Stating the Borders: A Discussion of Territoriality and State in the Peruvian Andes

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"We should abandon the state as a material object of study whether concrete or abstract while continuing to take the idea of the state extremely seriously... The state is, then, in every sense of the term a triumph of concealment. It conceals the real history and relations of subjection behind an a-historical mask of legitimating illusion... In sum: the state is not the reality which stands behind the mask of political practice. It is itself the mask..." (Abrams, 1988:75, 77, 82).

If we are to "take the idea of the state extremely seriously", as Abrams suggests, we need to avoid getting caught up in state legitimizing ideologies as to the naturalness or inevitability of state rule, permanence of their territories and fixity of their borders. To move away from instrumentalist and reified notions, we need to explore a series of "how" questions that shift the focus back and forth between state and society. How have states achieved physical and territorial presence, how have they taken on the authority to impose, coerce, persuade inhabitants of a particular territory to become subject-citizens and accept particular forms of governance and relations of ruling? In other words, we need to explore sovereignty and government as problematic territorial concepts. But to reach illuminating answers, it is imperative that we also ask how different social groups come to think about, imagine, react to states, get caught up in and become part of states as constituting and constitutive agents of state-forming processes.

In a volume on state formation and popular culture in Mexico, Joseph and Nugent (1994) came up with a title that subsequently caught on: "everyday forms of state formation". The formulation links James Scott's "everyday forms of peasant resistance" (1985), with Corrigan and Sayer's emphasis on the cultural revolution that accompanied the "formation of the English state" (1985), works that acknowledge the inspiration of social historian, E. P. Thompson. Under this line of enquiry, the state is explored not as a closed, abstract, omnipotent institution but as a series of processes and practices in which states are formed through day-to-day engagement in society.

States cannot assume either ready-made subjects/citizens or state-promoting agents, they have to strive to produce them. To do so they must adopt, co-opt, work through and rely on chains of representatives, agents, employees, underlings, only some of who are formally part of the state's military and bureaucratic orders. A great many others are not so reliable. Like "tricksters" they can change face, move across the notional division between state and society and blur their boundaries. Seen from the perspective of hegemony, then states need to open up channels, affiliate supporters and enrol agents who at least partially can be brought in to do the work of the state. This demands that states make their mark on profoundly cultural processes. States need to establish and authorise a common discursive framework and set out a hegemonic discourse or language that is articulated not only through words (statements of the state) but more importantly through its practices. These remind the populace of the presence of the state, by bringing into play "routines, rituals and institutions that 'work in us'" (Gilbert and Nugent, 1994:2).

The arguments concerning hegemony are familiar and persuasive. Nevertheless, they do not provide an entirely satisfactory answer as to "how" states first come into being and take the initial steps to rule over territories and populations. States still tend to be seen, a priori, as powerful institutions composed of "strong men", leaders who can impose their will. There are several reasons why the violent, coercive properties of states have been emphasised, either to laud the power of the state or to explain the weakness and failure of oppositions. Yet when one speculates on particular histories of state formation and takes an ex-centric view, that is one away from the centre or seat of state power, from the perspective of a province, then top-down relations of power, hegemony, coercion appear less clear-cut and more problematic. As Nugent (1997) has argued, at certain junctures, local "provincial" societies may be just as instrumental in bringing states into

existence. The apparatus and capacities of the state are needed to bring order and progress in the regions.

In this paper I want to focus on two themes in particular, territoriality and enrolment, that are constitutive and contested aspects of state formation. With the changing territoriality of states, I wish to open up the concept of social space, and see space as taking different forms and being vested with different meanings as domains, dominions, colonies and territories. With enrolment, I want to stress the dynamic, colonising aspects of political power, the way it is channelled, mediated and negotiated through the formation of networks that cross and blur boundaries between state and society.

I propose outlining three critical junctures in processes of state formation, taking as an example the Andean region of South America. The junctures can be visualised as encounters and inter-meshings between forms and relations of ruling which take shape and order space and society at different levels. The junctures I want to discuss stretch over a long time period starting in pre-colonial times. The first is between localised ethnic polities and imperial-colonial overlordships. The second is between the nationalisms imagined at local and continental planes. The third is between post-colonial provinces and the modern nation-state. Exploring these spatial-temporal junctures can raise very broad historical issues, so I shall try to limit and simplify the discussion by illustrating some of the processes involved by drawing on the history of Tarma, a province in the Peruvian Central Andes.

By what Processes have Territories Become States? Relations between Ethnic Polities and Imperial/colonial Overlordships

In exploring state formation over time, instead of trying to work with a normative idea of what should constitute a state, and define the historical juncture at which "the state" comes into being, one might start with a more open-ended question. How did specific ensembles of peoples (solidarities of family, kin, ethnic group), organising practices, ideas of destiny, myths and imaginings, coalesce into spatio-political entities? How did these ensembles take on a common culture and identity and how were these rooted and inscribed in territorial terms? To use David Harvey's (1985) phrase, by what processes do spatial "structured coherences" come into being? How do these

structured coherences reach sufficient depth, scope and scale so that ethnic polities, chieftainships, kingdoms, empires emerge?

Transforming localised, loosely structured coherences into institutionalised territorial identities entails the re-thinking and re-working of space and boundaries as well as the nature of political power. Some idea of enclosure is required so that a form of rule and myth of belonging comes to define territories and populations. In the distant past, once certain groups began to think of themselves as culturally distinct and as inhabiting a specific territory, then forces of competition and emulation were strong enough to ensure that groups living round about felt compelled to set up similar territorial arrangements. Proto-states did not emerge singly but in clusters. The study of state origins can have contemporary relevance, for one might learn more about state dissolution from understanding processes of state formation.

