

The payments for land were meant to be compensation for the work done on the land in the form of cultivation, since it was illegal to buy land outright. This gave villagers some leeway in negotiating the price of cultivated land. Even then, little pretence was made about the fact that what was being sold was the land itself and of the fact that land had indeed become a commodity. In 1987, for

example, a small board was put up in a public place along the Bagamoyo r road announcing that land was for sale.

It appears that village leaders who allocated land to city dwellers or villagers who sold land were initially attracted by the ready cash they could earn from the transactions. They were also expecting that the village might accrue secondary benefits by having better off city folk in their midst. The newcomers, who often became absentee farmers, were expected to make payments to the village since they had an obligation to contribute in one way or another. Some thought that having a guarded field next to one's own might provide better security from thieves and animals. A certain relationship of interdependency was expected, involving an exchange of services on some level.

Some of these expectations were fulfilled as villagers found that they could obtain additional income by finding labourers to clear and cultivate the land of the new landowners. Or they might themselves clear the trees from the plot to make charcoal for sale. In some villages like Chanika, the presence of wealthier people from the city brought services to the villages. Cell leaders benefited from the land transactions because a fee was paid to them as witnesses of the transaction. Village committees gained from new village membership fees, which amounted to 600 Tsh per (Maulidi, interviews in Mvuti and Chanika 1989, 1990). It should be quickly pointed out, however, that these minimal benefits were hardly sufficient to compensate for the frustrations the villagers felt as the new landowners grew in number.

Villagers' perceptions of the newcomers gradually changed from their initial expectations. Villagers in Bunju were asked in 1990 what benefit they thought the newcomers had brought to the village. They expressed dissatisfaction and showed little benevolence. Because of the greater material and human resources that the wealthier urban dwellers commanded, they were able to obtain far greater returns from the land than the villagers, who did not have access to same inputs, piped water, means of transport, farming equipment, information about farming techniques, and hired labourers. Villagers could not see how they with their limited resources could make the same kind of use of the land as their wealthier neighbours and this built resentment.

So far I have explained why villagers sold their land to city dwellers in terms of the monetary benefits they expected from such transactions and possible other indirect benefits of having wealthier neighbours. But this is not entirely sufficient to explain the sales of land, which had been in many ways a means of retaining social obligations that were so important to coastal dwellers. Disinterest in land could be interpreted as disinterest in cultivation as a source of income which stemmed in part from a frustration with government-directed development. In effect, it was a form of opposition to the many directives and campaigns that did not take their needs into consideration. The net result of these changes was a shift away from smallholder cultivation to wealthy or moderately well-off landowners hiring labourers to farm the land.

With other avenues for income-generation open to them, they felt they could sell their land, while still retaining their own plots for subsistence purposes. They might, for example, continue to own a few coconut, cashew or fruit trees the produce of which they would sell. They might also own a small field of rice and a small plot of cassava mainly for consumption, but sometimes also for sale.

People frequently combined cultivating with employment or self-employment. A woman might work at a nearby quarry for wages and pay a labourer to do her cultivation, while her children would be involved in small trade. Of the family members, it was primarily the elderly who did the cultivating and even many elderly combined cultivation with small business. Many older women would rise as early as 3-4 a.m. to make pastries, which they would sell by the roadside before going to farm.

Another source of income which made it possible for rural dwellers to sell land was rent the obtained from houses which they owned in the city. Evidence from Bunju, Mbweni and Mvuti as well as from Rufiji villages show that people increasingly invested proceeds from their crops, land sales or small businesses to buy houses in the city which they would rent out. For example, in the mid-1980s a resident of Mvuti sold three acres of his village land for 100,000 Tsh and used it to buy a Swahili type house with six rooms in the city. Investing in the city is not a new phenomenon. In fact it was quite popular already in the 1960s.

The lack of seeming concern for future generations may have stemmed from the fact that most youth were trying to make their living in groups or individu ally in small businesses, stone work, bricklaying, repair work, casual labour or fishing. Many had left for other parts of the country. Very few young people, men or women, had gone into cultivation.

Land sale and ritual life of the community

While it is clear that villagers were selling land to diversify their sources of income and were moving away from agriculture as their major source of livelihood, it is more difficult to explain why they felt compelled at this juncture to do so, especially when the returns on land sales were so small. When asked why they sold their land, villagers would often reply that they needed the money for some obligatory social event which they could not forego. People made a conscious, articulated choice, time and again, to use whatever cash they could muster for ritual celebrations. They felt bound to their ancestral obligation (*jadi*) to, for example, make public the maturing of a son or daughter or to honour a family member after his or her death.