One can broaden this line of thought. Once we look behind the curtain of 19th century state formation and ideas of democracy as they developed in Europe and at the models arising from this history and experience utilised in the Americas, Asia and Africa, then we become aware of older, indigenous processes and practices of state formation that were never wiped out. The newly independent state was not a tabula rasa. If we are to understand post-colonial states and their current situation in a globalising world, we need to look at their emergence in the light of indigenous and colonial pasts. Both at a global and a national level, state formation reflects the constant interplay between ideas of governance produced at the centre and relations and practices of ruling experienced at the outer edges, in the peripheries.

States emerge out of particular forms of territorialised rule but the meaning of state-ness lies in the capacity of rulers and administrations to generate a common imagined geography in their territories. In his book "The production of Space", Henri Lefebvre (1991:31) set out to show how "the state and each of its constituent institutions call for spaces - but spaces which they can then organize according to their specific requirements". Although states strive to create their own space, they are unable to destroy existing practices, perceptions and representations of social space. These are pushed underground in the course of successive overlordships, colonisations and experiences of state rule. One needs to decode the landscape, become aware of the layers and superimpositions of social space. This is not an empty or academic exercise. For here one unearths subterranean social spaces which furnish meanings, significance and imaginations about identity, cultural process and oppositions. From this it follows that Lefebvre's notion of counter space, the space that

will not be absorbed in state-formation processes, carries with it memories of earlier landscapes transformed by myth and imagination.

Though Lefebvre illustrates his ideas of overlapping space in relation to European history, a parallel argument can be made for South America. Space in ancient societies was filled with magico-religious deities, malevolent and benevolent, male and female, that were linked to the earth and to the subterranean world of the dead. When local polities were conquered and drawn into empires, as under the Romans or the Incas, the new masters as religious and political leaders assigned certain spaces new roles and gave them new meanings. These spaces came to appear as transcendant, sacred, magical, cosmic. By designating particular spaces as sacred and others as cursed, and by planting settlements and buildings whose layout and architecture immediately linked them to the new rulers, the power of imperial states was demonstrated through a supremacy visible in the landscape.

Colonisation involves the expansion of particular kinds of actor networks. Along with the implanting of holy sites and administrative centres over territory come the priests and soldiers, administrators and traders, dealers of all kinds, who circulate round the new geographical points and hold them together. This image draws on the translation model of power Latour (1986) has proposed, where power is conceived as a consequence rather than a cause of action. Colonisers comprise a diffuse group, they do not work "as one man" nor are they in a position to impose their will on subordinates through force over longer periods of time. Instead we can suggest that the power of colonisers "results from the actions of a chain of agents, each of whom translates it in accordance with his/her own project" (Latour, 1986:264). Colonisation is about enrolling many kinds of actors in a given political and social scheme.

Let us now turn to explore ethnic polities and imperial/colonial overlordships in Andean society.

(i) The ethnic polity

In the Andean region, archaeological evidence and early Spanish reports suggest that the underlying spatially structured coherence was the ethnic polity. To simplify greatly, the ethnic polities that had emerged in the Andes by the 14th and 15th centuries were chiefdoms and kingdoms of varying territorial reach, the larger and more important of which straddled the Andes from east to west (Murra, 1975, 1978). Their territoriality arose through the polities' attempts to secure a wide range of resource niches in the

varied environments, from the dry Pacific coast, high mountains, temperate valleys, to the tropical lowlands of the Amazon basin. Heartlands of the polities (as in the case of Tarma) were often zones of temperate agriculture, at around 3,000 metres, with potato lands above and maize lands below. From there, families colonised an archipelago of outlying, not necessarily contiguous, resource zones. The borderlands of the polities in the marginal resource niches were places where resources were shared. Members of different groups lived side by side and their rights to resources might overlap. But people remained closely bound up with everyday culture, obligations, kin and social ties in their communities of origin. Apparently, ethnic groups were not in the habit of mingling or forming hybrid frontier societies. They carried the identity of the ethnic polity with them in their clothing, beliefs and organising practices.

When we try to understand the concept of territory in relation to the ethnic polity, it is important to underline two important characteristics. First, the outer borders of the polity were not fixed in space since territories were in the process of expansion or contraction depending on the success of resource colonisation. Second, as resource archipelagos, the territorial base resembled a string of beads with a larger bead (the ethnic heartland) at its centre, and was not a coherent spatial entity. This form of territorialisation was a clear response to a mountain ecology and had permitted population growth and considerable prosperity. In the Andes, spatial organisation was associated with a hierarchical, ordered society. Chiefs deployed families of colonists to the resource zones and these peasant colonists continued to serve their communities and their lords.

The ethnic polity of Tarma was never extensive and seems to have incorporated resource niches scattered over an area in the order of 10,000 square kms. From the heartland of temperate agriculture, families had access to the highland plains (at around 4,000 metres) and silver mines to the west, and sub-tropical valleys (at around 1,500 metres) to the east. But zones of Tarma's rich, maize-producing heartland were also being colonised and annexed by a neighbouring ethnic polity, highland Chinchaycocha. On the tropical margins to the east, Tarma families worked in the Vitoc valley and sent back coca, fruit, spices. Some families lived there more or less permanently, the majority moved up and down seasonally (and continued to do so for centuries, as Franciscan missionaries later recorded, Amich, 1975). In the heartland, land holding kin groups, "ayllus", were in command of the resources of particular river valleys and surrounding hill slopes. Thus at the level of the "ayllu", there was a correspondance between territory and social

group. Members of an "ayllu" lived dispersed but collectively formed a land-holding community, represented by leaders of proven abilities.

(ii) Inca overlordship

On top of the mosaic of self-sufficient, inter-penetrating ethnic polities, groups of warrior-colonisers had periodically thrown a loose overlordship. The Incas were an imperially-minded, technically able group from Cuzco, who (like their fore-runners the Wari in the 7th to 9th centuries) set out to dominate the ethnic polities using a mixture of force, religious persuasion and colonisation. The ethnic polity of Tarma lay north of the prosperous kingdom of the Huancas (which later allied with the Spanish against the Incas) and south of bellicose Chinchaycocha. The lords of Tarma had allied with Chinchaycocha to resist the Incas but succumbed to the forces of Inca Pachacutec in the 1400's. The region marked the northern limit of Inca overlordship for decades to come.

The Incas held their empire together by a sophisticated system of accounting, a network of roads and imperial buildings. Empires can be built without the invention of writing but not without accounts. The Incas did not write but they kept records of the goods stored in the provinces and received and distributed by the Inca using the "quipu", a bundle of knotted strings of different lengths and colours. They also counted and classified their subject populations. This led to a labelling of the "ayllu" kin-groups in accordance with a decimal system of accounting. The hierarchic labels stuck whether population numbers rose or fell, producing fictions that confused as much as they ordered. "Quipus" and goods were sent to and from Cuzco and the new provincial capitals using the new paved roads, bridges, "tambos" (midway posts/warehouses), and the services of fast-running messengers. The characteristic architecture of the buildings, massive stone-work and trapezoid apertures and their arrangement in space left no doubt as to their Inca builders.

With Inca overlordship, the lords of ethnic polities had to relinquish authority but colonisation was done subtly and had its compensations. Inca administrators, known as "orejones" on account of their elongated ear-lobes were visibly different. They positioned themselves in the politico-religious hierarchies of the polities, but at the same time by making ritually important goods more widely available, tended to uphold the local power of the ethnic lords. As colonisers, the Incas re-wrote history by entering the genealogies of local chiefs and they showed respect for local deities and shrines by bringing them into the Inca pantheon (Silverblatt, 1988). They re-

elaborated a dualistic territorialisation of power, whereby polities were governed by two lords (Rostworowski, 1983). Most importantly, they enroled chiefs and their subjects by engaging them in an elaborate system of reciprocities and redistributions in which prized goods (sumptuous textiles and young women) as well as more mundane goods in cases of need, were sent up and down the chiefly hierarchy (Spalding, 1984). Inca overlordship was marked by the circulation of ritual goods and by adherence to a common calendar. Thus participation in Inca practices of exchange came to demarcate the territory over which the Incas ruled. Exchanges, accompanied by great feasts and celebrations lasting several days, took place on fixed days in the year and were organised from a network of provincial centres. These were provincial in a new imperial sense, in that their locational logic now pertained to the web of territorial overlordship directed from Cuzco.

In Tarma, the Incas annexed lands and built a new centre and copious warehouses (at Tarmatambo) in a zone of relatively sparce population at a distance from the heartland. But the site was strategic on two counts for it lay on the main road from Cuzco to the north and stood guard over a sacred mountain. Land was bestowed on two new "ayllus" of Inca colonists, and the agricultural base expanded through Inca expertise in terracing and irrigation. The well-stocked warehouses fed the passing Inca armies; Cieza de Leon (1962:227) who passed through the region in 1547 spoke of Tarma's great store houses and rich agriculture. The Incas had settled in the upper moiety (Tarmatambo) while the lower moiety (Acobamba), the old heartland with its shrines, remained in the hands of the ethnic lord (Arellano, 1988).

Around each centre, "ayllus" provided goods to the lords and could be deployed to work on particular activities or in different regions. There was one intriguing feature of Inca rule, noted by historian, Karen Spalding (1984), which indicated the emergence of a new kind of state. Of the families deployed by Inca overlords to distant regions, some continued to be part of the polity/province's resource archipelago and sent goods back, but others were sent much further away. Colonists ("mitmaq") in garrison settlements on the frontiers of empire or those sent to exploit particular resources directly served the Inca state. In Tarma, colonists sent by the Inca to mine salt deposits (at San Pedro de Cajas) were linked to distant Cuzco, not Tarma, and under the Spanish they were able to re-negotiate their privileged position by winning exemption from the hated forced labour in the mercury mines of Huancavelica.

Had there been no Spanish invasion, a growing numbers of colonists might have been enrolled and integrated into a state system. They could have broken free of their ethnic loyalties and dependence on lords who mediated

between polity and imperial state and become a new kind of citizen. As it was, the Spanish halted this process of indigenous state formation, imposed new concepts of territory, enrolment and colonisation. Nevertheless, as Alberto Flores Galindo (1994) has eloquently argued, an imagination of the Inca past and mythification of Inca practices lived on in a subterranean way, as a constant counterpoint and critique of all that was suffered and experienced by Andean peoples under Spanish colonial rule. Thus one Andean landscape, an untamed, oppositional, counter-state, a space that could not be absorbed into alien state-forming projects remained a thorn in the flesh for colonial and post-colonial technicians of government. It was rooted in the imagery of a glorious Inca past.

(iii) Spanish rule

The military and religious orders sent out from Spain to colonise the Americas cut off the head of the Inca state but sought to continue their overlordship and webs of control in which the Incas had enmeshed the ethnic polities. The Spanish, despite their later claims, were not inventive as imperialists or colonisers and they started out by adapting techniques of territorial control and enrolment from the Incas, using them according to their own very different mentality, and in ways that produced very different outcomes.