Family events frequently required considerable sums of cash. Compared with inhabitants who live further inland, the coastal people spent large sums of money on wedding feasts. A wide circle of kin members would contribute costly clothes, furniture, household items, food and fermented or unfermented beer at marriage celebrations and celebrations at the time of puberty. Harvested rice shared with the kin for the maintenance of reciprocal relations was frequently preferred over selling it or even storing it for a time of greater need. Havnevik points to similar emphasis in social life in Rufiji where surplus was redistributed ed to fulfil social and religious obligations

These customs were important for building social continuity and cohesion and for establishing trust. This trust proved crucial to other economic activities, ranging from agricultural production, fishing to the establishment and operation of small businesses all of

which relied heavily on the capital, resources and connections of kin.

The emphasis on social cohesion has served other, perhaps even more profound purposes. Looking at cultural features simply as economic strategies may overlook the aspect of purposeful resistance embedded in ritual and other forms of cultural association. Adherence to custom could be linked to the sale of land as a form of resistance to external attempts to control their lives and livelihood that did not serve their interests. Adherence and preservation of social customs, in this context, is not an atavistic backward looking response to the so- called "modernization" and "development" that the Government and Party were attempting to bring. Rather, it is a way for people to create space, to maintain spheres of autonomous action in order to direct their own destiny. It is a way of resisting the imposition of irrational policies that undermine their social order and means of sustaining themselves.

This is the same resistance we saw earlier to external pressures of the German colonial Government to grow cotton and to the villagization efforts of the independent Government. The Zaramo have stood their ground and have resisted becoming simply servants of new masters. They have indeed felt that they were the "owners" of the coastal land, which gave them a sense of pride that they could do with the land as they wished.

The Zaramo have created this "space" for themselves in a variety of ways, both obvious and subtle. They have, for example, had the capacity to create a linguistic space by verbal circumvention. They can talk at many different levels of meaning simultaneously, manipulating words so that the other (outside) party finds him/herself thinking initially that he/she understood what was said and later, upon reflection, realizing the purposeful ambiguity in what was communicated.

But the main way in which this space has been created is through ritual and symbolic intercommunication, which continues to form the basis for much of social life, even in the urban community. For the Zaramo, the persistent social symbols are drawn from the body or the human organism. The universality of body symbolism facilitates a shared symbolic interpretation and is relatively easy to transfer to

following generations through the instruction attached to maturity rites and through the repetition of the same symbolism through all the rituals, many of the therapeutic rituals included.

The basic weave of life is continually affirmed in the many ritual gatherings through which social relations are perpetuated in interaction between the city and village people. Women play a central role in maintenance of this continuity. They themselves first experience the significance of symbolism existentially in regenerating puberty seclusion and in childbirth. Then they transfer the symbols to new generations through instruction and symbolic action. Virtually all the youth to this day go through conventional puberty rituals with minor variations from generation to generation. After the girls have gone through seven years of schooling they have still continued to be secluded and confined to the home yard, even to a windowless room, for more or less than a year.

It remains to be seen what affect the recent influx of outsiders to the villages and the loss of land will have on people's social values and modes of social interaction in the longer perspective. It is possible that in a long run loss of land will result in gradual erosion of social coherence. Yet there is evidence that so far a remarkable degree of sociality is retained. The shared body symbols have a tremendous capacity for maintaining coherence even in the face of such radical changes as the loss of land.

In fact, social cohesion for the Zaramo was not even historically tied to the land. The groups of people living in regions close to the coast have a history of a relatively high degree of mobility. In the less fertile hinterland of the coast, shifting agriculture has been practised extensively. Since the beginning of long distance trade, external pressures, compounded with slash-and-burn cultivation, hunting, fishing and seasonal food-gathering, have prevented people from settling permanently to cultivate in one location. The Zaramo ritual symbols themselves have long reflected this life-style. They are not tied to a specific territory or to a landmark. They can be adapted to different environments with the capacity to create social cohesion even in urban conditions. For example, the Zaramo and related groups use a symbol of a child made of wood or a gourd (mwana-nya-nhiti or mwana sesele) which is passed on in families. Originally these were larger clan or lineage symbols kept in a shrine

or a cave in the place of origin. With proper rites, a replica of these articles as well as of the shrines in which they originally were housed has made it possible to carry the symbols around and not to lose their symbolic meaning. Similarly the spirit shrines were reproduced.