The Spanish implanted their own symbols of overlordship on the landscape through the replication of the colonial town. Towns were built according to directives set out in official statutes that determined their orderly lay-out and precise functions. The church, gaol, barracks and house of the colonial representative enclosed an imposing central space, the plaza de armas, where religious processions and military parades would be staged. The square replaced the trapezoid as the mark of overlordship in the landscape. The church struggled to convert the indigenous and campaigned against "Indian" idolatry. But they had to concede to sycreticism and settle for superimposing christian holy sites on pre-colonial shrines and places of pilgrimage (such as in the miraculous appearance of "El Senor" at Muruhuay, the most important shrine of the Tarma heartland). The new rulers also entered local chiefly genealogies, though this time through the marriage of some Spanish men with women of noble indigenous birth and widespread concubinage.

The economic rationale for the colonial state was to mine precious metals and ship bullion back to Spain. To service this colonial export mining economy, the Spanish insisted on a much more demanding system of tribute and labour deployment which was stitched onto the pre-existing obligations

of the "ayllus". But reciprocities were lacking. Spanish rule was accompanied by violence, brutality and disease, the indigenous population being decimated by European diseases to which they had no resistance. The colonised population was trapped in a vicious circle. As numbers dwindled, so survivors were forced to work ever harder for the Spanish overlords and could not maintain their agricultural practices or their command over their archipelagos of resources.

On June 27, 1534, the "Indians" of Tarma-Chinchaycocha under Tapraq, their Inca lord, were given as a grant ("encomienda") to don Anselmo de Riquelme, by the conquerors on behalf of the Spanish Crown (Arellano, 1988). The "encomendero" undertook to instruct his Indians in the articles of the Holy Catholic faith and the grant was to form the basis of the colonial administrative entity, the "corregimiento". Later Tarma became a province ("repartimiento"), comprising the old ethnic polity, and was handed over to the guardianship of don Lorenzo de Estupinán y Figueroa. At the same time the church was creating territories, "doctrinas" (parishes) on the basis of the "ayllus" and communities that had been enumerated and listed by the Incas. As Arellano (1988:60) argues: here "we see once more how the Spanish accommodated themselves to the demarcations they found".

Under Spanish colonisation, two sets of overlapping territorial division were imposed: by the church and by the state. Territory took on a new physicality. Colonial space could be carved up and tidied up, re-formed into contiguous, coherent territories, given firmer borders as a way of demarcating the domains of government. Through an ordering of territory, inspired by emerging concepts of property, the lands of "ayllus" and communities became defined, documented, registered and fixed. Similarly, lands bestowed by the Crown on Spanish settlers as "haciendas" also went through a process of greater territorial definition. The result was a massive effort at legalising and codifying colonial space. This was a process that laid the framework for contests and struggles that would be carried out through the law over titles and rights to land for centuries to come.

In 1542, the Spanish founded a "pueblo de espanoles", Santa Ana de Pampas, at a site mid-way between the Inca capital and the old heartland in Tarma.. A few years later, Santa Ana, was re-designated a "reducción de indios" in line with the reforms instituted by Viceroy Toledo to concentrate the indigenous population in larger (more manageable) settlements. Thus from the outset, both Spanish and Indian populations (from the "ayllus" attached to the upper moiety of Tarmatambo) were obliged to reside in the colonial town. This gave the town a quite different social fabric from colonial administrative outposts under other colonial regimes. There was probably, in

practice, no mass movement of the indigenous population into town, but it offered new perspectives to the local and Inca elites, as each of the seven "ayllus" now possessed their own space in the Spanish town.

Tapraq, the Inca lord of Tarma, had resisted Spanish colonisation at first but he later made deals with the new overlords. Recognised to be of noble birth, he held onto his position and authority. This noble family settled in the colonial town, became integrated into Spanish society, and changed their name to Calderon de Vargas Kanchaya (Arellano, 1988). This move from pre-hispanic nobility to Spanish subject was not an isolated case. In her careful reconstruction of the early Spanish period, Carmen Arellano (1988:137) finds that: "The indigenous elite of Tarma gradually stopped being Indian and went over to being creole or Spanish during the 18th century." One can see here how the penetration of the Spanish colonial state into the provinces entailed not just the positioning of a handful of Spanish representatives. It had involved the active enrolment and eventual absorption of the indigenous nobility into the ranks of Spanish/mestizo society, a blurred category during the early colonial period. Later, this process became sensitive and hidden, touching as it did on issues of sexuality and ancestry as well as confounding the ideology elaborated as to a "sociedad de castas", in which marriage unions across divisions of "race" were disallowed. Through this form of affiliation, the indigenous elite took on the identity and attributes of the coloniser. Their interests were translated, at least partially, into those of the Spanish colonial state.

Under Spanish rule, the principle of primogeniture was introduced and this conflicted with the Andean tradition of electing the most able to positions of leadership. This had the effect of allowing other, lower-ranking chiefly families to accumulate wealth and power and move into new positions in the racial-social scale. They moved into the colonial town and took on higher status as mestizos, who were not liable for tribute or forced labour obligations. Increasingly, these families distanced themselves from indigenous society. These new Spanish and mestizo groups were enlisted as functionaries of the Spanish state, encharged with collecting tribute and organising demands for labour from the old "ayllus", now re-named "barrios". These men knew how to manage the mechanisms of Andean political control, as a result the wealth and order of the colonial state came to depend on them. Yet they were always a risky element.

(iv) The late Colony

By the end of the colonial period, Tarma province had a population of some 35,000 people. A census levied in 1792 suggests that a comparatively high proportion of Tarma's population were mestizo (Arellano, 1988). For the province as a whole, 38% of the population was registered as mestizo, compared to 54% as Indians and 8% as Spanish. However, there was variation: in the temperate valleys there was roughly an equal percentage of mestizos and Indians (48% and 49% respectively), and only 2.35% were Spanish, the tiny remainder being negroes. The situation in the highland mining region was different: there, the Spanish numbered over 9% of the population, 62% were classed as Indians, and only 28% mestizos. An earlier list of tribute payers (of 1722) further suggests that there had been extensive population movement during the colonial period. Only 13% of the indigenous population of the "barrios" surrounding Tarma town (formerly Santa Ana) were classed as "originarios", whose forebears had been members of the "ayllus" at the start of the Spanish colony. The characteristics of Tarma's population reflected partly the nature of the colonial economy and partly the way indigenous families had become enrolled in Spanish colonial society. But although many originating in the indigenous population had found a new social position, their hybrid ancestry was at the same time denied through the colonial ideology of "racial" purity and segregation.

When the Bourbon reforms in Spain brought the high-ranking colonial official, don Juan Maria de Galvez y Montes de Oca, to Tarma as Intendent in 1784, he considered Tarma a miserable, uncultured place (Arellano, 1984). His choice of words referred less to the aesthetics of the place as the preponderance of its Indian-looking inhabitants. In a report to his superiors about Tarma's condition and possibilities for development, Galvez argued for various kinds of reform. Serious attention should be given to stopping Indians wasting valuable time and money in drinking and protect them from corrupt traders. They could greatly increase agricultural output. A town council ("cabildo") should be established for citizens to take action for the public good, and a new cemetery built outside the town to stop the risk of infection from dead bodies. One can sense from the report that the Intendent, as part of Spain's new modernising broom and as a bearer of new ideas from Europe, would be an unwelcome and unpopular meddler in provincial affairs. The improvements demanded by colonial officials recently arrived from Spain tended to be invigorate ideas of nationalism, revolution and independence.

What Kind of Territories are Imagined by Nationalism? From Colonial Dependency to Nation State

Benedict Anderson (1991) has argued that two kinds of attachment had developed amongst the population of Spanish origin during the colonial period in South America. The upper ranks of the colonial administration and church, staffed by Spaniards who had come out from Spain, were expected to be spatially mobile. They held colonial territories together by frequent visiting and rotation of posts in far-flung provinces. This contrasted with the circumscribed spatial movement of many "creoles", those of Spanish ancestry who carried the blemish (in colonial eyes) of having been born in the colonies, and the integrated indigenous elite, who were barred from office in the colonial regime. However, creole-mestizo society was increasingly literate and the printed word was facilitating the formation from Mexico to Patagonia of a common identity building on a common sense of grievance and purpose. This resulted, according to Anderson (1991:62) in "the well-known doubleness in early Spanish-American nationalism, its alternating grand stretch and particularistic localism". Aspirations for independence were continental in scope but attachments functioned at the level of the province.

The idea of nationalism's continental-local duality can be taken a step further. In the aftermath of the Wars of Independence, neither continental aspirations nor provincial attachment corresponded to the scale adopted by the post-colonial state. Early state-building attempts in post-colonial Spanish America were a fiàsco. The Liberators, who in the 1820's had led victorious armies against Spain and made deals with European states wanting to expand their trade with a "free" Latin America, had tried to institute a federated post-colonial America. But the huge proto-states quickly broke apart, not surprisingly fracturing into a set of territorial units that had previously been colonial administrative entities. But after the withdrawal of the Spanish colonial administrators, the spatiality at this proto "national" scale was not particularly meaningful to populations like that of Tarma, whose structured coherence remained bound to the provincial level. Post-colonial populations had no particular shared identity at the new national level nor did they possess practical experience of governing at a national scale. The pivotal event in Peru that laid bare the lack of popular imagination as to the integrity of the nation state was the War of the Pacific (1879-1884) when "national" sentiments could barely be rallied to throw out the more nationally-conscious Chilean invaders.

Nationalism formulated as the galvaniser of anti-colonial struggle pre-dated the formation of nation states and initially could not be easily tied up with the new independent state's efforts at transforming former colonial territories into national sovereignties. State nationalism had to be built up and fostered, from above and below, but this process in Latin America was sporadic and partial and did not obliterate earlier visions and utopias as to the moral state, from the perspective of the province. Versions of popular nationalism continued to be elaborated and to matter. They could rally and politicise provincial populations. Popular nationalism would remain outside the reach of the state, its invocation providing an undercurrent of unrest, opposition and political turbulence for the state to deal with for years to come.

Nationalism thus provided a second main source of myth and imagination for Andean peoples and could be coupled with the mythologised image of the Inca past in making demands for a more fair, reciprocating, redistributing state. As Thurner (1997) has noted the Creole elite of the capital did not turn to the myths of the Incas in order to articulate a shared identity for the new Peruvians. This was undoubtedly due to the very real threat posed by the subordinate though rival Andean indigenous elite reproduced under colonial rule who could lay "a stronger and demonstrably threatening claim to that legacy" (Thurner, 1997:9).

How do Modern States Extend Sovereignty over Territory? From Provincial to Centralist Relations of Ruling

New models of statehood and political ideals, not least the quest for democracy, developed in Europe at a time when the principle of hierarchical subordination of subjects to rulers was gradually giving way to the principle of territoriality, where spatial boundaries defined inclusion/exclusion. The political models and ideals, along with ideologies of inevitability and destiny that tended to accompany them, came to be studied and transferred to parts of the world struggling out of colonialism. This was the kind of state that victors of Latin America's Wars of Independence fought to establish in the 1820's.

The transfer of European ideas was not as mechanistic as some commentators now like to claim. Whether we are talking about the nationalists of Spanish America or India, considerable legal-constitutional

expertise had been built up prior to independence. In the case of India, as Chatterjee (1999:1) writes:

> "this was shown most elaborately in that remarkable document of Indian legal ingenuity - the Indian constitution - whose every little part was designed and fitted together after elaborate comparative assessments of designs culled from at least a dozen constitutional systems from a dozen different countries."