Rituals are not thus tied to a location. At times people return to the village for rituals, at other times rituals are held right in town under a tree, in the yard or inside the house, depending on the conditions. The medicine man (*mganga*) adjusts to the situation. Where in the villages he might have interpreted the causes of illness as a manifestation of ruptured social relations between neighbours or kin, in the city the illness is interpreted in relation to coworkers and neighbours. Relatives living in villages invite more powerful medicinemen from the city to perform in the village rituals and a large number of the participants also come from there. All this provides the needed space for interpretation and action so that cultural values can be upheld (Swantz, L. 1990; Swantz , MLS, 1987).

These factors support the proposition that the coastal people have had a historically developed capacity to adjust their ritual life to their environmental conditions and to frequent external interventions while retaining the capacity to reproduce their social group. Their social values also have shown great resilience in the face of the loss of land.

Conclusion

It has been my intention to take up various aspects of the coastal people's lives which demonstrate that they have found ways to resist being subsumed by the wider society and thereby losing their own cultural and social identity. They have used the very same cultural means at their disposal in building their defenses, thereby creating flexible social institutions and values which give meaning and continuity to life. But their cultural institutions are if anything even stronger than those of the Zaramo.

I have shown that there has been basic inequality in the initial various confrontations between the villagers and those attempting to control them, whether they were the colonialists with their cotton planting schemes or the independent Government in its efforts to direct the "peasants" to a path of so-called "rational" development. The villagers have looked to their own strengths in facing these attempts at domination and have used what instruments they have at their disposal to resist and maintain social cohesion.

Many of the people living along the coast had never been great cultivators. They planted a few sticks of cassava and rice on small plots of land near their homes. They had a few coconut, mango and other fruit trees. Nevertheless, it is puzzling to witness villagers selling large portions of their land to wealthier city dwellers who were seeking additional sources of income to supplement their low incomes as employees.

Part of this can be explained by the fact that villagers believed they could benefit from the new resources which the newcomers brought to the villages. One also could explain the sale of land as part of a shift away from dependence on agriculture towards greater diversification of sources of income. The apparent lack of concern over preserving land that could be passed down as inheritance to one's children is perhaps the most difficult aspect of this phenomenon to comprehend, especially since land has been so key to preserving the continuity of the society. I believe the sale of land to cover the costs of maturity feasts, funerals or other festivities for the expressed reason to keep up with the ancestral obligations helps explain the Zaramo response to changes in land tenure. Social cohesion is maintained through land inheritance, but more importantly through ritual. The maintenance of family and kin obligations take precedence over land ownership in a situation where difficult choices need to be made. Their way of life has been threatened repeatedly by intrusions of world and local markets, and by the new agents of "development" representing the post-colonial state. In the face of these challenges they have had to devise various ways of maintaining social cohesion.

Since continuity is not solely grounded in land as the material basis for cultural and social life, it can be expressed and maintained in ritual terms. All principal symbolic concepts are drawn from the

body because reproduction is seen as forming the basis for social continuity. For the Zaramo reproduction takes precedence in importance over the imperatives of the market and of economic production, which are generally prioritized in industrial societies. The insistence on continuity in ritual instruction guarantees also continuity in given meanings and in common interpretation of symbols passed on to new generations.

They make use of commercial opportunities but do not determine their social action based on the demands of the market or the use of land for profit. The fact that people are forbidden from selling of land in ritually significant places, e.g.,. places of offering to ancestor spirits or spirit dwellings like ponds or thickets, further underscores the importance of maintaining this continuity with the past.

At the same time, local villagers' ability to sell land and do with it as they wish is an expression or assertion of the fact that they consider themselves to be the hosts of the coastal lands. Even without titles to land, the coastal people believe they have a symbolic right to the territory and a right to decide what happens on this land.

Finally, the sale of land is an expression of autonomy and resistance in the face of external attempts to control their way of life. In the 1980s the earlier grievances of the Villagization period were compounded by the economic crisis Tanzania faced, and criticism toward Government and Party leaders came from many quarters. Many felt the Party had abandoned its own stated principles. People continued to be pestered with too much "guidance" and too many orders from above by those who believed directed planning necessary because of the "peasants' ignorance." People in the villages, however, simply wished to be left alone. They complained that officers, planners and leaders only gave orders but did not come to the villages with the intention of interacting with the villagers in away that might facilitate greater cooperation.

The analyses of cultural spaces seen as forms of resistance reveal social situations in which people have, by the means of social convention, maintained their own cultural mode of life in order to oppose unwanted interventions by their rulers. Even when losing materially by resisting people leave open the option of creating their own forms of shared wealth.

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