A century earlier, South Americans had looked round for inspiration for their national constitutions. But they rejected the fusty political ideas of the old colonial power and opted instead for an amalgam of French, British, and Anglo-American ideals with the aim of promoting liberalism, progress and modernity in the independent countries. It was the task of the new nation state to overthrow colonial concepts and reform and transmit more appropriate ideas about society and territory. But compared to the vast archives left by the Spanish and ideas of social engineering, the newly independent state of Peru took time to produce maps and descriptions; lists and registers; national histories and heroes. For more than a century after Independence, central administrations were barely able to reach, let alone govern, the provinces.

(i) Provincial government

In the process of re-organising society after independence, local government was placed at first virtually by default in the hands of Provincial Councils that were elected into office by the literate male population. From 1873, with the Law of Municipalities Councils had the capacity to levy taxes to pay for education, health, infrastructure, and improvement. The taxes imposed at the provincial level emphasised territoriality, and were out-of-key with the liberal philosophy of the constitution, in that they tended to penalise and restrict movement in space. The most important taxes for Tarma's Provincial Council were those levied on people, animals and goods crossing bridges ("pontazgo") and crossing provincial territory ("peaje") and on non-essential consumption goods (chiefly alcohol) brought for sale to the market place in Tarma town ("mojonazgo"). With these funds, Tarma Council paid for schools and teachers, public health measures (such as vaccinations), piped drinking water, transitable roads, public works, public lighting and the ornamentation of the town. The Tarma Council was usually manned by European immigrants

and local mestizos. But these were inexperienced men in matters of government.

The Mayors of Tarma sent a stream of letters to ministries in Lima throughout the 19th century. Above all they requested juridical advice as to the changing legal situation of the Indian and land after the colony. They requested adjudication of the political fights that flared up constantly with the rival political authority, the Prefect and his chain of command appointed to look after the interests of the state. Contrary to recent theorising, the provinces were not yet dominated nor subdued by a state intent on fashioning a national project. Instead, a nation-state was being brought into existence partly as a result of pressures from below, from the mass of correspondence from the provinces that landed on desks in Lima and demanded that the shaky central administration take the business of national government seriously. The Peruvian state in the 19th century was not enrolling in the provinces. Rather provinces like Tarma were experiencing a cultural and political renaissance when left to their own devices and were trying to breathe life into the state.

The Provincial Councils were to be disappointed. Responses from Lima ministries were a long time in arriving and rarely did the state bureaucracy take much note of the specificity of local situations. At the end of the 19th century, inspectors were sent from the Ministry of Government to report on the workings of local government in the provinces. In the case of Tarma, inspectors concerned themselves purely with petty technicalities and with formal breaches of the complex legislation governing election procedures. Reports ended with swinging attacks on the short-comings of the Provincial Council, declaring that so fine a flower as democracy could never be expected to flourish in such outlandish soil. Such an assessment and conclusion illustrated the beginnings of a process whereby the central state administration discredited, and sought to bring to heel unruly provincial government.

(ii) Re-configuring the colonial Indian

One of the most pressing subjects debated in Tarma's local newspapers from the late 19th century and in the correspondence of the Mayors, was the place of the "Indian" in post colonial society. It is through the optic of this debate that one can trace the emergence of a new provincial identity in which an energetic local nationalism and vision of progress was compared to the failure of the state.

Letters written by the Tarma Mayors in the 1860's (the earliest documents in the municipal archive) show how men from the local ruling elite

struggled at first to express an emancipatory, post colonial view with regards to the Indian. Old colonial labels that depicted Indians in double negative terms, as violent and unruly and as miserable and ignorant were discarded. The new labels were conscientiously de-racialising. Mayors wrote about Indians as their fellow countrymen ("paisanos"), individuals ("individuos"), people ("gente"), citizens ("ciudadanos"). Mayors criticised those who still talked about Indians as objects ("objectos") or things ("cosas"). Instead, Indians should be considered as masses of the people ("masas de ese pueblo") and as people like us ("nuestros semejantes"). Even so, the Mayors were reluctant to do more than indulge in a change of names. With population growth and new demands for urban infrastructure, the town had become even more dependent on the local system of forced labour ("mita de plaza"), whereby families from the surrounding "barrios" were obliged to deliver foodstuffs and construction materials and to give regular labour service in the town. There was at the time, as the Mayors pointed out, no market in existence through which these goods could be bought or labour engaged.

After the euphoria and soul-searching following independence, one finds in the Mayors' correspondence the return to a more paternalistic discourse in the 1870's. The municipal authority strove to portray itself as the true protector and representative of the Indian, thereby legitimating the town's continued overlordship of indigenous labour and resources. In letter after letter, racial distinctions were emphasised. Indigenous people were said to belong to "an abject and downtrodden race"[26]; to have suffered "horrible despotism" in the past, be in need of "measures to lead to their elevation and ennobling"[27]. Or in a more detailed rendering:

> "the unfortunate indigenous race which is capable of producing such immense benefits must be freed from absurd, ancient abuses. The unhappy Indian is forced to serve as 'pongo' (unpaid servant) in the personal service of persons clearly opposed to the practical application of the noble thought of bringing an end to the causes of the Indians' wretchedness, a people who are still plunged into unspeakable ignorance and disgraceful misery notwithstanding our brilliant civilisation which we believe we possess". [28]

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[26] Municipal Archive, Tarma (MAT): 1876, August 16, Mayor Munoz to Prefect.

[27] MAT: 1878, Mayor Exhelme to Prefect.

[28] MAT: 1880, August 16, Mayor Beraun to Prefect

However, the letters taking this tone were all written to the same recipient, the Prefect. This suggests that we are dealing here with a specific public discourse, with a way of labelling in which the identity of the letter's recipient determines the discourse used. In other words, a discourse of indigenous victimisation was being re-constructed for use in political conflicts, in this case in relation to the rivalries between political adversaries in the town, the municipal and political authorities. The discourse of "the Indian" was abstracted from the practices and experiences of indigenous people.

(iv) Protecting Indians from the state

The re-configured paternalistic discourse was already in play when in the 1890's the municipal authority sought to protect indigenous inhabitants of the province from abuses by the central state. The Peruvian state, working through the Prefects and their chains of command, first became a physical presence in the central Andes in the guise of recruiters of indigenous labour. The most pressing need was to recruit indigenous men into the army for defeat by Chile in the War of the Pacific meant that greater attention had to be paid to the defence of the realm. In the second place, the state was employing wealth gained through its monopoly of guano exports to provide a national infrastructure. The highest railway line in the world was constructed using indigenous and Chinese coolie labour, and trails were opened to stimulate the settlement and development of the Amazon jungle. These turned out to be extremely costly projects, verging on the surreal, where massive physical difficulties would be overcome by a modernising spirit but by turning a blind eye to loss of life and great hardships suffered by those coerced into sacrificing themselves to the national effort. Thirdly, the state began to act in collusion with foreign mining companies who were acquiring mines in the central highlands, by helping them contract and discipline labour. In other words, the central state appeared in the central Andes as an extractor of indigenous labour and as a rival to the interests of local hacendados and municipal authorities also in need of a captured labour supply to work their properties and modernise their town.

The most eloquent rhetoric as to the wretchedness of the Indian appears in letters sent by Mayors to the ministries in Lima. At the end of the 1890's, the letters of protest reached a crescendo in an effort to stop the activities of state-supported labour contracting agencies ("enganchadores"). To take one example, Adolfo Vienrich, a leading, socialist intellectual who on two occasions had been elected Mayor, wrote passionately against the practice of labour contracting and debt servitude. Indigenous men were being contracted to

work on the infamous Pichis Trail, that traversed a region of dense lowland jungle in the Amazon basin. It was hailed as the missing link in the state's plan to connect Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. Vienrich wrote in 1897:

> "The yearning for civilisation ennobled by the sentiment of humanity is both the motive and object of actions taken by the Provincial Council of Tarma in support of the unfortunate indigenous class." (But this was thwarted due to the contracting of workers for the Pichis Trail.) "The result is an incredible slavery because it is rare that the poor indigene can dispose of the liberty of his person and his actions and thus, one can add, the ignorance and shame of the clamorous inhumanity on the Pichis Trail. The Pichis which for lovers of the country's progress involves spectacular hopes has been converted for the unfortunate indigenes into a threat of suffering and death ... The passive character and sacrifice of the indigenes of the province are exploited to the full through the extremes of cruelty and desperate consequences of the system in which they are placed with respect to the Pichis". [29]

A dramatic discourse of indigenous victimisation was brought into play by the municipal authorities in their struggle against the state to protect indigenous workers and keep them within the province. State agents were considered abusive, marauding outsiders and provincial society appeared to close ranks. The inflated rhetoric of Indian immiseration became a kind of discursive buffer whose motive was not so much to patronize the Indian as to protect the integrity of local social and political relations and provincial autonomy against the actions of an interfering state.

By the 1910's, a new note was being struck in provincial public debate. Articles began to appear in Tarma newspapers reflecting a new racist discourse and blaming the state for the Indians' lack of citizenship rights, civil liberties and civic education. The state had not only enslaved Indians but furthermore had failed to make good its promise at the time of independence of providing progress and civilisation to all Peruvians. As a result, Indians were ignorant and exploited, victims who knew no better than to support their abusive patrons. Incorporated into this public discourse was a cluster of concepts: nationalism, progress, culture, domestication, sex roles, education. With respect to each one, the message given was that it was up to the province to accomplish what the state was failing to do.

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[29] MAT: 1897, February 24, Mayor Vienrich to Dirreccion General de Gobierno.

The newspaper "El Imparcial" dedicated many articles to rescuing the Indian. A sample of this new discourse can be seen in the following extract. "For the future and prosperity of the nation, education is essential for the indigenous race still living in semi-savagery" and the task of the pro-indigenist movement locally was "to protect, instruct and remove Indians from the state of barbarousness to which they are subjected". It followed that "the only way to raise the indigenous race from degeneration is through the education of women". For there was no doubt that "the fall of the Indian was essentially due to the ignorance of the woman, and the brutalised state in which she lives"[30]. This in turn meant that indigenous women had to be "located in the proper role for which she has been created; that is to say, to dedicate herself exclusively to carrying out tasks proper to her sex and not those destined for the man"[31].

This elaborated discourse about Indian barbarity and need of education was being promoted in Tarma precisely at a time when the demand for indigenous wage labour was increasing. "Capitalistas yanquis" were expanding their mining activities and had constructed a central refinery at Smelter, on the western margins of Tarma province. Though local newspapers might rail against the iniquitous system of labour contracting, mine work was being reimbursed with higher wages than any other work in the province and the mining centres were providing expanding markets for locally produced foodstuffs, alcohol and pack animals. The indigenous economy flourished and incomes from the mines were used to modernise the indigenous "pueblos". Once again, activities by outsiders were robbing local property owners and the town of indigenous labour and the image of Indian backwardness totally at odds with the changes underway.

(v) The encroaching state

At the end of the 19th century, the Lima Ministries were making sporadic, fragmented attempts to intervene in the government of the provinces. But apart from making an elaborate census, the renewal of state interest and activity in the case of the central Andes, skipped over the highlands and was concentrated on the re-colonisation of the frontier of tropical lowlands. This region had been "lost" to the Spanish colonial state as a result of the uprising of Juan Santos Atahualpa in the mid 18th century. From then on, Tarma had been a province, complete with military outposts marking the edge of

[30] El Imparcial, Tarma, 1910, November 7

[31] ibid

civilisation. In the mid 19th century, Tarma won state support to make military expeditions into the lowlands, clear out the indigenous inhabitants and take possession of the lands. In the colonisation of the Chanchamayo, the state sponsored the surveying and titling of lands and made an effort to attract settlers of European ancestry, by giving them assisted passages to Peru, so that they would colonise - and civilise - the jungle.

For Tarma, the state-sponsored activity going on in the eastern margins was a boon and a bane. Commodity production, first alcohol and then coffee, added greatly to provincial prosperity, not least in providing new possibilities for raising municipal taxes. But with the inflow of immigrants, including Europeans who were dismissive and disrespectful of provincial authorities and Chinese ex-coolie settlers who ignored them completely, the tropical part of Tarma province became increasingly difficult to manage. European immigrants complainted constantly to the Lima ministries about the inefficiencies and illegalities of Tarma's local government. Modernising entrepreneurs, in mining zones as well as tropical areas, pressured the central state to get rid of local government and curtail the powers and activities of the Provincial Council which they found so irritating.

During the first half of the 20th century, in a piece-meal fashion the administration of the central state progressively took government out of local hands. The scope of Tarma's Provincial Councils was persistently eroded as the province lost control over tax-collecting, road-building, education, and representation of indigenous society. The erosion of local government capacities became particularly strong during the dictatorship of Leguia (1919-1930), when a state-nationalist discourse was promoted, local elections suppressed and a ruling oligarchic clique put in control of the truncated Provincial Council. Robbed of political influence and power, oppositional groups in Tarma had to tackle questions of local identity and autonomy in other ways and along other channels. A new interest was generated amongst local intellectuals in local culture and in re-elaborating popular nationalism outside the control of the state.

Yet the state's project of extending government and sovereignty in the empty space between capital and frontier was to remain partial and unfinished for decades. Only in the mid 1960's, was the state forced to react on account of mounting political unrest in the Andean region where thousands of peasants joined invasions and movements to reclaim their lands, demand education and end servile labour. The army stepped in, staged a coup in 1968, and set up a reformist military government. The military promised to involve the masses in the political process and end their marginalisation.. Despite the stress put on democracy, popular participation and equitable reform, the

actual structure of power established by the regime was the antithesis of its own discourse. The military rulers set up a highly centralised and arbitrary form of government. Prefects were given monopoly over the state political apparatus in the provinces, and free reign to govern according to their own prerogatives, without interference from elected politicians. But the main vehicles through which the state entered into everyday life were a sweeping land reform and an education reform. Neither turned out to give the government or the populace what they wanted.

Local land reform offices working directly for the state were put in charge of expropriating and re-allocating the large landed properties, haciendas. Most of the old landed families left, rather thankfully, for a more comfortable life in Lima. The reformed properties became co-operatives and were put under state-appointed administrators, to the great resentment of their peasant populations who demanded direct control and rights to land. Where peasant movements had staged their own land distributions, the military moved in to impose a state-directed reform. The education reform continued an effort already started to open more secondary schools, training colleges and universities in the Andean region. But misguided attempts to impose payments (for children who had to re-sit their exams) and control the curricula of the teachers produced violent reactions. What the military regime failed to control, or even see danger in, was the mounting dissent in the universities where students from the provinces were presented with a simplified, accessible version of dogmatic Marxism, which purported to provide scientific truths as to the inevitability of the revolutionary future.

The mis-managed authoritarian reforms of the military regime and the violent reaction it helped provoke with the rise of the Maoist Shining Path party, were experiences that bear some resemblance to Lefebvre's view of the modern state as violently imposing sovereignty. What the state sought, according to Lefebvre, was the production of a new kind of social space, 'abstract space". He defined this as: "a space where a centralized power sets itself above other power and eliminates it; where a self-proclaimed 'sovereign' nation pushes aside any other nationality, often crushing it in the process; where a state religion bars all other religions; and where a class in power claims to have suppressed all class differences" (Lefebvre, 1991:281).

As in Europe, the state's production of space in Peru cloaked violence with rationality. The force involved in bringing the state into the provinces was obscured through the use of terms such as popular participation, anti-imperialism, education and agrarian reform. But compared to much of Western European history, the military state in Peru was not adept at enrolling support in the provinces. New employees of the state in Tarma

province tended to come from the coast, and this even included administrators of the reformed haciendas, who quickly lost all credibility with the peasantry through their ignorance of farming in the demanding Andean environment. Most damaging of all, the state lost support amongst the largest group of its employees, the school-teachers, and finally was forced to retreat in the face of insurrection in the highlands during the 1980's. The opposition to the state provoked a dirty-war by the military. Though the subversives that took on the state have been labelled Maoists, as some have pointed out their political views interwove a particularly Andean form of dialectics and popular nationalism.

In the current phase of state expansion now underway, in the post conflict period, President Fujimori, has perhaps hit a chord in the Andean discourse of reciprocity with his "government through public works". State provision of buildings and infrastructure that signify modernity and citizenship, from schools to sewers, finally are registering both the concern of the state and its apparent understanding of popular demands. But the price of constructing a new landscape that proclaims the presence of the modern state in the Andes is high. The shoddy, tacky structures built by the state at a rapid pace, the surveillance, the suppression of political dialogue and continued subordination of provincial government are reminders of the deeply undemocratic state of the state in contemporary Peru.

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